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THE PROJECTION OF LANGUAGE
by
Tanya Whitehouse
B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
Language is one of the most pervasive and yet mysterious of human activities. It
is our tool for so much of human life that it (and our ability to acquire it) can miss the
attention it deserves. Yet it raises profound and timeless philosophical questions, such as
whether or to what extent it is “natural”; how it may connect with our neurobiology and
our experiences; how it began; and how we use and change it, and the role elements of
human consciousness, such as intention, play in such processes. In this dissertation, I
consider the question of how we project words into new contexts. I rely on the
contemporary work of such philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, but
particularly Stanley Cavell, to consider this question. I outline the aspects of their
philosophy that inform such an investigation, especially Cavell’s “projective
imagination,” which, he argues, is what we use when we project words forward. I give
an account of this imaginative aspect of human life, enlarging on Cavell’s account. I
explain how it works and why it can be called “imaginative,” and I provide examples of
language use that support my interpretation of language projection. I also argue that the
projection of language is analogous, in many respects, to our use of metaphor. This
explanation constitutes my contribution to original research. My primary conclusions are
as follows: these philosophers have provided better avenues to the exploration of
language than recent, previous efforts in the philosophy of language (for various reasons,
including their treatment of context and intention); the imagination is functioning much
more widely and in more complex ways in our use of language (and doubtless other areas
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of human life) than has hitherto been recognized; and the timeless, fascinating process of
language projection, borne out by the centuries of change we see in our languages, is not
occurring because we operate with language according to determinate rules.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF PROJECT
How do we project words into new contexts? On what resources of mind and
language do we rely when we do this? Take our English word, “feed.” It dates to before
900 C. E.; it is rooted in Old and Middle English. Why did we eventually come to use a
word for the act of nourishment for the process of putting coins in parking meters,
centuries after use of the word began? Will we continue to make such moves in
language? Is language a rule-bound endeavor that guarantees there are fixed ways to do
this? And what do philosophers working in this area have to say on these matters?
Some philosophers suppose we can trace this process back to our mental acts of
will, to the way in which we intend certain meanings, including language meanings.
Some are inclined to think we have no say in the process of projecting words—certain
rules of language, which control our very ability to use it, shape the direction our
language takes. Perhaps there is a third possibility, one that recognizes that intention
plays a role in our use of language; regularities of meaning and context do as well
(though we should be careful to call such regularities “rules” without qualifying what,
exactly, we mean by “rules”); but the characteristics of words themselves also play a
determinative role in what we can mean by them and what we can do with them.
The first two ideas have been historically influential philosophical views about
how we can mean in our languages and how languages operate. But they are naïve and
misleading ways of thinking about language. We might suppose that meaning is
completely determined by individual intention, so that what we mean in any case is
completely up to us and determined by our individual acts of will. Philosophers of
language influenced by H. P. Grice’s work in the field (and his emphasis on the
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constitutive role of intention in communication) have taken views along these lines. Or,
at the other extreme, we might think of language as a rigid, rule-bound calculus, so that
what we can mean is determined absolutely by fixed rules of some kind that allow no
innovation or change. For example, philosophers of language and logicians have
espoused a “structuralist” picture of language, recent philosophical dissatisfaction with
which Paul Livingston traces in his work.
The third view is proposed as an improvement on these two, and, in this project,
makes use of the projection of language as a unique avenue of language use in which we
can see intention, regularities, and word-meanings playing constitutive roles in this
uniquely human activity. I argue that Stanley Cavell’s (and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s)
appeal to projective imagination is a way we can avoid the two misleading views with the
appeal to “what we would say when.” That makes our understanding and projection of
language into a kind of self-knowledge that is also appropriate for critical thinking about
our culture and larger social lives. This dissertation is about how this works.
This investigation reveals much about the nature of language and the role
intention plays within its development and continuation. It also reveals something about
ourselves and our forms of life; for one thing, imagination is playing a much more
profound role in our use of language than has been generally recognized. I challenge the
idea that language is primarily dependent upon consciously controlling intentional states
or immutable language rules. Instead, projection is deeply influenced by our swift
imaginative engagement with the perceptual inputs surrounding us. In developing my
exposition, I rely on the contemporary work of Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and especially
Cavell, who provides an account of the “projective imagination” meant to illustrate how
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we move language into new contexts. I focus primarily on what these philosophers have
to say in their work regarding language, intention, and imagination. In the course of this
analysis, I demonstrate that these three contemporary philosophers hold views of
language that could be characterized as essentially pragmatic, as that term has been used
in the philosophy of language: they recognize the importance our learning, imagination
and judgment, and the various contexts in which we use communication all have on our
fundamentally important human use of language. This is particularly clear in their
treatment of intention, as well as in Austin’s analysis of how words are not just speech;
they can actually do things. I also illustrate the fact that intention is not the sort of mental
act that can necessarily control human phenomena like words. Instead, as G. E. M.
Anscombe describes, it is a diffuse and complex aspect of thought that takes various
guises, answering to a description of “what we are doing,” which will vary (as will our
awareness of it) from case to case.
Outline of Philosophical Research
I begin by providing a summary of the work of Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Austin,
and Cavell, focusing on their discussion of these issues about the nature and structure of
language, intention, and linguistic production. This summary will inform the discussion
to follow.
In the course of the review of this literature, I explicate Cavell’s views on
intention and the way he uses the work of Austin and Wittgenstein to support his views. I
examine how his view of the way we acquire and use language is related to his
understanding of intention, and I describe two views of intention he is countering. I
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suggest that, in analyzing intention, these philosophers establish that it cannot be the sole
determinant of our language meanings.
First I provide an explanation and some analysis of Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy. I explain that Wittgenstein has famously criticized a certain conception of
language and offered another that emphasizes the nature of language-games. I provide
accounts of his terms “criteria,” “form of life,” and “context,” and I address his
exposition of the nature of language. For Wittgenstein, it is a shared, social procedure,
which indicates our agreement in judgment and justification. Briefly, I mention
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on how we learn the judgment relevant to such an activity, and I
also explain features of his notion of the imagination, especially its connection with
willing and how, at least in some cases, it relates to what we can conceive as possible.
Next, I turn to his account of an “institution,” and I point out that Wittgenstein relates
institutions to the use of rules. Following this, I argue that Wittgenstein is skeptical of
certain conceptions of rules. It is not clear that he is skeptical of rules if they are
understood as conventions, for example, but he is skeptical of the view that they are “rails
to infinity,” inescapably catching us up in their trajectory. I review some of
Wittgenstein’s remarks on intention (emphasizing that he argues there is a difference
between what is “inner” and what is “outer”) and explain how he can be understood to
avoid discussion of so-called inner states. I argue that Wittgenstein refuses to discuss
what he thinks cannot productively be discussed, and I close with some remarks about the
significance of the “voice” to his work. I focus almost entirely on Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations, as Cavell often does, only occasionally referring to his
other work.
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Next, I provide a review of important aspects of G. E. M. Anscombe’s influential
Intention. Some of Anscombe’s claims are relevant to the work of both Wittgenstein and
Austin, and her explanation of how intentions effect changes in the world will anchor my
claims about how intentions assist in the process of projecting language forward into new
contexts.
Next, I turn to a discussion of Austin’s philosophy, providing a summary of a
number of his claims about language. I point out that he often engages in a close analysis
of our use of words. Like Wittgenstein, he calls them “tools,” and like Wittgenstein, he
also relies on metaphor.
Austin is interested in providing a “linguistic phenomenology” that captures
features of our language use. He notices that our words do not capture everything that is
significant about reality; he emphasizes that there is a difference between the world and
our language. However, he acknowledges we cannot work with an endless vocabulary.
We focus on similarities and cannot foresee what, in our language use, will change. He
says the “economy” of language is responsible for the fact that we do not often introduce
new terms, though we can, and the words we do have reveal the use of generations and
thus herald a type of collective wisdom. Austin also claims words do not escape their
etymology. As language users, he maintains, we frequently agree, but even when we do
not, this does not reveal some fundamental flaw in language itself.
I also explain some aspects of the imagination Austin notes (he appears more
puzzled by it than Wittgenstein) and some remarks he makes about the meanings of
words. He says when we use the same name to refer to different entities, this has been
understood to indicate either that we recognize a universal, or to show that the entities of
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the same name are similar. He criticizes the idea that such identically named entities are
similar, and I in turn criticize his view (relying on some of his own comments to do this).
Austin also discusses intention, calling it a “miner’s lamp” illuminating what is
before us, and a general aspect of our actions (of what we are “doing”). A characteristic
of his philosophical work is a tendency to draw an initial distinction (he rarely, if ever,
maintains them as clearly at the conclusion of his analyses). He draws such distinctions
when he discusses the “linguistic legislation” of naming and sense-giving, and when he
describes the difference between performatives and constatives.
In How to Do Things With Words, Austin says performatives are those types of
speech acts that are more than words (or more than just descriptive or constative words),
or saying something. They also do something. I provide an explanation of what
performatives are as well as how Austin thinks they can both succeed and fail to do
something. In specific instances, the failure of performatives is associated with their
institutional setting. Austin claims the circumstances surrounding the uttering of words
may carry more weight in actually accomplishing something than the words themselves.
He disputes the idea that we can conceive of words as merely outward evidence of
inward acts, remarking that we can say one thing but really mean, or be thinking,
something else. And in such circumstances, one can be “bound” by one’s utterances,
even if one does not mean them. This is significant, because it is evidence for the idea
that intention cannot be the chief determinant of meaning in those cases in which
language presents interpretive difficulties and we find ourselves trying to locate an arbiter
of such meaning.
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Cavell’s work shows the influence of Wittgenstein and Austin, and he conceives
of himself as continuing the project of returning language to everyday use (and endorsing
the methods of ordinary language philosophy in doing so). He also points out the
significance of their work for education itself.
I explore Cavell’s characterization of the Philosophical Investigations. I explain
that Cavell reads Wittgenstein as aware of skepticism and thinks we are dissatisfied with
aspects of ourselves and lacking in real knowledge (about ourselves and the world). For
Cavell, the problem of skepticism concerning other minds ultimately involves a failure of
acknowledgment of that other, not a failure of knowledge. I review Cavell’s emphasis on
learning and aspects of judgment (especially about matters of value, which he principally
investigates) before turning to Cavell’s analysis of criteria. I explain Cavell’s account of
“ordinary” and Wittgensteinian criteria. I also provide an explanation and commentary
on the following terms as these are used in Cavell’s philosophy: authority; attunement;
convention; and context.
Wittgenstein’s influence is apparent in Cavell’s account of how we learn
language. Like Wittgenstein, he maintains it is public and shared, and not the product of
formalist rules. I provide a summary of Cavell’s explanation of our language acquisition
and our ability to “go on” in language. One indication that we have learned a language is
our ability to project words into new contexts. This feature of Cavell’s work—his
account of the “projective imagination”—is one I address in later chapters. I briefly point
out that Cavell’s analysis of language demonstrates Austin’s influence before turning to
his analysis of one of Austin’s examples (from Euripides’s Hippolytus) and the
implications of that analysis for Cavell’s view of intention.
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Cavell thinks our intentions regarding words take place within the shared
structures, or settings, of the language in which we find ourselves, into which we are
initiated. Those institutions constrain what we can mean by words. Intention and
language can come apart. He uses his concept of “attunement” to reinforce this point,
and, like Austin, mentions that our disagreements often indicate the extent to which we
do agree (and says writers, unlike other artists, are able to rely on such agreement). We
even share the connotations and implications of our words, for they are learned and
collectively reinforced as an aspect of this form of life. Words reflect our intentions as
well as the constraints on those intentions; they are like the “horses of thought,” which
we inherit and carry forward. Cavell underwrites this view by appealing to the work of
his philosophical influences, Wittgenstein and Austin. His view clearly recalls elements
of their work, down to the metaphors he uses. Cavell maintains that both Wittgenstein
and Austin emphasize the institutional setting in which language occurs and, as a result,
that institutional setting’s greater weight in determining meaning than individual
intention.
Cavell is responding to two possible ways of construing the significance of
intention to discussions of the meaning of language: either intention counts for nothing
in determining meaning, or it counts for everything. He can be read as supplying a view
of intention that navigates between these two extremes (as Kant meant his “Copernican
revolution” to represent a successful sail between the cliffs of rationalism and
empiricism). He ultimately affirms a conclusion like Austin’s own: we have to consider
the total speech-act in our attempt to judge its meaning, and intention, in Cavell’s phrase,
is just the “fuse to the flame” within that context.
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Assessment of Research
I close this review of these philosophers’ work by arguing that their views are
substantial improvements over some ideas formerly prevalent in philosophy of language
(especially the structuralist picture of language) and maintain that they point us in the
direction of promising further research for that field, for philosophy of language appears
in general to have failed to recognize the different contexts in which language and
intention occur—written and spoken, for example—and the implications those contexts
may have for the role intention plays in each.
The Projective Imagination
Next, I explain and assess Cavell’s account of the projective imagination. First, I
recapitulate views of the imagination expressed by Wittgenstein and Austin, and then
explain Cavell’s view. Cavell provides a provocative, though not fully outlined,
explanation of the faculty that enables us to project words into new contexts. He calls
this the “projective imagination” and says we access it by thinking of examples,
supposing, and so on. Our imaginative ability to project is responsible for the manner in
which we both respond to the projections of others and create them ourselves.
Ultimately, I provide an account of the role imagination and intention play in the
process of projecting words into new contexts, carrying our language use toward the
“judgment of the future,” to use a phrase of Cavell’s. When we project, we do so against
the backdrop of our shared forms of life as well as the tendency to economize language
described by Austin.
I examine specific processes involved in projecting words into new contexts, and
I argue that this can be described as an aspect of imagination. First, however, I
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emphasize that this process is not taking place because we are completely constrained
either by our intentions or a calculus of rules. When we project words into new contexts,
we rely, consciously or unconsciously, on a process that is imaginative. I sketch
elements of this process and explain why those elements justify its characterization as
imaginative. Related to this, I touch on the fact that projection bears similarities to the
way imagination functions in the use or creation of metaphor and other types of figurative
language, and throughout, I make use of the motif of similarities between music and
language (a connection reinforced especially by Wittgenstein, though also by Cavell).
I support Cavell’s idea that we project on the basis of “similarity.” Cavell
emphasizes how “controlled” our projections are, and one reason for this is because there
are similarities between previous contexts of use and the new context into which a word
is projected. It is the reason we do not just find everything “different,” as Cavell puts it.
In fact, our economy of language may be directly due to our capacity to recognize
similarities. Imagination is indispensable to the ability to recognize a context to which a
term could be applicable. I examine instances of projecting words into new contexts—
such as the case of extending a word like “feed” into a new context, and the case of
extending a term like “game” to a new instance—to establish that when we project
successfully, this happens because the contexts of a word’s projection and its previous
incarnations are relevantly similar in some way. (However, I do not maintain we are
always aware of these similarities, nor that the ways in which contexts are “similar” can
be exhaustively catalogued or specified in advance of our projections.) I support
Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” concept in making these claims, and mention that
recognizing similarities is often an imaginative endeavor.
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Intention in this context is constituted by the projective imagination. Though we
are not automatons parroting language with which we have been passively programmed
(by rules or mental states), we may be improvising more profoundly than we have yet
recognized. In this context, we make use of a type of judgment that Wittgenstein
examines in various passages in the Philosophical Investigations.
I also relate my account of projection to Anscombe’s Intention. In that work,
Anscombe shows our intentions must exhibit a “word-to-world” direction of fit. I
mention this is what happens when we project words into new contexts. We use our
imaginations to give words new meanings, but we do this in a way that corresponds to
what is factual or discernible in our world (at least, our world of language). My account
of the projective imagination also answers to her explanation of what intention is—it is
supposed to answer to the “Why?” question, to explain what “we are doing.” I have
developed an answer to the “Why?” question, and to the question of what we are doing,
when we project.
Concluding Remarks
I make a few final points about projection: our projections do not necessarily
render language unstable, though projection itself has no end—we are never through
projecting toward the judgments of the future.
I close by describing the issues that are still open to me and awaiting further
research and by surveying some facts about the history of language that reinforce the idea
that projection—not only of words, but languages themselves—takes place because of the
convening of our criteria (a phrase I will explain) and our collective language use.
Language is confounding; many questions confront us, including how it began, how
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“natural” it is, how its different contexts—written, spoken, and so on—relate to one
another, and if it reflects universally shared human experiences. But it is always open to
projection, as its history demonstrates, and I have tried to account for the way this works.
I wonder if the phenomenon of language projection is timeless, even if languages
themselves are not.
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CHAPTER 2
THREE PICTURES OF LANGUAGE AND INTENTION (WITTGENSTEIN,
ANSCOMBE, AND AUSTIN)
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
In the following section, I focus on Wittgenstein’s views on language, judgment,
and rule-following, also discussing his remarks on intention and imagination. These are
the topics that will inform the discussion of the projective imagination, to follow. (I
indicate the location of passages by putting the section of the Philosophical
Investigations [I or II] first and then the number of the passage.)
In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein arguably turns from his
earlier philosophical thoughts to a new conception of philosophy and seeks descriptions
and analyses of our concepts. He proposes therapies, rather than one way of solving
philosophical problems, and claims “The problems are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what we have always known” (I, 109). He included a
quote by the playwright Johann Nestroy, whom he admired, at the beginning of the work
(though it was not included in all editions); the quote claims progress looks greater than it
really is. The quote’s significance is of great interest: was Wittgenstein alluding to the
“progress” he had made? Or the so-called progress philosophy has made? Or the
progress (especially the technological progress) of his culture—a progress he viewed as
problematic?
Wittgenstein’s work in this book marks a change in his own thought, and
significantly, more questions are raised in the Philosophical Investigations than are
answered. He attempts to bring words back into “everyday” use, rather than what he
calls their metaphysical use, and this is a project to which Cavell will continually allude.
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Wittgenstein says when words are used “normally,” their use is clear (I, 142). He records
his investigations in what he calls “remarks” (vii), and these remarks are uttered by
various “voices,” through whom Wittgenstein presents different views and responses to
them. He begins with a discussion of language, emphasizing that when a child acquires
rudimentary knowledge of words, “the teaching of language is not explanation, but
training” (I, 5). For Wittgenstein, the elements of language are like the tools of a
toolbox; not all parts of it have the same function, and not all are what we could call
names (I, 11, 12, 23). (Words share this feature with tools, though they are not like tools
in all respects.) Language is not “finished” or done, either, but is like a city with various
sections and new developments, containing all kinds of sentences, and, just like a city,
language is not immutable:
ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the
symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were
incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how
many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our
language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old
and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and
uniform houses (I, 18).
Languages change, they develop, and some disappear.
Wittgenstein argues what we see if we examine language use are “languagegames.” They are related by what Wittgenstein terms “family resemblances,” so one
member of the category may share a feature or features with another member, but not
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with the others; there is no one feature that all of the members of the family share.
Rather, they might be said to form an interlocking web. Wittgenstein counters the idea
that some of our concepts can be circumscribed by an essential definition, a definition
that isolates the sufficient and necessary conditions of a concept’s existence and marks its
boundaries (I, 66).1 This idea—that some propositions may not share one, common
essence, in spite of whatever disjunction of properties they do share—has been
influential. Wittgenstein provides examples of such language-games, and says reading is
one. Reading fits the “family resemblance” description, for we use different criteria for
different instances of it.
What are criteria, according to Wittgenstein? I maintain that, for Wittgenstein,
they are the aspects of our shared intellectual judgments as well as ways of behaving that
specify what it means to say that the requirements for a concept have been fulfilled in a
given instance. (I will discuss Cavell’s understanding of criteria below. I think Cavell’s
account is substantively similar to Wittgenstein’s.) For example, we might say that we
consider people proficient readers of a language other than their native language if they
can read, silently or aloud, words in another language and then explain what those words
mean, or translate the terms. (This is different from reading that does not require
translation, such as “reading” the words of a foreign language by just sounding out the
letters.) Thus a criterion for reading in a second language is being able to independently
read and translate texts of the second language. Such criteria establish what we subsume
under our concepts. There are many different types of criteria (our criteria for judgments
about the merits of art may differ from the criteria we apply in judging what makes one a
good friend), and it is possible that different criteria are required for the application of

16

one concept on different occasions. For example, the term “art” may apply to a work of
creative activity for many different reasons, as different criteria can satisfy this concept.
If a sculpture is particularly well-done, we might subsume it under the concept of “art”; if
a play is especially original, it might count as art as well. Skill and originality constitute
criteria we use to determine whether something falls under the family-resemblance
concept of art, and though many works of art display both, these two criteria do not
always occur together. These criteria are not only manifested by our judgments; at I, 269,
Wittgenstein says there are criteria in behavior for understanding; for thinking one
understands; and for not understanding.
According to Wittgenstein, the speaking of language is “part of an activity, or of a
form of life” (I, 23). His term, “form of life,” is, like “criteria,” a disputed one, but it
clearly is a term he uses to refer to the shared aspects of human life, shared aspects that
invoke our judgment when we deliberate about them. These judgments are shared as
well, though the possibility of disagreement—and settling it—cannot be dispelled.
Forms of life include the various human dimensions of our lives—shared experiences,
thoughts, and behaviors. This does not mean that clearly delineated communities, akin to
social or political organizations (with codes, e.g.) always accompany our criteria. For
example, all (or almost all) people who exhibit pain can be considered to share a certain
form of life, that is, all the various ways, often physical in nature, that people manifest
pain (this is an example of something just mentioned—Wittgenstein’s insistence that
there are criteria for behavior). There is no deliberately planned association of painexhibiters here, and pain, like many other manifestations of bodily behavior, is a natural
element of human life. But what makes it a form of life is the way in which participants,
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or potential participants, of that form of life can discern it for what it is and apply their
collectively shared concepts to it. People can be said to share a form of life when they
are participants in an aspect of their experience that they understand, at least to some
minimal extent, and can engage in together. Perhaps not every person understands or
participates in every element of it (as many English-language users do not know every
term of English, or all of its grammar rules, and, of course, people do not know every
language spoken, past or present, though they are still language users), but there is
enough agreement or overlap in what they do that they can be said to share a form of life.
Speakers of a particular language form such a community, as Wittgenstein has said. It is
plausible to suppose criteria reveal the collective judgments and behaviors of participants
in a form of life. In his use of the term, “form of life,” Wittgenstein focuses on those
forms of life that seem most elemental and natural to the human experience. (It is unclear
that he endorses the idea that there is one such form of life, but it seems plausible that he
supposes aspects of human experience must be held enough in common between us that
we can share judgments and agreement in criteria about those experiences.)
He also emphasizes the importance of context in making sense of language,
providing the example “After he had said this, he left her as he did the day before” (I,
525). He says we cannot really understand this sentence absent a context, but it provides
enough clues to what it might mean that we could construct possible meanings that would
match it. The sentence could mean a person left someplace, say a house, leaving the
person he was visiting as she herself was the day before (maybe she was gardening on
both occasions, so when he took leave of her, he took leave of her in the garden on both
occasions). It could also mean he did the same thing in the same way on both occasions:
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maybe both times he put a hat on his head in the same way. Or perhaps it just means that
he left her again, left her for a second time. What it presumably could not mean is that
machines think, or the laws of physics can be ignored. There are limits to what the words
can mean. Wittgenstein also emphasizes the significance of context in another passage,
providing the following exchange: “’I set the brake up by connecting up rod and
lever.’—Yes, given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with
that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a lever; it may be
anything or nothing” (I, 6).
What does this suggest he thinks a context is? The context, for Wittgenstein, is,
in my reading, all of the background factors relevant to determining the meaning of some
aspect of our experience or consciousness which we are examining (in these cases, what
is necessary to understand a sentence, and what is necessary to make a piece of
equipment function as a brake-lever). The factors must be relevant, though we face
difficulties about the extent to which we agree or disagree about such matters; we cannot
consider every possible factor that could conceivably be in the background of what we
investigate. In the case Wittgenstein has provided in I, 525, there are a number of ways
of reasonably interpreting these words, but not every interpretation of the sentence is
reasonable. The example requires interpretation because although it is sensible, it seems
to require more information, outside the sentence, to truly constrain its meaning (if it is
construed as a sentence referring to an actual situation). This is true of many (perhaps
most) of our sentences, though some give rise to greater ambiguity than others. The
second case (I, 6) is a metaphor for different types of cases. It emphasizes how the
contextual factors of a subject of our investigation must fit together in order for us to
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make sense of it. The parts of the machine make up the whole; they function collectively
to establish the machine itself. They acquire their significance from this overall, cohesive
context.
Wittgenstein argues against the idea that our concepts are “unregulated” (too
loose) or otherwise defective (one of the speakers says “meaningless”—I, 70) if they
have unclear boundaries (I, 68) or “blurred edges” (I, 71). He writes “Does it take (a
boundary) to make the concept usable? Not at all!” (I, 69), “(‘inexact’) does not mean
‘unusable’” (I, 88), and “When I give the description: ‘The ground was quite covered
with plants’—do you want to say I don’t know what I am talking about until I can give a
definition of a plant?” (I, 70). In response to the worry that a blurred concept really does
not count as an actual concept, as Gottlob Frege would argue, he says “Is an indistinct
photograph a picture of a person at all?” (I, 71). He says such blurriness can even be
useful. He continues “is it senseless to say: ‘Stand roughly there’?” (I, 71); and, when
one of the speakers asserts, “An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none,” another
responds “But is that true?” (I, 99). Language itself, including the concepts we indicate
in using it, can be vague, though this does not render it useless or meaningless. In fact,
acknowledging as much can support the conviction that we find concepts expressed in
language meaningful even if they cannot be defined in terms of sufficient and necessary
conditions: “What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it
and not be able to say it?” (I, 75). It is a puzzling fact of our language use, and our
thought, that we employ concepts we cannot satisfactorily circumscribe in essential
definitions, and we may well wonder why a new game gets subsumed under the concept.
We may also well feel that simply providing examples and pointing out how they
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resemble other instances of the concept in question is not entirely satisfactory. (I will
suggest how we might resolve this persistently nagging dissatisfaction below.)
Wittgenstein uses these considerations about how language works to approach the
view that language is formalized and complete, like a calculus, and we could reach “a
final analysis of our forms of language” (I, 91) if we would just eliminate such inexact
language as he has been describing. In passages that reflect his tendency to use the
metaphorical to describe such matters, he says this urge reflects a preoccupation with
what might be “beneath the surface” (I, 92). This is our conception of logic, “Something
that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, and which an analysis digs
out” (I, 92). If we could locate an answer, it would be something that sounds eternal,
“given once for all; and independently of any future experience” (I, 92). He thinks we
suppose there is a logic to propositions that is “something in the background—hidden in
the medium of the understanding” (I, 102). (In these passages, he is recalling views he
expressed in the Tractatus.) But he thinks this is a mistaken view, like looking through
glasses (which must focus the image in a particular way, rather than another) that we
could remove (I, 103), and this is something we are actually mistakenly imposing on the
subject, a mistake in our investigative thinking: “We predicate of the thing what lies in
the method of representing it” (I, 104). He emphasizes this point in other passages: “For
the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a
requirement” (I, 107); next he says this crystalline purity is a “preconceived idea” (I,
108). Later he says the thought that “reality must correspond” to such preconceived ideas
is a frequent “dogmatism” of philosophy (I, 131). We do not maintain an adequately
clear understanding of language if we stray from the ordinary, everyday uses of our
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words, and philosophy, he says, can only describe language; it cannot provide a
foundation for it (I, 124).
For Wittgenstein, language is a shared, social phenomenon, which people are
trained to use and understand (“To understand a sentence means to understand a
language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique” [I, 199]). This is
thought-provoking, as a technique is something that many different people may do,
though many techniques can be carried out by individuals acting on their own (as an
example, auto repair is a technique, and something that many different people may do,
but one person can do it individually). Likewise, many speak language, but language
users can talk to themselves, or think about, write, or otherwise engage in the technique
of language absent the company of others.
Language also requires “regularity” (I, 207), that is, were it chaotic or
unpredictable, it would not serve its purposes so well. Wittgenstein acknowledges that
we look for the “common behavior” of humanity when faced with trying to understand an
unknown language, and to “find the right expression” is like “translating or describing”
(I, 335). And we must become proficient in a language if we are to mean something by
it: “After all, one can only say something if one has learned to talk. Therefore in order to
want to say something one must also have mastered a language” (I, 338). As J. L. Austin
does, Wittgenstein also makes the point that words can accomplish acts: “Words are also
deeds” (I, 546). He emphasizes that the meaning of a word is its use in the language (I,
43). He tells us to search for that use, because in many (though not all) cases in which
we use the term “meaning” or “mean,” the “meaning” is supplied by giving an account of
the use. Wittgenstein means by this that we should not try to locate some object or
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correlate of a word, but should examine the way the word is used; that use will clarify the
meaning of the word. In the course of this mastery of language, he claims “we calculate,
operate, with words, and in the course of time translate them sometimes into one picture,
sometimes into another” (I, 449). Sometimes, depending on the context, our mood as
writers or speakers, we might prefer one word over another; such choices are indicated in
our use of parts of speech, such as nouns and verbs, and even in our choices of
punctuation.
Language also requires agreement in our judgments, which cannot be equated
with agreement in definitions. To take one example, we frequently agree on what
constitutes sufficient evidence for proof in the realm of scientific experiment. We do not
share such judgments simply because we agree on definitions for “evidence” and “proof”
as these terms are applicable to science. We agree because we jointly recognize the set of
circumstances that provide us with what we would call “evidence” or “proof”—that
boiling indicates (is evidence or proof of) the heat of water, for example, or why the
newly discovered Kepler planets may be capable of supporting human or other life.
Agreement in judgments is not an agreement that undermines our logic: “If language is
to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also
(queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so”
(I, 242). However, we have to be able to agree among ourselves about what our terms
mean. We cannot simply legislate linguistically (to anticipate a term of Austin’s) or
make our uses of terms inaccessible to others: “For if I need a justification for using a
word, it must also be one for someone else” (I, 378).
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Now, what does he mean by justification? That will vary, depending on the form
of life and the criteria and contextual factors involved. “What people accept as a
justification—is shewn by how they think and live” (I, 325), he writes. This is a trust in
our ability to understand and share judgments, and not defeasible simply because those
judgments could be mistaken or are not anchored in reality by a discernible foundation.
He says the kind of certainty we require for our judgments or justifications depends on
the subject of the investigation: “The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game” (II,
xi). For example, it is possible that the kind of certainty required for aesthetic judgments
may differ from the kind of certainty required for at least some mathematical or logical
judgments (though he does not say this here). We can verify what we mean by
“justification” by considering how often we will advert to it when describing aspects of
language-games: “How is the word ‘justification’ used? Describe language-games.
From these you will also be able to see the importance of being justified” (I, 486).
Wittgenstein makes astute observations about how we are likely to develop good
judgment about matters of human feeling, and this endeavor, like the use of language, is
also not the result of some kind of calculus. In the course of these observations, he often
uses music or visual imagery to illustrate his claims. Understanding language, like
understanding music, may very well depend upon this type of judgment. We can indeed
speak of “expert judgment” in matters of feeling, and pronounce some judgments better
than others. Those with better judgment are those with the best insights or knowledge
into matters of human life. Can this faculty be learned, as language can? Wittgenstein
says yes, but our facility with such judgments depends on experience, or perhaps the
prompting of a good teacher, one who knows just how to help at the right time: “From
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time to time he gives him the right tip.—This is what ‘learning’ and ‘teaching’ are like
here” (II, xi).
In “Morality, Human Understanding, and Language,” Ben Tilghman cites this
passage and provides just such an example of this kind of learned ability, analyzing the
novel La Princesse de Clèves. In this work, Nemours, a member of the court of Henri II,
realizes a woman is infatuated with him, though she never says anything to him and in
fact tries to avoid him. Tilghman says “Nemours’s judgment in these things is better than
many others” (Wittgenstein in America, 242); he attributes this expertise to the man’s
experience. Now, Nemours has this expertise because he is the sort who has the social
acumen (perhaps, but not necessarily, due to his station at court; certainly, according to
Tilghman, because of how effectively he can assess his experiences) to size up the
chemistry between himself and the woman in question; though this is not, probably, the
type of knowledge about which he could claim to be indubitably certain.
As another example, suppose two people, a “student” and a “teacher,” observe the
racist treatment of a third (the experience of racist treatment qualifying as a matter of
human feeling, though it is other things as well). A number of factors count as racist
treatment; suppose this incident involves underestimating the intelligence of the offended
person. The teacher says to the student: “That’s what racism looks like,” and the
student, if properly poised to receive it, grasps this tip.
This is more art than science, but it has its sense of right and wrong, true or false,
nevertheless. The infatuation of the first case, and the racism of the second, are real, even
if not physically quantifiable; so is apprehension of such states of affairs. One can learn
and apply accurate judgments about such matters. “What one acquires here (knowledge
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gained from this process of learning) is not a technique; one learns correct judgments.
There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can
apply them right’ (II, xi). The reference to experience is underscored by Tilghman’s
analysis of what is going on emotionally between two characters. Thus Wittgenstein
argues:
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music
than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a sentence lies nearer than
one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is
just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? One would like to say
“Because I know what it’s all about.” But what is it all about? I should not be
able to say. In order to ‘explain’ I could only compare it with something else
which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern) . . . (How does one justify
such comparisons?—There are very different kinds of justification here.) (I, 527).
Just as we might sense the upcoming bridge of a song, we understand the
meanings, implications, and cadences of our sentences and interactions. This is the kind
of skill involved in making judgments of value, and it can be taken very far, as
Wittgenstein points out, saying in the case of aesthetics, for example, “It is possible—and
this is important—to say a great deal about a fine aesthetic difference” (II, xi).
Skill in such judgment is displayed, in the Philosophical Investigations, in our
efforts to imagine. He says we lack clarity about the imagination and the role it plays in
making propositions meaningful, or sensible. Wittgenstein writes, “In what sort of
circumstances should we ask anyone: ‘What actually went on in you as you imagined
this?’—And what sort of answer do we expect?” (I, 394). But, he argues, imagination
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can be used “in the course of proving something” (II, xi), and it, as well as the ability to
perceive an aspect, “are subject to the will. There is such an order as ‘Imagine this’, and
also: ‘Now see the figure like this’; but not: ‘Now see this leaf green’” (II, xi). For
example, when we consider the duck-rabbit image, the switch we make in our minds
when we see it as a rabbit, then a duck, depends on our willing (and if we do not invoke
our wills, the image will appear to us one way or the other—as either a rabbit or a duck).
It is a way of perceiving or conceiving of examples that is under our control. While there
may not exactly be limits to what we can imagine, there are constraints, he suggests.
(Limits would mark a sharper boundary on our judgments than constraints; beyond them
we could not go, but the constraints might provide something akin to “guidelines.”) For
example, he writes “we call something (or this) ‘the length of a rod’—but nothing ‘the
length of a sphere’” (I, 251) and says “many mathematical proofs do lead us to say that
we cannot imagine something which we believed we could imagine” (I, 517). An
example is the construction of the heptagon, and such examples “lead us to revise what
counts as the domain of the imaginable.” (Nevertheless, as a heptagon cannot be
constructed, we realize in confirming this via proof that we thought we could imagine
something we actually could not.) But we also perceive that our imaginative efforts will
reveal which connections are apt. The imagination will also be deployed on those
occasions when we have reason to imagine something; we could use it to think up all
sorts of things, but we do not do this (or at least, we do not do this on many occasions
when we could). For example, Wittgenstein asks, “Could one imagine a stone’s having
consciousness? And if anyone can do so—why should that not merely prove that such
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image-mongery is of no interest to us?” (I, 390). (He is here considering what “kinds” of
things we think can have consciousness, and why.)
He says a sentence “can strike me as like a painting in words” (II, xi) and, as he
frequently does, likens language to music, pointing out people can have a “sensitive ear”
for the nuances of words (II, xi). Seeing an aspect is like seeing an image—“Doesn’t it
take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme?” (II, xi). Failing
to do so is like failing to understand music as well: “Aspect blindness (that is, the
inability to see something in a particular way—as something, as Wittgenstein puts it) will
be akin to the lack of a ‘musical ear’” (II, xi).
Language is a type of institution for Wittgenstein, and we might consider what he
means by “institution.” Though it is not entirely clear what he does mean, he obviously
thinks many aspects of customary behavior are linked to human institutions: “To obey a
rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses,
institutions)” (I, 199).
Wittgenstein’s juxtaposition of these terms deserves closer consideration.
Customs and institutions are not identical entities. There are customs that are not
institutions, and there are institutions that are not customs. The practice of shaking hands
is a custom, but it is not institutionalized. It has not always existed in its present form
and may now be declining as a custom of polite behavior. And many institutions are not
customary. Perhaps the presidency of the United States is one such example. Though
many formalities associated with that office are carried on regardless of who holds it, one
of its primary functions is to enable the incoming president to make changes as needed, to
exercise prerogative without necessarily paying heed to any custom. Institutions can also
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be formally instituted without historical precedent or deference to custom, as well. The
United States did indeed do that when it first instituted the office of the presidency. Also,
it is not clear how the term “use” relates to either. Wittgenstein may be suggesting some
likeness between these terms. Perhaps he means to emphasize the fact that customs, uses,
and institutions are at least alike in the way they reveal and cause (at least to some extent)
regularities in our behaviors and ways of life.
Wittgenstein’s use of the term “institution” suggests he means they are those
structures that reflect certain regularities or conventions of human behavior, including
perhaps human forms of life, for Wittgenstein does describe language as an institution.
They impose, and reflect, the regularity of the shared judgments and justifications of our
human experiences. (Though in no particular order of precedence—whether the
institution or judgments particular to it comes first would depend on the case in question,
though in many or most cases, there might exist a complex interplay of mutual
determination between the institution and the judgments.) The characteristics of these
institutions can also serve to explain how those forms of life can be carried forward.
Institutions have a tremendous impact on who we turn out to be and what and how we
perceive. We are not always consciously aware of these institutions and their influence
on us, but they do shape our lives in definitive ways. This is obviously true of language,
and Wittgenstein notes “custom and upbringing” influence what we are able to perceive
even in styles of painting (II, xi).
The signs of such institutions can also direct our behavior. Wittgenstein says “a
person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of a sign-post, a
custom” (I, 198). We may follow signs as a result of customs, too, which have not been
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clearly instituted in any formally recognizable sense, so it is worth distinguishing
between customs and institutions in this respect. To take a very simple example, we
follow conventions in spelling because we have regular sign-posts (the correct spellings)
for the way we write our words. These spellings are a customary aspect of our lives and
could be different than they are, but they provide a regular, customary way, which we
use, of conveying our words. We do not, of course, infallibly conform to spelling
conventions, for many reasons, nor are these conventions immutably fixed for all time, as
any study of the developments of the English language—to take just one example—will
reveal. We have also either adopted or accepted, to varying degrees of consciousness,
such sign-posts for polite behavior, appropriate workplace behavior, and so on.
Institutions are not always formally codified, though they can be. They must be
instituted if they can fairly use their name, but that process need not require conscious
rules and regulations. The construction of a creole language counts as an example. The
creole is instituted to resolve communication problems; if it receives formal codification,
that comes later. It is important to distinguish between institutions that clearly reflect
conscious human decisions (such as institutions of law and government) and those that do
not, such as our natural dimensions of human behavior (like language), as well as all the
unclear cases that exhibit characteristics of both human reflection and natural life.
Wittgenstein does not explicitly make such a distinction in this passage above. However,
it is implicit in his work in the Philosophical Investigations.
But institutions do more than this in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. They also give
rules their point. For example, Wittgenstein says rules “hang in the air” if “the institution
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of their use is lacking” (I, 380). And understanding what Wittgenstein really thought
about rules is a central interpretive challenge posed by the Philosophical Investigations.
What did Wittgenstein mean by a “rule”? When he talks about what a rule might
be or what it might do in this work, he says the following (among other things): rules can
function as instruction; rule-governed behavior can be something we observe, and learn
about that way; they can be a tool in a game (he does not elaborate further) (I, 54); they
do not always clearly “circumscribe” the games in which they play a part (I, 68);
following a rule is like following an order (I, 206); vagueness does not render them
meaningless (I, 100); they raise a paradox that makes it seem as if they could be
interpreted in any way (which, in my reading, he ultimately intends to contest—I, 201),
and they are related to agreement (I, 224). We can also ask, however, whether learning,
obeying, or understanding a rule means applying that rule consistently, indefinitely into
the future, after learning it.
Wittgenstein asks,
Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails
invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And
infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule . . . The rule,
once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be
followed through the whole of space (I, 218-219).
This is a supposition that wrongly leads us to believe we have to “wait upon the
nod (the whisper) of the rule” (I, 223). Under such a conception of rules, we are led
(perhaps as an instance of imposing a predetermined concept on our experience, as he has
suggested) to think the “steps are really already taken, even before I take them in writing
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or orally or in thought” (I, 188) (which he also suggests means “I no longer have any
choice” [I, 219]). He claims we can gain this impression from thinking about the
workings of a machine: “the action of a machine—I might say at first—seems to be there
in it from the start . . . If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement,
seems to be already completely determined,” and, just as we might suppose the first step
in “rule-following” sends us along such a series of rails to infinity, “We might say that a
machine, or the picture of it, is the first of a series of pictures which we have learnt to
derive from this one” (I, 193).
Wittgenstein does not appear to be a thoroughgoing skeptic about rules, though
skeptical of certain conceptions of them. In particular, he is skeptical of the idea,
described above, that language corresponds to or is a calculus, and that in following
language’s rules we somehow instantiate or locate such a calculus. It seems quite clear
that Wittgenstein did not mean a “rule” is a metaphysical reality that catches us up and
carries us toward infinity. In these passages, he is criticizing that idea and disputing
traditional metaphysical conceptions of philosophy. Nor does he mean that once we learn
it, we are bound always to follow it, though we frequently might.
In the Philosophical Investigations, based on his use of certain examples,
Wittgenstein does not clearly distinguish between mathematics and language. He sees
mathematics as an integral part of human forms of life and language, and in his later
philosophy he may have conceived of mathematics much differently than he once had.
Of course, Wittgenstein understood mathematics well. It is also possible that he
conceived of mathematics as a clear, perhaps the clearest, example of a rule-following
human endeavor, and if he could cast doubt even on the nature of rules in mathematics,
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he could cast doubt on the possibility of rules elsewhere, including in language. But even
if both mathematics and language can be reduced to games that exhibit family
resemblances, the differences between them, or at least his reasons for thinking they are
similar in this respect, should be more clearly accounted for than they are in the examples
he uses.
Does this mean once we learn a rule, we must always apply it without variation in
the future? The answer must be no. Wittgenstein, and, later, Cavell, would say as much,
and this appears to be the consequence of Wittgenstein’s view that languages develop as
do cities. (Perhaps in other areas of human endeavor and knowledge, “rule-following” is
necessarily more rigid, as well as different in nature.)
What do we do when disputes arise about who is right? Wittgenstein appears to
be aware of this problem and does not appear to hold the view that interpretive disputes
about the truth or who is right can be solved by simply issuing more words (at least not
always, though of course sometimes words do clear things up). The regularities or
conventions of a subject like language are not empty of meaning and do not collapse into
the subjectivity of each individual. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,
Wittgenstein demonstrates an awareness of this possibility when he says the consequence
of such an endorsement would be: “Then . . . everybody could continue the series as he
likes” (I, 116). Such regularities simply do not seem to be grounded in a foundation we
can locate, a foundation that reveals the existence of the “rules” we follow. And there
may be a limit to how far we can pursue questions about them or adjudicate between
conceptions of what is right or true, though that, as Wittgenstein might say, reflects the
certainty such inquiries call for; it does not mean everything is a matter of individual
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subjectivity, and any view is as good as any other, and no distinctions or evaluations can
be made in our judgments concerning what is right or true.
Wittgenstein says the question “How am I able to obey a rule?” is a request for a
justification if it is not a request for information about causes, and he responds “If I have
exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned” (I, 217). In
this passage, Wittgenstein is not only refuting the idea that there are formalist rules
underlying our language use, including ones “encoded” in neurophysiology, which will
explain why we do what we do. He is also pointing out that those attempts to explain
must come to an end at some point: he claims “Justification by experience comes to an
end. If it did not it would not be justification” (I, 485). As mentioned above, justification
(its nature and certainty) depend on what people accept within their forms of life, and
here, Wittgenstein explicitly links experience to it. One’s experiences determine how far
one can be expected to provide explanations, and if two people are involved in a search
for explanation that reaches bedrock, they may be unable to take their inquiry further. As
an example, consider what might happen if a student asks a teacher about the nature of a
logical contradiction: “Why are you representing the propositions as A and not-A?” “So
that I can demonstrate that the sentence is logically false.” “What does that mean?” “It
means the sentence will never turn out to be anything other than false, no matter what
truth-value you assign to its component letters.” “So that sentence can never be true?”
“No. It is like saying something is true and false at the same time. That’s a
contradiction.” “So? Does that mean contradictions are just sentences? Then can’t they
just be ignored?” “Well . . .” The conversation may move at this point toward a
discussion of the nature of reality, or how human minds conceive of it, or how logic can
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represent or idealize certain aspects of reason, but if the student truly refuses to see the
significance of these explanations, or to see the force of such properties as logical truth
and falsity, not much more in the way of justification can be supplied—“the chain of
reasons has an end” (I, 326), Wittgenstein writes. This does not mean the student is right,
and it does not mean the teacher can continue to supply reasons indefinitely.
Now this is a final point of providing reasons in a conversation, so to speak, but it
neither reveals a final point for all such disputes, nor the need for one. Wittgenstein
explains “an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunderstanding—one, that is,
that would occur but for the explanation; not every one that I can imagine” (I, 87). He
also adds that justification may not be necessary in some cases; the request for definitions
can be “architectural,” an “ornamental coping” (I, 217).
Wittgenstein also raises questions about intention. He does not say much about
the physical nature or brain-state of intention itself (he appears to think we could not
locate “intention” in this way), though he acknowledges, as G. E. M. Anscombe will, that
an expression of intention can function as a prediction about how one will act in the
future (II, x). He says intention is not always apparent; it can come into view, it can
“vanish” (I, 645); and sometimes it seems as if it is only clear to us in speaking about it,
when, for example, we say we know we had an intention to quiet someone, Wittgenstein
says, but we do not remember the words we used to do this (I, 648). He says our memory
might not supply anything; all we might have are the recollection of the words we spoke.
He says intention is not an “experience” as meaning is not an “experience”:
“Meaning is as little an experience as intending . . . They have no experience-content.
For the contents (images for instance) which accompany and illustrate them are not the
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meaning or intending” (II, xi). The intention is not actually instantiated in what happens
as a result of it: “The intention with which one acts does not ‘accompany’ the action any
more than the thought ‘accompanies’ speech. Thought and intention are . . . to be
compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with
a tune” (II, xi).
But it is something we accept, something we recognize when questions about
what someone meant arise: “In a law-court . . . the question might be raised how
someone meant a word. And this can be inferred from certain facts.—It is a question of
intention” (II, xi). He also wonders if being the recipient of something meaningful, rather
than the sender (we do often seem to construe intention as the effort of a “sender”), could
be similarly important: “But could how he experienced a word—the word ‘bank’ for
instance—have been significant in the same way?”
In the passages that refer to intention, he seems clearly to be emphasizing an
“ordinary” sense of intention, as when he notes that it can be a species of willing: “If
(willing) is the action, then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word; so it is speaking,
writing, walking, lifting a thing, imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting,
making an effort (to do those things)” (I, 615). He endorses the idea that our intentions
do not change or determine the meanings of our shared words. For example, he includes
in a note:
It is also possible for someone to get an explanation of the words out of what was
intended as a piece of information. [Marginal note: Here lurks a crucial
superstition.]
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Can I say “bububu” and mean “If it doesn’t rain I shall go for a walk”?—It
is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shews clearly
that the grammar of “to mean” is not like that of the expression “to imagine” and
the like (18).
Though Wittgenstein’s term, “grammar,” is one that raises interpretive issues, we
can suppose Wittgenstein thinks meaning differs from imagining because he is referring
to the fact that words cannot just mean anything, even if we are imagining various
meanings through them. We are not limited by our imagination in the same ways we are
by our languages. We can imagine many things (even without using language); we can
even imagine going for a walk when we use the term “bububu”; but we cannot actually
mean that. Later, he remarks: “Suppose I said ‘a b c d’ and meant: the weather is fine.
For as I uttered these signs I had the experience normally had only by someone who had
year-in year-out used ‘a’ in the sense of ‘the’, ‘b’ in the sense of ‘weather’, and so on.—
Does ‘a b c d’ now mean: the weather is fine?” (I, 509). He returns to this problem in
posing the following questions: “Make the following experiment: say ‘It’s cold here’
and mean ‘It’s warm here’. Can you do it?—And what are you doing as you do it? And
is there only one way of doing it?” (I, 510).
Yet later on in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein muses: “Suppose,
however, that someone were to draw while he had an image or instead of having it,
though it were only with his finger in the air. (This might be called ‘motor imagery.’)
He could be asked: ‘Whom does that represent?’ And his answer would be decisive.—It
is quite as if he had given a verbal description: and such a description can also simply
take the place of the image” (II, iii). Wittgenstein reinforces the idea that in some
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contexts what we seek to know is someone’s intention; it is decisive in resolving some
interpretive problems. In cases such as these, the only way to find a meaning is to
consult the creator’s intention, or what relevantly counts as that intention. What we take
to be an intention will vary from case to case, depending on the context. (But this may
not always remove interpretive difficulties. If we ask someone what is meant by
something, we may get an answer. But presumably this answer consists of words. And
what do we do if those words raise further indeterminacies of meaning?)
His speakers revert to intention again, as well as a mysterious question about its
relation to rules: “it is just the queer thing about intention, about the mental process, that
the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it” (I, 205). He says we go
along with rules the same way we go along with orders, thus following our training (I,
206). He sees intention as bound up with its surroundings: “An intention is embedded in
its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did
not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do intend the
construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak
the language in question” (I, 337).
In this passage, it is clear that he holds the view that our intentions as expressed in
language are constrained (in some way) by the language itself. He appears to recognize
that human intention does not necessarily arise from what is outside of human beings.
Intentions are an aspect of our consciousness, even if we are not cognizant of them; what
we could call part of the “inner” human life. But what is “outer” can influence them and
the shape or expression they can take (as language can influence our intentions when we
speak). What we call or refer to as “intentions” are, in some cases, part of what we
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describe as our consciousness, but in other cases they are not. One can intend to become
an artist, for example, without ever fully or completely realizing this intention, or
realizing it much later than one might have supposed one would. The “inner” and the
“outer” can be separated, and it is not possible to suppose that intentions themselves can
be neatly analyzed in terms of a well-defined, comprehensible “inner” landscape and an
equally well-defined, comprehensive “outer” one. But what is within and what is
without can work together in the expression of intention. For example, when we play
games, to use Wittgenstein’s example, we are often following along with the “rules” of
those games, regardless of whatever personal intentions we may hold. We can follow
rules “blindly” (I, 219). But we can also hold intentions specifically relevant to the
games we play: our moves in chess are embedded within the context of that game, and
inform it. Without the game of chess, we could not intend anything with respect to that
institution; likewise, he says, without the institution of language, we could not intend
certain sentences.
As a result, we can infer that Wittgenstein maintains that when we intend
something in language, we must do so within the framework of language itself, which
provides our tools for meaning certain things by our words. This also limits our ability to
change their meanings. When we use language, we use tools held in common.
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is criticizing certain notions of
language, but he is also criticizing certain conceptions of what we might term “inner
states” that allegedly have some connection to language and other elements of human
experience. For example, he criticizes the idea that every word corresponds to an object;
that every utterance of language calls up some specific picture or mental process; that our
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thoughts must always match language or reality, or even control it—“to remember,” for
example, is not a term that should be equated with whatever goes on in our consciousness
when we remember (I, 305; I, 601); and also that when we speak, we have in mind every
use or definition of the words we are using, as if dictionary definitions must scroll
through our minds when we use words (or our memories, or recognition of things we
have seen in the past—I, 603). We do not just view all of the meanings of words in our
minds, he says. If asked to “mean” the word “Scot” in different ways, he writes “I blink
with the effort as I try to parade the right meanings before my mind in saying the words”
(II, ii), but this is not something he would do in other contexts in which the word “Scot”
might naturally arise. Do we mean something different, he asks, every time we point to
something we perceive, such as the color of an object? Perhaps only if we are asked to
do so. Reading may offer different experiences still; speaking numbers 1 through 12 is
different than looking at the numbers on a watch and “reading” them (I, 161). He
disputes the idea that when we are communicating, we are transferring our mental states
over to someone else (I, 363) and rightly notes that conscious thought and language do
not always function together. Conscious thought can be so automatic and instantaneous
that sometimes there appears to be no “inner working” of the mind there, if we go to look
for it. For example, we frequently talk sensibly without any conscious forethought about
the words we are suddenly putting into speech.
Wittgenstein has effectively criticized some ways of discussing inner states, and
in considering what he says, and what he will not say, we can mark an aspect of
Wittgenstein’s procedures as a philosopher. He conveys the impression that he feels talk
is cheap when it will not issue in real answers we can accept, and he shows that this is
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where, at least at this point, in this work, he stopped. He is not eliminating questions
about “inner workings,” but he is criticizing certain ways of posing such questions, or
certain ways of understanding what the real questions are, because he realizes we will
encounter difficulties and reach a point at which we have nothing comprehensible to say.
Though such questions can be posed, they ultimately will not lead us anywhere; this is
another feature of philosophy—sometimes it raises questions for which we realize we do
not have direct answers, or indirect ones, either, and perhaps never will.
This is as far as he will take such subjects, and perhaps as far as he thinks they
can be taken. For example, at I, 157, after he has been describing the questions that arise
when we consider when we can say someone has learned to read, he attributes the ability
to read to a change in behavior. But in the next passage, 158, a speaker poses the
question: “But isn’t that only because of our too slight acquaintance with what goes on in
the brain and the nervous system? If we had a more accurate knowledge of these things
we should see what connexions were established by the training, and then we should be
able to say when we looked into his brain: ‘Now he has read this word, now the reading
connexion has been set up.’” To which Wittgenstein responds that this sounds plausible,
and may indicate whatever we may mean by “a priori” knowledge, but then says: “Now,
ask yourself: what do you know about these things?” And then he says someone could
accuse him of holding a behaviorist view, to which he replies:
We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime
perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what
commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite
concept of what it means to learn to know a process better . . . And now the
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analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we
have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium.
And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t
want to deny them (I, 308).
He will not weigh in or give voice to a view on these matters—beyond saying we
cannot. Is his failure of voice here a capitulation to skepticism, or a signal of the state of
his philosophical activity? (It is more likely the latter. Wittgenstein notes that two things
tend to occur: (1) we assume something we do not know anything about [e.g., that there
“must” be some kind of brain process going on], and then (2) when we cannot find what
we assumed must be there, it looks as if we are denying something. Both aspects of the
philosophical “game” are misleading us into false pictures.) It is noteworthy that he says
“when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an
inarticulate sound” (I, 261). The project of cataloguing the ontological status of inner
states is such a point. It is as if words, and his voice, fail him here, and it is interesting
that in this work Cavell sees so much material for his own “voice” in philosophy.
How can words fail us when we do philosophy, specifically if, like Wittgenstein,
we approach philosophy out of dissatisfaction with the questions and the answers it
gives—which also fail us? No doubt one reason is because of the nature of philosophy
itself, a discipline that works at the outer edges of what we can know, including those
questions for which we have never developed satisfactory answers. But one could also
argue that words fail us in certain compressed instances of learning itself: one begins
with questions and confusions, one learns, one understands, and that is it—one’s early
efforts seem puzzlingly inept at a backward glance; the material has been mastered, it is
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past, and there is nothing more to do or say. Sometimes the effect of this education is to
let us see that there really was no question where we thought there was one. Cavell says,
at the opening to Must We Mean What We Say?, that history can refer to what has passed
within oneself, and when one has progressed through learning, one can similarly feel that
the need to explicate one’s thoughts has also passed. That foment of words that can
accompany learning can exorcise the very need to say any more about the subject once it
has been mastered. This may be especially true of those areas of inquiry involving
“something that is already open to view,” as Wittgenstein put it (I, 89). I suspect this
experience may be true of progress through the levels of other kinds of endeavors; it may,
for example, be related to the way in which some visual artists move increasingly toward
abstraction as their skills, their experience, and their knowledge become ever more
refined. And in philosophy, one can, in an instant, see the problems, see the impossibility
of resolving them, and get to the point of feeling an inarticulate sound is most
appropriate, as Wittgenstein says. Perhaps this is where he found himself. These are
experiences in philosophical development that can affect anyone who is philosophically
inclined, not just Wittgenstein.
Related to this, the quote with which Wittgenstein begins the Philosophical
Investigations deserves more investigation than it has received (I notice it is rarely even
translated in editions of the book). Nestroy writes that progress appears greater than it is.
The observation is symbolically rich: Wittgenstein could be using the words to suggest
philosophy has not progressed very far, or that he and other philosophers have made less
progress than planned or supposed. The words are mocking, depressingly accurate,
amusing, and simply true. Is he raising a challenge to progress forward? It does not
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seem like it; he is reflecting from the standpoint at which he has found himself. (These
words correspond well with the tone of the preface to the Philosophical Investigations.)
And it is noteworthy that Wittgenstein availed himself of someone else’s brief, insightful
words, the words of a playwright who, like his quote, should receive more attention.
The Philosophical Investigations poses numerous interpretive difficulties (not the
least of which is the translation of the text itself, as well as what Wittgenstein would have
done with the sections his editors arranged). A feature of the text that is notably
consistent is its own particular use of language: a forceful, no-nonsense brevity, as if
Wittgenstein was or had grown impatient with what he saw as philosophical mistakes (his
own, those of others, or both?) or his own ability to get his thoughts across. Questions
remain about whether he can be understood as abandoning philosophy; if, in his view, he
felt he had dissipated the confusions of the subject, and philosophy itself had nowhere
further to go, or if he can be understood as providing a new, positive program for
investigation. (It sometimes sounds as if he is doing both.) At any rate, Wittgenstein
writes like the kind of teacher he describes. His language illustrates the striking power of
imagery to convey ideas, and he distills his reflections to main points (or at least central
questions). He tends to get to the point; Cavell quotes his remark in Culture and Value:
“Each of the sentences I write is trying to say the whole thing” (Cavell Reader, 386).
This may be because he writes with the image of his previous work in mind. Cavell also
repeats his admission “My account will be hard to follow: because it says something new
but still has egg-shells from the old view sticking to it” (Cavell Reader, 387).
G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention
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I will explain elements of Anscombe’s influential account of intention, later
relating some of Austin’s remarks to hers. Anscombe begins by pointing out three uses
of the word “intention”: it is used for statements that one is going to do something; it is
used to characterize actions as intentional; and it is used to refer to the intention
underlying or motivating such actions. She says we use the same word for these three
cases of intention, but this does not mean we are describing the same thing in each case.
Though in some cases expressions of intention, or descriptions of intentions or intentional
actions, may concern events in the future, intentions are not merely predictions of the
future, as Anscombe explains. For one thing, an intention might fail to get carried
through in the future; this does not mean it was not an intention. The fact of the
intention’s existence is not supplied by the fact that the action or behavior named by the
intention occurred. Intention also requires no outward evidence, though that can
accompany intention: it “can exist without a symbol,” Anscombe says (5). That is why
we say intention can be expressed. Yet expression is not necessary for the existence of
intention either, for one can have intentions that are not expressed in any way or that do
not match, or contradict, what one says or does.
Anscombe asks how we can at least recognize intention, and says we can often do
this by determining what a person is doing. She thinks we might suppose the only way to
determine a person’s intentions is by consulting that person about them; the person who
has intentions, on this view, has some sort of internal thoughts, and the person’s
intentions are “authoritatively settled” by whoever holds them. But she says we have to
begin by analyzing outward, not inward, acts:
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All this conspires to make us think that if we want to know a man’s intentions it is
into the contents of his mind, and only into these, that we must enquire; and
hence, that if we wish to understand what intention is, we must be investigating
something whose existence is purely in the sphere of the mind; and that although
intention issues in actions, and the way this happens also presents interesting
questions, still what physically takes place, i.e. what a man actually does, is the
very last thing we need consider in our enquiry. Whereas I wish to say that it is
the first (9).
In saying this, Anscombe raises the concern, related to criticisms that have been
made of Wittgenstein, that she is too focused on what is only observable by way of
“outer” behavior. As mentioned above, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the “outer” has led to
charges that he was a behaviorist (and I have maintained that he would not engage in
unprofitable discussions about what we couldn’t talk sensibly about, such as certain
“inner states”). Similarly, Anscombe’s emphasis on what we are “doing” can make it
sound as if she gives insufficient attention to the aspect of human thought (whether
consciously recognized or not) that actually informs so much of human activity, and
which she herself recognizes; as just reviewed, she acknowledges that we often use the
word to refer to something “inner,” and she maintains that a person’s intention might not
be carried through in action. If we have to choose between studying outer states, or
studying inner states, when we assume a starting-point in our accounts of intention,
perhaps Anscombe is correct to emphasize what is “outer” and observable. This involves
different philosophical problems than investigations into brain-states or “inner” states,
and Wittgenstein may be right to recognize, as I maintain he does, that such
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investigations lead to irresolvable problems and may be misguided. I do see how
Anscombe’s construal of the issue could incline readers to suppose hers is a behaviorist
explanation, however, and as such leaves something to be desired. In “Notes and
Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Investigations,” Cavell says that if the
interpretations of Wittgenstein reduce to behaviorist or antibehaviorist, he would pick the
antibehaviorist (280), and I would do the same. I am inclined to do the same for
Anscombe.
Having said this, Anscombe turns to intentional action. Intentional actions, she
explains, fall within what she calls a “sub-class” of things “known without observation,”
that is, not only known because they are observed. She thinks intentional actions are
those that, unlike other actions, can be investigated by a “Why?” question. The answer to
“why?” could refer to a historical factor, supply an explanation of the action, or refer to
something the actor is trying to bring about in the future (something that, she later adds
[35], the intending person must reasonably suppose can be brought about). (Anscombe
mentions that “reason” and “cause” cannot always be sharply distinguished: revenge as a
reason for an action is certainly different from knocking a cup off a table when startled—
so the cup is caused to fall—but is, she asks, the answer “Because he told me to” to the
“why?” question a reason or a cause? She says it depends on the case and its
circumstances. She also distinguishes between motive and intention, though she
acknowledges there are connections between them. She points out motives can
“interpret” [19] what we do. But one aspect of her ensuing description of the difference
between them is confusing. For example, she says revenge is a motive, but the act of
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revenge is itself the revenge, it constitutes the motive; an act of revenge is not some
other, additional state of mind or affairs.)
The “why?” question does not apply when we can answer “I was not aware I was
doing that,” or when we cannot provide (however this is to be done) some sort of mental
cause. (A hard case, to Anscombe, is the answer “I don’t know why I did it” [25-26].)
Intention depends on answers other than “I just did” (33), according to Anscombe: “the
concept of voluntary or intentional action would not exist, if the question ‘Why?’, with
answers that give reasons for acting, did not” (34). This intention, which she thinks is
revealed in answers to the “why?” question, is, she says, “the intention with which a man
does what he does” (34).
She then asks a fundamentally important question, “is there any description which
is the description of an intentional action, given that an intentional action occurs?” (37).
In response, she considers the case of a man pumping water that will be transmitted to
people inside a house. The water is poisoned; in pumping it in to them, the man is
engaged in poisoning them in order to stop their atrocities against Jewish people and
bring about a better political order. Anscombe argues that what the man is doing can be
described in various ways—as sweating, wearing out his shoes, making money, exerting
his muscles—but not all of these descriptions capture the intentional aspects of what he is
doing. Answers to the “why?” question here would issue in a sort of chain that supplies a
description of the intention: if asked why he is moving his arm, the man would say he is
pumping; if asked why he is pumping, he would say he is providing water for the house;
if asked why he is pumping the water, he might respond the people in the house need
water, and he is going to “polish that lot off” (38). Again, however, not everything the
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man is doing counts as relevant within such a description of his intention. We could ask
him a series of “why?” questions to which he will say he is moving his arm, pumping the
water, and then finally reach the point where he says he is poisoning the people in the
house. “And,” Anscombe writes, “here comes the break; for though in the case we have
described there is probably a further answer, other than ‘just for fun’, all the same this
further description (e.g. to save the Jews, to put in the good men, to get the Kingdom of
Heaven on earth) is not such that we can now say: he is saving the Jews, he is getting the
Kingdom of Heaven, he is putting in the good ones” (40). We have reached the point
where we are moving past what counts as an accurate description of the man’s action,
though in my view there could be room for disagreement about when exactly this
happens in the example she provides. Though she says the man’s intention is not to save
Jewish people and put good leaders in office, it seems to me this is in fact relevantly
connected to his intention and is part of the overall point of what he is doing.
This view encounters difficulties in the case in which the man claims his intention
is just to acquit his job duties and get paid. He might say, she explains, that he didn’t
care about the poisoning or any of that; he just wanted to do his usual job. She says “The
answer to this has to be: there can be a certain amount of control of the truthfulness of
the answer . . . It is therefore necessary that it should be his usual job if his answer is to
be acceptable; and he must not do anything, out of the usual course of his job, that assists
the poisoning and of which he cannot give an acceptable account” (43).
Each aspect of what the man is doing makes up a series of descriptions,
Anscombe says, using the formulation “A—B—C—D,” where each letter represents a
description of an action, and each description depends on the one that came before it. In
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the case of the man pumping water that will poison the people in the house, “A” refers to
the intentional movement of his arm; “B” to the operation of the pump; “C” to the
transmission of water to the house, and “D,” finally, to poisoning the people in it. She
says this is “one action with four descriptions” (46), and refers to one intention as the last
in the series—“D” is what really isolates the intention under investigation, and it explains
each of the prior stages in the series (46-47). There are innumerable details of events that
might interest us (we might focus on the way the water is being pumped to the house; we
might focus on other minutiae within the chain of events that has been initiated), but
Anscombe rightly points out that within any series we could construct, if what concerns
us is a description of the intention, we would only focus on those that are of relevance to
the intention. Later she claims that the movement of the pump handle may be construed
to play a part in the series, but not the train travel that brought the people to the house.
She asks “Why has the movement of the pump handle a more important position than a
turn of that wheel?” (83) and responds that it is because the pump is directly implicated in
the process of the poisoning we are investigating (that is, in the way in which we are
interested in it), though the train ride is not (though again, there is room for dispute about
what is relevant and what is not). She says “After all, there must be an infinity of other
crossroads besides the death of these people” and cites Wittgenstein to support this focus:
“Concepts lead us to make investigations, are the expression of our interest, and direct
our interest” (citing Philosophical Investigations 570) (84).
Now, an important aspect of Anscombe’s work in Intention concerns the
“direction of fit” between intentions and the world. She says if a man goes to the store
carrying a shopping list, it counts as an expression of his intention if he wrote it, and an
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order if his wife wrote it. If he is being observed by a detective who then makes up a list
based on what the man is buying, there is an important difference between the list the
man is carrying (whether it is an expression of an intention or an order) and the list the
detective makes. The man makes a mistake of performance if he does not buy what is on
the list; but there is a mistake in the record if the detective writes down something the
man buys that the man, according to his list, was not supposed to buy (56). She says if
we do not follow an order correctly, “there is a discrepancy between the language and
that of which the language is a description. But the discrepancy does not impute a fault
to the language—but to the event” (57). For example, she says, if we came home with a
grocery item we were not supposed to buy, because it was not written on the list, we
would not fix this by scratching out what is written on the list and supplying the term for
what we did buy.
This passage has been interpreted to emphasize the significance of the fact that
our intentions can effect a change in the world; they do not simply describe that world.
We cannot make the world aright by changing some words on a list. When our words
function as the performatives Austin will describe, for example, they actually change
what is in the world; they cause boats to be named, people to be married, bets to be
placed, and so on. They are like “deeds,” as Wittgenstein called them. Intentions are like
this as well, for they bring about changes in our world, if they are acted on. The fit is
what is called “word-to-world,” and I will investigate how intentions bring about changes
in the world when they function in the projection of words into new contexts.
J. L. Austin’s “Linguistic Phenomenology”
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J. L. Austin, like Wittgenstein, pays careful attention to our use of words and what
their use reveals. For example, in the essays of Philosophical Papers (abbreviated PP in
what follows), he analyzes “can,” “if,” and “prae-tendere,” the Latin etymological root of
“pretend,” as well as the differences he perceives between “purpose,” “intend,” and
“deliberate”—all three of which can figure differently in the case in which a child
happens to spill ink (“Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” PP, 274). He also employs
metaphors and, in phrases that recall Wittgenstein’s, he calls words our “tools” (“A Plea
for Excuses,” PP, 181) and insists “we should use clean tools,” by this presumably
referring to the need for precision and an avoidance of terms that obfuscate our inquiries
into language. He also wishes to examine the connection between words and what they
are about, or what exists, and he terms this a type of “linguistic phenomenology” (where
this refers to the “phenomena” we perceive in the world) (ibid., 182). In connection with
this phenomenological project, he provides examples of classifying and analyzing various
speech-acts.
I begin by reviewing Austin’s ideas about language. Though he believes we have
to closely examine our existing language use, and should not try to assimilate it to some
ideal model, Austin acknowledges our ordinary use may not reveal everything that is
meaningful or could be expressed in language, or that we would wish to investigate. He
says “There may be plenty that might happen and does happen which would need new
and better language to describe it in . . . There may be extraordinary facts, even about our
everyday experience, which plain men and plain language overlook” (“The Meaning of a
Word,” PP, 69). There is, he argues, a sharp difference between the world and our
language; words are not “facts” or “things,” and sometimes we must “prise (words) off
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the world” (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 182), so we can see it clearly. He thinks language
can only accommodate some human purposes. The world in which humans find
themselves, he says, is extraordinarily varied, “but we cannot handle an indefinitely large
vocabulary; nor, generally speaking, do we wish to insist on the minutest detectable
differences, but rather on relative similarities; nor, with our limited experience both as
individuals and as a race, can we anticipate in our vocabulary vagaries of nature which
have yet to be revealed” (“How to Talk,” PP, 147). It is unlikely that we will need to
introduce words to our language if we have some that work, he claims, due to “the natural
economy of language” (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 195), but it is true that this may occur:
“fact is richer than diction” (ibid.). Yet he does maintain “our common stock of words
embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they
have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations” (ibid., 182), and thinks
these represent a “survival of the fittest” that are probably more valuable than any that
can be invented by philosophers of an afternoon (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 182; also
“Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” PP, 281). Words themselves do not, he says, ever move
entirely away from their source. In his view, it is rarely the case that a word “shakes off
its etymology and its formation” (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 201). The “old idea” will
remain; “no word ever achieves entire forgetfulness of its origins” (“Three Ways of
Spilling Ink,” PP, 283). Additionally, as language users, we do not really differ in that
use as much as we might suppose, though it might turn out that on some occasions we
imagine things differently from one another—“which is all too easy to do, because of
course no situation (and we are dealing with imagined situations) is ever ‘completely’
described” (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 183-184). As Wittgenstein did, as Cavell does, he
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has confidence in our ability to agree (which is not to say we must or always do agree,
though he is optimistic about our ability to secure common ground, as necessary). If we
do fill in such a picture, he thinks it is unlikely it will turn out we disagree, but even if we
do, he goes on to say this may not be cause for alarm about the overall coherence of
language, or reason to suppose we should give up on it or find it hopelessly flawed: “If
we light on an electron that rotates the wrong way, that is a discovery, a portent to be
followed up, not a reason for chucking physics” (ibid., 184).
Significantly, and like Wittgenstein and Cavell, Austin makes use of imagined
cases to make his points. Examples must be brought to mind for examination by way of
the imagination. For example, Austin asks us to consider the difficulties posed by
thinking about a case such as “x is extended but has no shape” (“The Meaning of a
Word,” PP, 68). Yet he says “there are difficulties about our powers of imagination, and
about the curious way in which it is enslaved by words” (ibid., 67). The imagination is
hampered both by its own erratic power and its connection to language, Austin says. For,
he argues, “we can only describe what it is we are trying to imagine, by means of words
which precisely describe and evoke the ordinary case, which we are trying to think away.
Ordinary language blinkers the already feeble imagination” (ibid., 68). What we can do,
he says, is make ourselves aware of the tendency of ordinary expressions to obscure
whatever it is we are trying to perceive, and work around this: “the only thing to do is to
imagine or experience all kinds of odd situations” (ibid.). (In the case of something that
is “extended but has no shape,” what I imagine is something like the air all around us.)
The imagination can be assisted by details: “The more we imagine (a) situation in detail,
with a background of story—and it is worth employing the most idiosyncratic or,
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sometimes, boring means to stimulate and to discipline our wretched imaginations—the
less we find we disagree about what we should say” (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 184).
(Though as he has mentioned, no imagined situation is ever fully described.) And when
it fails us, that may be because of a “failure to appreciate the situation” (ibid., 194).
Austin criticizes the attempt to find “the meaning of a word” when that amounts
to trying to figure out what a word itself is, in general. He says we can sensibly ask such
questions as “What is a rat?,” but not “What is the-meaning-of-a-word?”, meaning by this
asking what it is for any word to have any meaning (“The Meaning of a Word,” PP, 58).
In those cases in which we seek the meaning of a word like “racy,” to use Austin’s
example, we can either try to provide a definition, or we can try to convey what the word
means “by getting the questioner to imagine, or even actually to experience, situations
which we should describe correctly by means of sentences containing” the term “racy”
and its cognates, as well as situations in which those terms would be inapplicable (ibid.,
57). The first case is explaining the word’s syntactics; the second, demonstrating its
semantics (ibid., 57, 60).
When, he says, we wonder why we call a set of entities by the same name, two
kinds of responses have been provided. The first supposes this use must indicate the
presence of a universal; the second supposes there must be something “similar,” as
Austin says, about all of the objects referred to by this word. But he objects to this notion
of “similar,” arguing that many objects called by the same name are very different from
one another. For example, he says, the aspects of the world we describe as “healthy”
(exercise and the human body) are not similar to each other. And when we consider the
use of “foot” employed in the “foot of a mountain” and “the foot of a list,” he asks, how
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can these two uses of “foot” be similar? He criticizes the “similarity” explanation by
claiming we often give B the same name as A because it is like A; C the same name
because it is like B . . . and before long we are calling things by the same name that bear
no discernible similarity to some other members of the category. For example, we might
say a game of hopscotch is like a game of jacks because both games can be played with
just a couple of people, but how do either resemble baseball, which involves multiple
players? Wittgenstein maintains that there are many different human activities to which
we apply the term “game.” Yet there are overlapping characteristics that result in their
placement under that broad umbrella, “game.” Here, Austin is focused on how dissimilar
identically named entities could turn out to be. As well, sometimes we use a term to refer
to an object that bears only one characteristic borne by others of the category. But he
feels the subject deserves further consideration:
it is a matter of urgency that a doctrine should be developed about the various
kinds of good reasons for which we ‘call different things (sorts of things, he adds)
by the same name’. This is an absorbing question, but habitually neglected, so far
as I know, by philologists as well as by philosophers . . . to develop such a
doctrine fully would be very complicated and perhaps tedious: but also very
useful in many ways. It demands the study of actual languages, not ideal ones
(“The Meaning of a Word,” PP, 70).
While Austin is right to point out that many things do not look, upon closer
examination, very similar, and concepts such as “game” may serve as names for entities
that appear flatly dissimilar, he may not have adequately made his case against similarity.
He ignores two observations of his own, explained above—first, that as language users
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we focus on relative similarities, and second, that words usually do not entirely shake off
their histories. If they hew close to their histories, can’t we, at least some of the time,
trace their travel through contexts? It is true that nominalists, as he calls them, should
specify exactly how entities called by the same word are “similar,” for this explanation
can be too vague, and we should not ignore the extent to which entities called by the
same name are dissimilar. Here Wittgenstein’s explanation of the nature of concepts
(that they exhibit family resemblances, rather than essences we can specify in terms of
sufficient and necessary conditions) is persuasive.
Both philosophers are appealing to something like family resemblances as being
the actual basis for what we term “similarity.” And Wittgenstein does this by looking at
our actual language use, not by peering at ideal language constructions. I am unsure why
Austin would not avail himself of this explanation, beyond his aversion to some of
Wittgenstein’s thought. (Incidentally, “healthy” seems like a much less problematic
concept than “game.”)
In “Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” which Austin did not complete, he distinguishes
the word “intention” from “deliberate” and “on purpose.” “Intentional” lacks certain
senses of performance, he says, and supposes this is because “intention is too intimately
associated with ordinary action in general for there to be any special style of performance
associated with it” (282). But the word itself is metaphorically associated with bending
or straining, he says; “compare ‘intent on mischief’ and ‘bent on mischief’” (ibid., 283)
(though these could be interpreted to suggest a level of determination that is slightly
different in each case). Intention is more “subtle” than deliberating or acting on purpose,
he explains. Echoing Anscombe (he cites her as the source of the insight), he claims it is
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about “what we are doing,” which we do not determine by observation (ibid.). He
describes “what we are doing” as a “miner’s lamp on our forehead which illuminates
always just so far ahead as we go along—it is not to be supposed that there are any
precise rules about the extent and degree of illumination it sheds” (ibid., 284). The
illumination, however, will be limited. It cannot extend any length whatsoever; it cannot
light up everything that is ahead of it. Everything that follows from “what we do” in a
given instance cannot be associated with that one intention. We can intend to fill our
car’s gas tank at the gas station, but if the gas station runs out of fuel shortly thereafter,
this does not mean our intention was also to deplete the station’s fuel resources. The
intention will take place, Austin claims, against what he calls a “background of
circumstances” (this background includes what other people do). A number of other
incidents or factors are implicated in this background of the intention. It is not a notion
we often make explicit in our use of verbs, according to Austin, except at those times
when we are not doing what it can be supposed we were doing. When we do something
inadvertently, we might say “I didn’t do that intentionally” (though this is not to suggest
that “inadvertent” is a synonym for “unintentional”).
Austin, like Wittgenstein, is aware that there is more to this aspect of our
consciousness and our actions: “we need to realize that even the ‘simplest’ named
actions are not so simple—certainly are not the mere makings of physical movements,
and to ask what more, then, comes in (intentions? conventions?) and what does not
(motives?)” (“A Plea for Excuses,” PP, 179). He sees intention as a useful way of
understanding what we are doing, but it is important to consider the acting agent’s own
assessment of what that is:
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There is a good deal of freedom in ‘structuring’ the history of someone’s
activities by means of words like ‘intention’ . . . we can assess (human activities)
in terms of intentions, purposes, ultimate objectives, and the like, but there is
much that is arbitrary about this unless we take the way the agent himself did
actually structure it in his mind before the event (“Three Ways of Spilling Ink,”
PP, 285).
It is interesting to review Austin’s comments in “Three Ways of Spilling Ink”
(though, again, that work is incomplete) in light of Anscombe’s analysis. As explained
above, Austin briefly comments on intention, separating it from other elements of human
action or behavior, such as doing something “purposefully” or “deliberately”
(“intention,” “purpose,” and “deliberate” function in the different ways one can spill ink).
Intention is general; it is, as he says, following Anscombe, about “what we are doing,”
conceiving of this as a miner’s lamp, with the limits of such a source of light. Our
intentions are not a source of our responsibility for everything that follows from them. At
some point, the context of intention in which our actions take place diffuses to the point
where we cannot really say our intentions are linked to it any longer. The same can be
said of the elements of a context that precedes our intentions. Anscombe says we do not
count the train ride to a house as implicated in the chain of events that led to the
poisoning of the people who traveled to it. Likewise, not every aspect of a situation that
precedes our intentions can count in forming our intentions and carrying them through.
Of course, as I have noted in discussing Anscombe’s work, there will be room for dispute
about just when we can say intentions have been formed and how we are responsible for
what follows from them. Austin also says actions are not simple; he wonders how
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intentions and conventions figure into them; and he thinks it is important to determine
how acting agents conceive of their own behaviors. To Austin, our own accounts of our
intentions are important in making sense of intentions.
Austin’s work shows a tendency to draw distinctions in the service of making
some initial point, and then to blur them, or to see they must be blurred, at a certain point:
“You will be waiting for the bit when we bog down, the bit where we take it all back, and
sure enough that’s going to come but it will take time” (“Performative Utterances,” PP,
241). This occurs in his analysis of what he calls “linguistic legislation” (“How to Talk,”
PP, 136) and in the initial distinction he draws between performative and constative
utterances. It is possible that this tendency illustrates Austin’s efforts to do ordinary
language philosophy. Perhaps he initially draws such a distinction because it is very
clear to him in our ordinary use of terms and concepts, but, upon closer examination, the
difficulties of maintaining such a distinction become just as clear. (This may reveal a
significant feature of linguistic structures themselves—systematic accounts of their
natures may face these difficulties eventually, somewhere.)
The initial distinction between performatives and constatives is drawn in detail in
How to Do Things With Words (the following quoted passages are from this work unless
otherwise noted). He defines performatives as utterances that are not words alone; they
do not just say something. They are part of, or function as, actions.2 (In “Performative
Utterances,” in another of his frequent examples drawn from the law, he likens them to
“operatives” used by lawyers—PP, 236.) Saying something is doing something, as he
later puts it. Examples include getting married, christening a boat, betting, and setting
out the terms of a will (5-6). When we say “I do,” “I bet,” or “I promise,” we are doing

60

more than uttering words; we are committing ourselves to certain courses of action and
actually bringing about different states of affairs. This, of course, assumes we do
something, bet on something, or promise something using the right words, in the right
context, under the right circumstances. Austin defines constatives as statements (the kind
of expressions, typically declarative sentences, that are supposed to be true or false), and
they are not, according to Austin, restricted just to definitions. He goes on to point out
that the difference he has located between saying something and doing something makes
an appearance in American jurisprudence: “a report of what someone else said is
admitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance of our performative kind: because
this is regarded as a report not so much of something he said, as which it would be hearsay and not admissible as evidence, but rather as something he did, an action of his” (13).
This marks an initial rough distinction between saying something and both saying and
doing something.
What is of great interest is his analysis of how performatives can succeed or fail.
Performatives can be “happy,” as he puts it (successful), or “unhappy,” that is, not true or
false. This depends, significantly, on context, or all of the other surrounding factors that
must be in place for a performative to succeed. Austin uses the term “circumstances,”
which he says must be “appropriate,” and includes within those circumstances the states
of mind of those trying to do something by their words. Austin says we may regard the
words of a performative as crucial, but he allows that context may be even more
important to the successful execution of the performative than the words used.
He then describes the things that have to obtain for performatives to go right. He
breaks this set of conditions into lettered distinctions:
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(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by
certain persons in certain circumstances, and further
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate
for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
(B.2) completely.
(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on
the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the
procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must
intend so to conduct themselves, and further
(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (14-15).
These are also described, more or less, in “Performative Utterances” in the
Philosophical Papers. Here, he says we can fail to enact performatives when we try to
“pick” a person for a game who then tells us he is not playing, or when we try to appoint
a horse Consul. In that work, he does not formally specify the nature of such failures.
But we can see that they violate A.2 in particular, above; a person who refuses to play a
game, and a horse, are inappropriate targets for the invocation of the procedures of gameplaying and political appointment, respectively.
We can examine an example of these conditions by considering a quote from
Euripides that Austin provides and Cavell analyzes in great detail. In Euripides’s
Hippolytus, Hippolytus says he took an oath with his words, but not his heart; he spoke
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the words, but he did not mean them: “The classic expression of this idea is to be found
in the Hippolytus (l. 612), where Hippolytus says i.e. ‘my tongue swore to, but my heart
(or mind or other backstage artiste) did not’” (10).
Hippolytus makes
(A.1) The promise, as
(A.2) someone who has the authority to make it (selected by the legitimate,
accepted procedure of language use to function in this capacity), acquitting his
promise
(B.1) Correctly and
(B.2) Completely
(Γ.1) He must have the correct thoughts, feelings, and intentions in conducting his
duties (in this case, carrying out his promise) and
(Γ.2) His actual conduct reveals this.
Austin says that violating these conditions can cause unhappy performatives.
(And, as Euripides presents it, Hippolytus’s promise is such an unhappy performative.)
Austin develops what he calls a doctrine of the infelicities, which he says obtain when
performatives fail.3 He then turns to an account of the difference between these
classifications. Here Austin makes another distinction, between the A and B cases taken
together and the Γ cases.
The A-B cases are misfires, but the Γ cases are abuses. He explains that in a
“misfire” that may accompany the act of marrying, we are liable to call the marriage
void; but we are liable to call an abuse “hollow” or “not implemented,” though we would
not call it void.
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If we offend against any of the former rules (A’s or B’s)—that is if we, say, utter
the formula incorrectly, or if, say, we are not in a position to do the act because
we are, say, married already . . . then the act in question . . . is not successfully
performed at all, does not come off, is not achieved. Whereas in the two Γ cases
the act is achieved, although to achieve it in such circumstances, as when we are,
say, insincere, is an abuse of the procedure (15-16).
So the difference is that in the case of misfires, the attempt to successfully bring
about the performative fails because something was wrong with the initial situation, so
the performative is never brought about—it is void. But in the case of abuses, the failure
has to do with the “hollowness” of the act, or the inappropriate thoughts or behaviors
accompanying the attempted performative—promising when we do not mean to keep the
promise, for example. Abuses seem to lean more toward the failure of participants’
intentions than do misfires; this occurs in the statement from the Hippolytus.4 (However,
there could be some cases where failures of intentions result in misfires—for example,
when nobody in a wedding ceremony intended to go through with it because they were
all performing as actors in a play. Some of the A conditions will fail in this case as
well—for example, the authority condition A.2.)
Austin considers to what these infelicities apply (conventional acts—that is, ritual
or ceremonial ones); how complete this classification is; whether the classes he has
demarcated are mutually exclusive; and says questions will arise about the ones to which
he has assigned question marks (18). In the Philosophical Papers, he points out that such
a classification cannot account for misunderstanding: “You may not hear what I say, or
you may understand me to refer to something different from what I intended to refer to,
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and so on” (“Performative Utterances,” PP, 240). It also does not account for cases
where we may be under duress or otherwise relieved of responsibility, he says, for the
nature of our speech-acts. He also rightly acknowledges the distinction between misfires
and abuses may not be as sharp and clear as it seems. For one thing, it is possible to think
of cases that are both.
It is striking in Austin’s account that success or failure of the performatives—
whether they are happy or unhappy—depends upon the commission of certain acts, and
the intention of the actor does not outweigh the surrounding context in which the act
occurs.
Austin himself seems to think as much. For example, when we consider the
phenomenon of promising, he claims we may wrongly assume that whatever words are
associated with the promise merely reflect the intentions of the person doing the
promising: to suppose an utterance is “the outward and visible sign . . . of an inward and
spiritual act,” thereby leading us to think the utterance “a description, true or false, of the
occurrence of the inward performance” (10). That is, we might erroneously suppose
there is a correspondence between inner state and outer act; the outer act merely reflects
the content of the inner one. This is normal in cases where the performative seems what
he calls “serious,” which means we must not be teasing, or speaking words in some other
context in which we do not expect words to truly convey the speaker’s thoughts—as
when actors recite lines on stage, or poets or fiction writers express claims in literature.
Austin says this may lead us to think that we can then report on the words of a given
performative as truly or falsely reflecting the intentions of the person promising. But
Austin does not think this is correct, and he cites the Hippolytus to point out that the
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connection between inner state and expressed words may fail. He says “if we slip into
thinking that such utterances are reports, true or false, of the performance of inward and
spiritual acts, we open a loophole to perjurers and welshers and bigamists and so on . . . It
is better, perhaps, to stick to the old saying that our word is our bond” (“Performative
Utterances,” PP, 236). Hippolytus is, as the Γ.I case stipulates, supposed to have the
correct thoughts, feelings, and intentions in conducting his duties—making good on his
promise.
Austin does not think this means promises or bets given in bad faith are thereby
false, and when we speak of false promises, we mean something by this other than the
falseness we attribute to statements. Saying something is not always enough, as he
explains, mentioning you cannot successfully bet after the race is over.
Austin later goes on to describe locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary
acts. The locutionary act is essentially a voiced utterance. The illocutionary act, on
which Austin primarily focuses, is the doing of something by such voiced utterances.
Russell Goodman provides an explanation of the difference between illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts: “An illocutionary act is what we do in saying something, for
example, christening a ship, or making a promise by uttering appropriate words in
appropriate circumstances. Perlocutionary acts, in contrast, are what we do by saying
something, for example, frightening someone. They need not be accomplished through
language” (Contending with Stanley Cavell, 4). Austin notes “the performance of an
illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake . . . many illocutionary acts invite by
convention a response or sequel” (117), and perlocutionary acts can be achieved without
locutionary means, by waving a stick or pointing a gun, for example (119).
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We can fail to effect these speech acts, too, of course (105-106). We can intend
to do things we do not achieve; we can fail to intend things and achieve them anyway
(106). Notably, again, Austin places the emphasis on the surrounding circumstances, all
the relevant contextual factors, or what he calls a “speech situation.”5 Ultimately, Austin
does not maintain the distinction between performative and constative utterances. He
says it “has to be abandoned in favour of more general families of related and
overlapping speech acts” (150). This emphasizes the significance of context in our uses
of language. Austin recognizes that we cannot entirely distinguish such uses; it is
impossible to claim that our words can be classified as immutably performative or
immutably constative in all cases. In fact, according to Austin, the category of constative
expressions might collapse into the category of performative expressions. Uses of words
crisscross, take on different shades of meaning and significance, depending on the
circumstances of their use. And in abandoning this performative-constative distinction in
favor of families of speech-acts, Austin again seems to share Wittgenstein’s conception
of games as exhibiting family resemblances among themselves, though he might not say
this himself. He declares “The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only
actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating” (148). This
suggests he notices that all three types of speech act are instantiated in complex ways in
many of our utterances, and in different combinations, and cannot be clearly separated
from one another, or from the contexts of their occurrences. He conveys his
understanding of the significance of contextual factors surrounding our utterances in the
Philosophical Papers as well: “the difference between one named speech-act and
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another often resides principally in a difference between the speech-situations envisaged
for their respective performances” (“How to Talk,” PP, 151).
Austin’s work illuminates the difference between saying something and both
saying and doing something. “If we follow Austin,” Michael Morris writes, “our interest
in language is shifted from the concentration on truth which characterizes the bulk of
work in the analytic tradition (of philosophy of language), to a general concern with the
various ritual and conventional procedures involving language with which we carry on
our everyday lives” (An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, 232). Austin’s
work also illuminates the difference between successfully carrying through an intention,
and failing to do this, because of the circumstances surrounding that intention.
Interesting parallels can be drawn here between Austin’s work and Wittgenstein’s.
Wittgenstein clearly establishes that “inner” intention is deeply affected by the workings
of the institutions or customs in which it occurs. Perhaps Austin is less decisive about the
nature of the circumstances surrounding intention because he ultimately emphasizes that
we must consider the overall context of utterances, though Wittgenstein would not
disagree with this. But in discussing the way our uses of speech can fail us, as when we
fail to carry an intention through, or fail to absolve ourselves of the commitments entailed
by the words we use, Austin, like Wittgenstein, establishes that we work with common
tools that decisively constrain the meanings of our shared stock of words.
In closing, it is worth considering what Austin thought about the future of the
study of language, as he saw it. He characterizes philosophy as the “sun” from which
other disciplines have issued, becoming planets, or sciences, with their own trajectories
toward knowledge. He says this has happened with mathematics and physics, and
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wonders if it will happen with language: “Is it not possible that the next century may see
the birth, through the joint labours of philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other
students of language, of a true and comprehensive science of language?” (“Ifs and Cans,”
PP, 232).
Such a science of language would rest upon observation of our human languages
in use, as Austin maintains that actual language is very different from any ideal language,
or model of one (he also questions the propensity to classify sentences as either analytic
or synthetic). Such a project shares features with Wittgenstein’s work, as Wittgenstein
decisively focused on actual language use and would not endorse any ideal language. I
think Austin would have supported contemporary developments in linguistics and
cognitive science for their focus upon empirical analysis of language and its connection
with neuroscience. A science of language in keeping with Austin’s own work could
further investigate the issues Austin himself has mentioned: how two contexts can be
“similar” to one another and how words do not move entirely beyond their sources.
(Cavell will say Austin heralds a “science of linguistics.”) But it also must examine what
Austin said about the “economy” of language; we do not often enlist or create more
words than we need. I intend to contribute to the science of language Austin might have
envisioned by examining the relationship of these elements of his thought to the
phenomenon of projecting words.
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CHAPTER 3
STANLEY CAVELL
Stanley Cavell’s work takes place against the backdrop of the work of
Wittgenstein and Austin, what he terms “the superficially, and sometimes deeply, similar
thoughts of Austin and Wittgenstein” (Themes Out of School, 216). Cavell is profoundly
influenced by them, though he points out that he himself puts off engaging in an
examination of works of Wittgenstein’s other than the Philosophical Investigations. He
says Austin’s teaching prompted him to consider whether he was “serious” about
philosophy (A Pitch of Philosophy, 60), and says Wittgenstein is the famous philosopher
who has been most significant to him (Cities of Words, 293).
He conceives of himself as validating a number of their insights by way of
defending ordinary language philosophy.6 Cavell insists that a conception of the
“common” underlies his conception of ordinary language philosophy, specifically the
work of Wittgenstein and Austin (The Senses of Walden, 142-143).7 Ordinary language
philosophy, Cavell says, gives him what he calls a “voice in philosophy,” as well as a
“return of voice to philosophy” (A Pitch of Philosophy, 69). Their work enabled him to
find his way as a writer and philosopher, and it is curious that he became inspired
philosophically by a work (the Philosophical Investigations) that may indicate a point at
which Wittgenstein vocally breaks off speaking about aspects of the subject. (Now,
Wittgenstein does not simply stop because he is speaking from a position of assumed
strength, one that demands obedience, but rather because he is recognizing our limits. A
sense of those limits is reinforced by Cavell’s reading of him, described below.)
Cavell is uniquely suited to address philosophy like Wittgenstein’s: as a young
college student considering a career in music, he was acutely aware of feeling like a
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fraud, someone who could not make his way forward in that endeavor, because he lacked
understanding. Charles Petersen writes of this consternation of Cavell’s: “it was as if
each new (musical) performance (of Cavell’s) followed only from instinct, without the
understanding that promised a way forward.” Cavell’s later philosophical works
powerfully attest to varieties of skepticism: to the skepticism he experienced in the
presence of logical positivism, and, as Petersen says, as a philosophical problem, an
intellectual experience, that philosophy should attempt to solve, or at least adequately
acknowledge.8
Cavell sees in Austin and Wittgenstein “the concern and implication of their work
for correct instruction” (Must We Mean What We Say?, xxv), and the significance of
instruction is an important theme of Cavell’s own work. Cavell argues in that book that
Wittgenstein and Austin are both complicating the relation of philosophy to its history,
and this can be instructive. For Wittgenstein, a primary instructive aim is showing the
“fly” out of the bottle—dissipating the confusions that philosophy can both cause and
cure. Austin’s careful focus on the way our words work in the world—including what
they can change, and what they cannot—is instructive as well as eye-opening.
Austin, according to Cavell, dismisses much of past philosophy, or cites people
whose views could easily be criticized. Wittgenstein, Cavell claims, mentions major
philosophers, but directs his energy to the act of philosophizing itself; according to
Cavell, “(neither) Austin or Wittgenstein spends much of his time confronting other
philosophers directly” (Themes Out of School, 216). Cavell says an interpretation of
Austin is that his “fundamental philosophical interest lay in drawing distinctions . . . in
this crosslight the capacities and salience of an individual object in question are brought
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to attention and focus” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 102-103), even if, as Austin
himself says, those distinctions often “bog” down upon closer examination.
Cavell shows great ease in moving between literature and philosophy and never
insisting on a sharp demarcation between them; perhaps this is due in part to a facility
with all of these aspects of cognition—abstract, imaginative, all combined together—that
shape thought and endeavor in both fields.
Cavell on Wittgenstein and Philosophy
Cavell characterizes the Philosophical Investigations in various ways, mentioning
that Wittgenstein refers to his work as “sketches” and an “album” (This New Yet
Unapproachable America, 59); he later says the book “can be seen as a philosophy of
culture, one that relates itself to its time as a time in which the continuation of philosophy
is at stake” (ibid., 72). The continuation of philosophy is threatened by what Cavell calls
the “modern,” the main aspect of which “lies in the relation between the present practice
of an enterprise and the history of that enterprise, in the fact that this relation has become
problematic” (Must We Mean What We Say?, xix). The “modern,” for Cavell, marks a
discontinuity between the past or tradition of an art or intellectual endeavor and its
current (and in Cavell’s assessment, wanting) state. (Perhaps Wittgenstein’s work is a
direct embodiment of such tensions, and this is one reason why, as briefly discussed
above, it can be so illuminating as contemporary philosophy.) We cannot, according to
Cavell, always innovate and then repudiate what came before; history does not vanish.
And he elsewhere notes that at the time he is writing, he feels philosophy “is in one of its
periodic crises of method” (ibid., 74). He notes the difficulty of the modern in its present
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manifestation in academic philosophy as the professional journal article,9 and he notices
the effect of the modern not only on philosophy, but on other disciplines.
He characterizes Wittgenstein’s speakers as antagonists, one the voice of
“correctness,” and the other a voice of “temptation” (ibid., 71). He says Wittgenstein is
aware of the importance of feeling and emphasizes the significance of his spare, emphatic
writing style. He emphasizes the literary quality of Wittgenstein’s other strategies: “the
patently and unembarrassed literary responses to itself, where we are asked to consider
such matters as a fly trapped in a bottle, a beetle in a box, talk from a lion, the teeth of a
rose” (Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 193) (not to mention the mouse forming out
of gray rags—meant to illustrate why and when we search for the reasons for things, and
light upon the explanation that seems most reasonable). Cavell says of these methods of
making points that they prompt “pleasure,” a “shock of freedom,” an “anxiety of
exposure” (which could incline Wittgenstein’s interpreters to missteps), that they are
“plain,” “sudden,” “brilliant”—they are reflective of Wittgenstein’s talent. And “they
require a matching aesthetic effort to assess: for example, to see whether their pleasure
and shock and anxiety are functions of their brilliance” (“The Investigations’ Everyday
Aesthetics of Itself,” Wittgenstein in America, 255).
Cavell says Wittgenstein’s work parallels Kant’s: “one of the most revelatory of
the affinities of Philosophical Investigations with the vision of the Critique of Pure
Reason, (is) its sense of the essential and implacable restlessness of the human, its
distinguished faculty of reason as precisely the faculty that tantalizes itself” (Philosophy
the Day After Tomorrow, 195). The works of Kant and Wittgenstein illustrate reason’s
dissatisfaction with itself and recurrent philosophical tendency to place itself on trial.
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Cavell sees Wittgenstein’s philosophizing in the text as a struggle (This New Yet
Unapproachable America, 37), a struggle aware of philosophy’s tendency to create
problems for itself, as Wittgenstein sees it. This struggle recognizes inherent limitations
in our quest for knowledge and truth. What we call or count as knowledge often must
include an awareness of our fallibility and potential lack of information or understanding.
In Cavell’s reading of him, Wittgenstein wishes us to reconcile with this aspect of our
knowledge without feeling as if what we call knowledge is ultimately unsatisfactory or
unworthy of the name. We must bear in mind that we may have to recognize that we are
wrong, or revise our information in light of further developments. However, this does
not mean what we count as knowledge is worthless (though it may be imperfect,
incomplete, or subject to revision), or that one idea (say, about the coexistence of
dinosaurs and human beings, or the actual workings of gravity) is as good as any other.
Cavell’s impressions of the Philosophical Investigations contribute to the idea
that philosophizing can leave us dissatisfied, searching, and far from ourselves, but
philosophizing can also lead us toward, or affirm, what we consider knowledge. Cavell
notes “the justifications and explanations we give of our language and conduct, that our
ways of trying to intellectualize our lives, do not really satisfy us, is what, as I read him,
Wittgenstein wishes us above all to grasp” (The Claim of Reason, 175). (Cavell refers to
this as an “exile of words” [This New Yet Unapproachable America, 36].)
What is the nature of this “disappointment,” this “exile”? It can refer to the
disquieting sense that what we take for knowledge or what we perceive around us is not
all there is, or we are mistaken about it, and we must seek answers—the impulse that can
prompt philosophy in the first place. And it can refer to our dissatisfaction with where
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philosophy takes us. I pointed out above that we can come to understand philosophical
problems as well as the impossibility of solving them, and this can lead us to an
experience of “voicelessness”—words often seem useless, or at least past, in such
circumstances. And it can refer to the frustration we may experience in realizing that
words irrevocably shape us, but may not be enough for our thoughts, or truly reflective of
them, or inadequate for what we may feel or wish to convey, as Austin noted. Our
explanations of our language and conduct—our ways of “intellectualizing our lives”—
may reflect all of these shortcomings.
Cavell also quotes Wittgenstein’s remarks on the fact that a person can be an
“enigma” to others. We can fail to understand each other even if we speak the same
language, and our fundamental relation to the world is not one of knowing about it, so we
continually look for knowledge where we cannot find it—or where locating it would not
solve our philosophical problems: “I once put what I gather to be a congenial thought by
formulating an intuition I find shared by thinkers from Emerson to Wittgenstein to the
effect that our fundamental relation to the world is not one of knowing” (A Pitch of
Philosophy, 79).
The Philosophical Investigations, to Cavell, represents an attempt to resolve or
treat these intellectual dissatisfactions. Philosophy is, in Cavell’s reading of
Wittgenstein, a potentially therapeutic process, one meant to demonstrate how
philosophical problems come up, and how we can resolve or understand them. It can
combat other pitfalls of human experience, which Cavell characterizes as episodes of
“restlessness, disorientation, phantasms of loneliness and devastation, dotted with
assertions of emptiness that defeat sociability as they seek it” (Contending with Stanley
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Cavell, 161). He calls human restlessness “a fundamental, motivating idea of
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, a perpetual seeking, perpetually undermined,
for what Wittgenstein calls rest, or peace” (Cities of Words, 128).
In Cities of Words, Cavell likens the effect of Wittgenstein’s book to that of
Plato’s myth of the cave from the Republic. He emphasizes that Wittgenstein mentions
turning in passages 108 and 116 of Part I of the Philosophical Investigations, and
compares this to what happens when those in the cave turn toward the light (Cities of
Words, 328). This turning does not, to Cavell, effect a cure, if by cure one means that
one is finished with philosophy and kicks it away, as Wittgenstein himself says, in the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we will kick away ladders we have used to climb.
Cavell emphasizes instead that the Philosophical Investigations is actually an example of
the very old philosophical search for self and wisdom, which is liberating: “If I say that
philosophy, as influenced by the later Wittgenstein, is therapeutically motivated, this does
not mean, as some philosophers have construed it, that we are to be cured of philosophy,
but that contemporary philosophy is to understand its continuity with the ancient wish of
philosophy to lead the soul, imprisoned and distorted by confusion and darkness, into the
freedom of the day” (Cities of Words, 4). Philosophy can release us from delusion (ibid.,
293).
Cavell thinks Wittgenstein does not see philosophy as completed, as indeed some
interpreters have taken Wittgenstein to have demonstrated, in his own writing:
“Philosophy in him is never over and done with” (Senses of Stanley Cavell, 47). We have
made progress, in Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein, when we move “from illusion to
clarity . . . from insistent speech to productive silence” (Cities of Words, 328). And
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perhaps this is an intellectual phase through which Wittgenstein moved (though he did
not stop engaging in philosophy). Cavell thinks Wittgenstein can be understood as
struggling to get back to a conception of philosophically grounded acknowledgment or
liberation we can really endorse, and Cavell wonders “is it strained to speak of
Wittgenstein’s philosophizing as the study of homesickness?” (Philosophy the Day After
Tomorrow, 235). The challenge for us is presented by Wittgenstein in the remark, quoted
above: “The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what
we have always known” (I, 109).
It is a challenge echoed in some lines of T. S. Eliot’s:
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time
(from “Little Gidding,” quoted in Empires of the Word: A Language History of
the World, 456).
(Of course, “exploration” may not entirely match Wittgenstein’s project, with its
emphasis on the therapeutic, not necessarily new discoveries.)
But this should not lead us to any kind of easy acceptance of common sense.
Cavell thinks Wittgenstein refutes the idea “that in the (apparent) conflict between
philosophy and the common ‘beliefs’ (assumptions?) of ordinary men, philosophy’s
position is superior” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 61), but he is not, therefore,
plumping for common beliefs. Cavell says Wittgenstein “does not wish to give the
impression that what is in question are two modes or realms of discourse, the ordinary
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and the philosophical. His claim, largely implicit, is that the philosophical is not a special
mode of discourse at all” (Themes Out of School, 37). That does not mean philosophy
has no place, or that uncritical acceptance of what we perceive works just as well as
anything else, or that we ought to abandon the pursuit of knowledge or truth. The pursuit
is important, even if it may bring us back around to something we knew, or thought we
knew, from the start. While philosophy sometimes confirms the deliverances of
common-sense reason, sometimes it does not, and it is valuable as both an intellectual
activity and a subject of inquiry with its own historically important texts and problems.
Also, for Cavell, Wittgenstein is a critic of contemporary culture, and sees philosophy as
one means by which to make such a critique.10
Cavell thinks the various thoughts rehearsed in the Philosophical Investigations
are exercises in seeking self-knowledge, and one reason it is so difficult to come to grips
with this aspect of the book (in his opinion) is due to the fact that since the rise of modern
science, the pursuit of self-knowledge has not figured largely in the history of
philosophy. As an example, he quotes Bertrand Russell on the fact that philosophers
have tried to understand the world, and says “so astonishingly little exploring of the
nature of self-knowledge has been attempted in philosophical writing since Bacon and
Locke and Descartes . . . But philosophers from Socrates onward have (sometimes) also
tried to understand themselves, and found in that both the method and goal of
philosophizing” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 68). Securing what we accept as
knowledge for ourselves, however, does not entirely resolve the unsatisfactory aspects of
experience with which Cavell takes the Philosophical Investigations to grapple. An
awareness of the force of skepticism remains a constant challenge. And, in Cavell’s
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reading of Wittgenstein, knowledge may fail to issue in better versions of ourselves:
“Wittgenstein’s disappointment with knowledge is not that it fails to be better than it is
(for example, immune to skeptical doubt), but rather that it fails to make us better than we
are, or provide us with peace” (Cities of Words, 5).
Cavell’s recognition of this problem of self-knowledge is, he says, related to
Wittgenstein’s idea that there are different methods of philosophizing, as there are
different therapies. Cavell says “in all of these methods part of what is necessary is that
we respond to questions like ‘What would we say if . . . ?’ or ‘But is anyone going to call
. . . ?’” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 66). But if we do this—if we ask someone “What
should we say if . . .?”—about some topic, we are seeking information that will reveal
something about that particular person, but not, obviously, only about that person. And
in seeking that information, we presumably advance the person’s self-knowledge. There
are ways—methods—of acquiring self-knowledge, even if they are not, as Cavell terms
it, “obvious”:
If it is accepted that “a language” (a natural language) is what the native speakers
of a language speak, and that speaking a language is a matter of practical mastery,
then such questions as “What should we say if . . . ?” or “In what circumstances
would we call . . . ?” asked of someone who has mastered the language (for
example, oneself) is a request for the person to say something about himself,
describe what he does. So the different methods are methods for acquiring selfknowledge . . . (Wittgenstein’s is the) discovery that knowing oneself is
something for which there are methods—something, therefore, that can be taught
(though not in obvious ways) and practiced (ibid., 66-67).
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For Cavell, our ability to imagine is also dependent on our self-knowledge (The
Claim of Reason, 146). The greater our insight into ourselves and our experiences, the
greater our ability to reap the advantages of at least some levels or aspects of the
imagination. Such self-knowledge may not generate creative leaps, but it can refine our
capacity to “call to mind” information as needed and to recognize and understand aspects
of imaginative thinking.
Cavell also glosses the self-knowledge we have won as related to our forms of life
and the ways in which they may develop. He does this by describing an experience of his
own, his reflection on whether atonal music should be assimilated within the concept of
“music.” He broaches the question of whether atonal music is really completely without
tonality and uses an investigation of the phenomenon of assimilating this type of music to
existing examples we unequivocally consider music in order to illustrate “Wittgenstein’s
sense of the way philosophical problems end . . . this happens (at least in the
Philosophical Investigations, according to Cavell) when we have gone through a process
of bringing ourselves back into our natural forms of life . . . I had to describe the
accommodation of the new music as one of naturalizing ourselves to a new form of life, a
new world” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 84). He thinks this recognition of the way in
which language-games operate is Wittgenstein’s “most original contribution” (ibid., 85)
to philosophy. As mentioned above, it has certainly been influential.
Cavell does not wish to call Wittgenstein a pragmatist, perhaps because, he
maintains, pragmatism does not take skepticism seriously, or at least seriously enough.
But he maintains that in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s writing is
“deeply practical and negative” (ibid., 72). For the process of invoking philosophy
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therapeutically, clarifying what one thinks and knows, as Wittgenstein does, is a
pragmatic (in the sense of practical) endeavor; it is negative in that it burns away the
dross, which, helpful though this may be, may leave nothing in its place.
In general, Cavell places great importance on learning, and how that takes place
in every conceivable human activity, from learning a language to following rules to
engaging in art to doing philosophy (though learning a language is uppermost in priority
for Cavell). He relates teaching and learning to our reasons for speaking, and he thinks it
“remarkable” that the Philosophical Investigations begins with a child; “It is not a figure
one expects to find in philosophical texts” (Philosophical Passages, 167). Yet perhaps
this is not so surprising, since Cavell says the book is “a work of instruction,” in “the
culture depicted in the Investigations we are all teachers and all students” (This New Yet
Unapproachable America, 75), and the passage about reaching bedrock is “its scene of
instruction” (Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 112). He mentions that there is a
controversy over how to interpret this passage in Wittgenstein’s text. He reads it “as
acknowledging a necessary weakness, I might call it acknowledging separateness, in
teaching (or socialization), stressing that the arrival at an impasse between teacher and
pupil also threatens, and may enlighten, the teacher . . . (this is) a recognition of finitude,
limitation, expressing patience, (not one of) assumed strength, insisting upon obedience”
(ibid., 113, 136). This may very well be just the type of impasse Wittgenstein reached,
and is an apt description of his own acknowledgment of limitation and resulting loss of
voice. We learn to follow rules much as we learn language, according to Cavell:
“against the background of, and in the course of, learning innumerable other activities”
(Must We Mean What We Say?, 49). And we even learn that there are things we cannot
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learn, or at least that we cannot be directed into accomplishing. “Every art, every
worthwhile human enterprise, has its poetry . . . You may think of it as the unteachable
point in any worthwhile enterprise” (Themes Out of School, 14). When we reach such a
point in these worthwhile human enterprises—in art, in language, in the practice and
ultimate mastery of a skill—it is up to us to go on alone, to be fully competent, and this
requires (primarily practical?) aspects of judgment that we must internalize for ourselves.
Like Wittgenstein, Cavell recognizes the nature and importance of an attuned or
educated judgment that does not depend on any kind of calculus. His own work
demonstrates an understanding of Wittgenstein’s insight into the similarity involved in
understanding a sentence and understanding music. Cavell investigates issues of value,
topics that historically raise doubts (perhaps common-sense doubts) about the objectivity
(or the provability) of their judgments, judgments that must be made in the absence of
such a calculus. As an example, Cavell points out “Hume’s descendants . . . found that
aesthetic (and moral and political) judgments lack something: the arguments that support
them are not conclusive the way arguments in logic are, nor rational the way arguments
in science are” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 88). Cavell argues that this does not
mean judgments of value do not thereby count as meaningful and reasonable grounds for
argument in philosophy: “Indeed they are not, and if they were there would be no such
subject as art (or morality) and no such art as criticism. It does not follow, however, that
such judgments are not conclusive and rational” (ibid.). In considering aesthetic
judgments in particular, and the similarity between the structure of those judgments and
those of the ordinary language philosopher (at least in certain respects), he argues “the
aesthetic judgment models the sort of claim entered by (ordinary language) philosophers .
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. . the familiar lack of conclusiveness in aesthetic argument, rather than showing up an
irrationality, shows the kind of rationality it has, and needs” (ibid., 86). He wants to say
Kant’s sense of “universality” (perhaps what we can intersubjectively validate) is “what
we hear recorded in the philosopher’s claims about ‘what we say’: such claims are at
least as close to what Kant calls aesthetical judgments as they are to ordinary empirical
hypotheses” (ibid., 94). (I will return to this matter below, as I describe the kind of
knowledge that informs our ability to project terms.) He suggests that the different kinds
of judgment called for in different philosophical contexts registers a difference in what
Wittgenstein would call their grammar (ibid., 90).
Cavell, like Wittgenstein, emphasizes the importance of certainty (though
Wittgenstein emphasized that the kind of certainty we require may be dictated by the
language-game we investigate), and thinks we need to supply it in areas of inquiry
important to human life, including, presumably, areas of value: “I am inclined to say that
to give up the quest for certainty regarding our fundamental convictions concerning the
way our lives are is to give up seriousness in our judgments. They may be overthrown”
(Contending with Stanley Cavell, 161). In order to understand the type of certainty
Cavell feels we can productively seek, we need an account of Cavell’s conceptions of
criteria, convention, context, and what is “natural.”
What, for Cavell, can provide some ground for our learning and our correct
judgment? For Cavell, an important aspect of our ability to judge correctly depends on
“criteria” of the kind Wittgenstein describes. I defined Wittgenstein’s “criteria” above as
“aspects of our shared intellectual judgments as well as ways of behaving that assist us in
understanding whether the requirements for a concept have been fulfilled in a given
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instance.” We share “criteria” in our forms of life for what counts as pain: people
groaning, rubbing the part of the body that hurts, and so on. By these means, we
recognize what pain is. We can think of other examples: we have criteria for singing or
reaching a new insight, for example. Clearly, however, one can behave in this way
without being in pain, and one can be in pain without exhibiting any of these criteria for
pain. In another example of the way the “inner” and the “outer” can come apart, pain
may not be conclusively established by either the presence, or the absence, of criteria,
and this may lead us to suppose, skeptically, that our shared criteria for pain cannot really
tell us whether it exists in a given instance or not. Cavell will go on to argue that
Wittgenstein’s conception of criteria cannot actually successfully deflect this charge of
skepticism, and this is not its aim (for example, The Claim of Reason, 7, 45).
Cavell argues that Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria does depend on what Cavell
calls the everyday idea of it, though the two are not the same. He collects instances of
criteria that illustrate how we use the word, referring to such examples of ordinary
criteria as admission to a college and what qualifies a poem for poetic excellence. These
examples illustrate the terms on which groups accept something, or determine what
“counts as” something. Cavell extracts seven elements he says underlie this ordinary use
of “criterion”: these are (1) source of authority, (2) authority’s mode of acceptance, (3)
epistemic goal, (4) candidate object or phenomenon, (5) status concept, (6) epistemic
means (specification of criteria), and (7) degree of satisfaction (standards or tests for
applying 6) (The Claim of Reason, 9).
Criteria establish whether the object, person, or event under consideration is fit for
evaluation according to the specifications of the relevant group; these specifications
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concern the status, or value, of the thing in question (ibid., 11). When we use the word in
its ordinary sense, Cavell says, criteria determine if something is eligible for the category
under which it is being considered. Could we love or hope for just a second?—No,
because that is not a possibility included in our understanding of those concepts (Must We
Mean What We Say?, 91, n. 9).
Standards, however, he says, specify how well the objects actually meet the
specifications of that category. He points out that contests provide an example of a case
in which criteria are formally specified, and the objective of the contest is often to
determine how well those who meet the criteria of a category actually acquit themselves
by its standards.
Importantly, these specifications concern judgment; it is an indispensable element
of such practices. Cavell establishes that criteria are the basis of judgment: “Criteria are
criteria of judgment”—at least in some cases (The Claim of Reason, 17). Criteria concern
not only individual judgments, they “settle” and announce our collective judgments
(ibid., 31). The builders’ primitive language, presented by Wittgenstein in the
Philosophical Investigations, and illustrating a limited conception of language, is for
Cavell “imagining them . . . without the possession of (shared) criteria” (Cities of Words,
286). (The builders can get by with their shared possession of a few words, but they lack
the full-blow dimensions of language actual ones exhibit, including the multiplicity of
uses of words that reflect and carry forward our judgments.) Cavell mentions that entities
that determine criteria (in the ordinary sense) often include an office specifically reserved
for it. Such judges ascertain how well contestants meet standards, but they are not
empowered to actually change the criteria under which they judge. Interestingly, he
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notes there are some who think judges working in law should confine themselves to this
model as closely as possible, while others argue this is not only unnecessary, but
impractical or impossible. (He mentions some wish to uphold the saying “judges make
the law, not merely apply it”—The Claim of Reason, 12.) Cavell points out that this is a
false dichotomy. Judges of law are not, theoretically, free to make law that does not
respect what has come before; neither are they able to apply the existing law to every new
case as if using a calculator that can produce a correctly computed result that does not
depend, at least in part, on judges’ reflections or interpretations. (But he does note the
“myth” that the case, not the judge, is thought to “extend” the law.) And he says umpires
are more limited than judges in their ability to exercise discretion. They are supposed to
call what they see, Cavell says. But umpires do have some discretion, Cavell argues,
when establishing whether a player’s intentions violate the rules of a game (ibid., 13).
Cavell says Wittgenstein does not use the “standards” of this two-part,
“criteria/standards” model Cavell has used to describe our ordinary use of the word
“criteria.” He says Wittgenstein does not apply criteria to objects of these kinds (ibid.,
14). When seeking criteria, Wittgenstein is talking about commonplace and pervasive
aspects of our experience, Cavell argues, not Olympic performances and their rigidly
delineated requirements (or similar special institutions, not the “general” institution we
think language is). To Cavell, this means Wittgenstein would maintain that criteria
govern our use of concepts in general. Cavell also says Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria
differs from the ordinary notion because Wittgenstein’s does not pick out officials who
establish or enforce criteria, but counts all of us, “we,” as the authorities. Authority is
constituted by all human beings: “It is, for (Wittgenstein), always we who ‘establish’ the
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criteria under investigation. The criteria Wittgenstein appeals to—those which are, for
him, the data of philosophy—are always ‘ours’, the ‘group’ which forms his ‘authority’ is
always, apparently, the human group as such, the human being generally” (ibid., 18).
When we make appeals to what “we” say, we are appealing to all of us, our shared
convictions (ibid., 20). (Cavell would maintain a community exists between Wittgenstein
and his readers; he points out readers do recognize and respond to the often highly
personal examples of his experience Wittgenstein describes.) As examples, Cavell
alludes to criteria for our concepts of “art” and “chair”: “that an art object is an object
which is fit for holding attention, allowing contemplation, inviting appreciation . . . as
much determines the nature of art, the criteria of art (what we are going to call ‘art’ and
the ‘criticism of art’) as what is fit to sit on determines what we are going to call a ‘chair’
and ‘mending a chair’” (ibid., 210). We seek or attempt to clarify criteria when we sense
there is a problem or confusion about some subject of investigation (Cavell says when we
are “lost”), and we have frequently sought criteria for the application of our term “art.”
For example, as they developed, people questioned whether photography, and later film,
should be considered art. Some people argued that the products of such technology
should not be called art, because they are “not made by hand.” This is a criterion for art:
to some people, at a certain point in time, artifacts that were not “handmade” were not
art.
As another example, Cavell discusses the fundamental importance of tonality to
our concept of music. It is so important to us, Cavell maintains, that the entire concept of
music might not be the same for us without it. As such, it is one of our basic criteria for
music, music as a form of human life:
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The language of tonality is part of a particular form of life, one containing the
music we are most familiar with; associated with, or consisting of, particular ways
of being trained to perform it and to listen to it; involving particular ways of being
corrected, particular ways of responding to mistakes, to nuance, above all to
recurrence and to variation and modification. No wonder we want to preserve the
idea of tonality: to give all that up seems like giving up the idea of music
altogether (Must We Mean What We Say?, 84).
It is no doubt the case that there are variations in the contexts in which criteria
occur, and variations in the judging abilities called for in each context. Participants of a
sport, the citizens of a nation, members of a creative community, and those who share a
friendship all make use of criteria in the exercise of their judgments, but some of these
human activities are more elemental to the human experience than others (as language is
more basic than the standards of a sport). And they call for different applications or
levels of judgment, different standards of proof, and so on. In some cases, we may apply
standards or select judges, as necessary. But in other contexts, such as those in which
Wittgenstein is primarily interested, in which “we” are all authorities,11 some of us will
be better able to clarify criteria and make judgments about some aspects of our
experience than others. Almost all of us may be able to weigh in on what a chair is, but it
may not be the case that all of us can conclusively determine what art is. Moving,
resting, and sitting are part of the basic daily functions of human beings, and even those
who cannot engage in these activities are familiar with them, unless they are unconscious
or unable to understand those aspects of reality. Understanding and using chairs is
involved in those functions. Art is not necessarily this basic, though elements of aesthetic
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experience may be (probably not). Does this mean art cannot be investigated according
to Wittgensteinian criteria, because for example he eschews standards and suggests we
are all authorities? I do not think either Wittgenstein or Cavell would say so. For
example, the fact that Wittgenstein eschews standards does not mean he eschews critics,
or, indeed, criteria.
“Authority” for our criteria is something that is constituted by our judgments, and
may not exist without them. When the subject is language, authority is constituted by
competent language users, though there is no independent standard or definition of
competence. Aspects of authority will be determined by the subject of investigation. For
example, a form of government, such as a democracy, acquires its authority from the
citizens who accept and institute it, and then participate in it. (Although one might object
that this kind of “social contract” is in many ways a fiction with respect to those actual
democracies people have limited choice in constituting.) This does not mean there are
specialized “authorities” at work in the institution and maintenance of government; the
point of many governing organizations is that everyone has this authority. But it has no
real existence otherwise; it is something that exists as authoritative because of the
collective exercises of human beings. Authority can be formally institutionalized, as the
example of government illustrates, though this does not always happen, nor should it
always happen. (An additional consideration arises regarding those subjects whose
criteria are institutionalized. Those applying or seeking criteria in an institutional setting
must act within the institution in an appropriate way in order for their judgments about
the subject to be legitimate. In an observation that could introduce complications into the
idea that everyone has authority, we might say that not all do in such settings. This can
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be either fortunate or unfortunate, depending on whether those with the best judgment
about a given subject are affiliated with the institution in an appropriate way.)
Many of us may have authority in various areas of human judgment, but not all
areas. When the subject is chairs, more or less every member of the human race counts
as an authority, though there might be significant cultural differences concerning what is
a “chair,” what is appropriate to sit on and how, and so on. When the subject is art, it is
that group of people who make the best judgments about art, which will not be almost all
of us, even if one reason for this is that some people simply lack interest in the subject,
not the ability to judge it.
Though it is not a formally codified institution, language is called an institution,
by both Wittgenstein and Cavell. Perhaps they should not have used exactly this word, as
it suggests deliberate formation, a moment of organization and a choice of officers.
(Maybe it could have just as effectively been called a “custom,” or a “practice.”) Instead,
language is a type of institution whose authority is determined by all of us. It exists
because of what all of us do, and it does not exist for us otherwise. But our collective
authority for language depends crucially on our ability to understand each other—we
have to share the meanings of the terms of that language itself, as Cavell will claim
(below). We have to agree. Agreement is not necessarily simple or superficial, however
(as perhaps different cultures might “agree” on appropriate manners or customs of dress,
or the rules of a game, or what will count as suitable for a certain party); it also marks our
considered judgments about knowledge and what we consider true. We have the criteria
for pain that we do (that Cavell describes) because acting in the way Cavell explains is a
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fairly typical reaction—shared by human beings—to this aspect of the natural world.
Because people know what pain is like, they agree on criteria for it.
Our search for, or application of, criteria, and our collective authority, are possible
because of our agreement. Cavell, like Wittgenstein and Austin, emphasizes its role in
our judgments about our lives. Cavell maintains that we do share agreements of which
we may not be conscious: “there is a background of pervasive and systematic agreements
among us, which we had not realized, or had not known we realize” (The Claim of
Reason, 30). And he claims Wittgenstein “sometimes calls them conventions; sometimes
rules” (ibid.). (Here, in order to explicate what Cavell thinks rules are for Wittgenstein, it
is helpful to consider Cavell’s remark regarding claims about ordinary words and actions:
if they “are taken as guides and supposed to be followed, they are rules” [Must We Mean
What We Say?, 15]. If we obey a rule, Cavell says, this is ultimately due to convention;
“That is always the ultimate appeal for Wittgenstein—not rules, and not decisions” [ibid.,
50].) As explained above, Wittgenstein is critical of the conception of rules as rails laid
to infinity, and here, I think Cavell is trying to make the same point. Cavell marvels at
the pervasiveness of our agreement, and the way in which it is reflected in our automatic,
indeed unconscious, use of words. He likens this agreement to attunement, and the
musical phrase echoes Wittgenstein’s own use of music as an example in conveying his
ideas—agreement is “being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, like pitches or
tones, or clocks, or weighing scales, or columns of figures. (Human beings) are mutually
voiced with respect (to their language), mutually attuned top to bottom” (The Claim of
Reason, 32). Attunement indicates our shared forms of life. Criteria do not explain or
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prove attunement, Cavell says, sounding a Wittgensteinian note; they describe it (ibid.,
34).
Applying criteria rests, again, on judgment, indeed collective judgment, and
Cavell thinks statements of fact as well as judgments of value stem from the same
capacity. Criteria help us, in making distinctions, toward what counts as knowledge in a
given epoch (ibid., 17). Later, he says “what can comprehensibly be said is what is found
to be worth saying” (ibid., 94), which suggests that the attunement underlying our criteria
are also attunement in valuing. It is not that what we value arises from or depends on
what we communicate, he says; what we communicate depends on what we value. But
he also emphasizes, as Austin does, that language and the world can come apart (and
routinely do): “growing up (in modern culture? in capitalist culture?) is learning that
most of what is said is only more or less meant—as if words were stuffs of fabric and we
saw no difference between shirts and sails and ribbons and rags” (ibid., 189).
Cavell’s discussion of the example of pain illustrates that criteria, in describing
our attunement, also demonstrate that pervasive aspects of our lives reflect conventions.
If we did not know what constitutes criteria for displaying or pretending pain, we might
not understand deviations from these criteria, and this, according to Cavell, reflects
convention. For Cavell, conventions register the “convening of criteria”12—conventions
are products of our attunement (though not the result of actual events in which people
gather to decide on matters).
Because we recognize how human beings often manifest pain, we are better able
to understand if someone is showing it or faking it: “In all such circumstances he has
satisfied the criteria we use for applying the concept of pain to others. It is because of
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that satisfaction that we know that he is feigning pain (i.e., that it is pain he is feigning),
and that he knows what to do to feign pain” (ibid., 45). We have norms for these aspects
of our experience; if we come across a case of behavior that does not fit our concept of it,
we will not “give up our usual notion of what pain-behavior is” (ibid., 89). For example,
if someone expresses pain by suddenly dancing vigorously or cheering or behaving in
ways we do not ordinarily associate with pain, we are not inclined to change our criteria
for pain. These would be exceptional cases, if they count as real cases of pain at all.
(They could count, depending on other aspects of the context.) If people stray too far
outside our conventionally accepted categories, they challenge our recognition of them as
persons, Cavell says (ibid., 90). We do share behaviors and often do not deviate from
them: “That human beings on the whole do not respond in these ways is, therefore,
seriously referred to as conventional” (ibid., 111). According to Cavell, Wittgenstein
“says that language, and life, rests on conventions. What he means is, I suppose, that
they have no necessity beyond what human beings do” (Themes Out of School, 224).
But such criteria can be disappointing, for they do not guarantee that what we are
observing is pain; there is no way to know that for certain. The surety we might wish for
eludes us, and we recognize this is what counts as knowledge.
Cavell does not mean by this sense of convention “the arrangements a particular
culture has found convenient, in terms of its history and geography, for effecting the
necessities of human existence, but as those forms of life which are normal to any group
of creatures we call human”; they are aspects of the universality of human life, not
“patterns of life which differentiate human beings from one another, but those exigencies
of conduct and feeling which all humans share” (The Claim of Reason, 111). (A possible
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ramification of this, Cavell says, is that human nature is empty, determined by
convention, and there is no essence to it.) He says the idea of normality indicates
learning, and it is from this that our criteria gain their force, from “an idea of
naturalness” (ibid., 122) (though Cavell discusses the “natural” in the biological, as well
as the cultural or conventional, sense). In investigating the communities we share, we are
unlikely to discover that these elements of our experience are consciously dictated by us.
Instead, they arise from what is natural or normal to human beings. Our criteria for pain
include the natural human tendency to wince when one is in pain, for example. We did
not consult each other and decide to count this as a way of identifying pain; it just reflects
our normal, natural experience of it. Should we seek criteria for pain, we will understand
this experience and the expression of it. According to Cavell, “(Wittgenstein) does not
mean, for example, that we might all convene and decide or vote on what our human
forms of life shall be, choose what we shall find funny or whether we will continue
finding loss and comfort where we do. If we call these arrangements conventional, we
must then also call them natural. The thought was perhaps expressed by Pascal when he
said of human beings, ‘Custom is our nature’” (Themes Out of School, 224). (I return to
Pascal’s idea, and to the “naturalness” of convention, below.)
Of course some aspects of our lives are conventional in a manner that does reflect
conscious agreement. Games provide a good example of conventions consciously
decided and carried forward (though these are not the most important subjects of
investigation for Wittgenstein and Cavell). Conventions also reflect the human tendency
to devise, or settle on, ways of life that are more or less arbitrary and may require
revision. Custom may reflect or influence irreducible aspects of human nature. But it
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also reflects the problematic or pointless traditions human beings institute, for various
reasons, some the product of conscious reflection, some not. These can ossify into
traditions or institutions that require change. Cavell says “it is essential to a convention
that it be in service of some project” (The Claim of Reason, 120), so it can change.
Within those forms of life that require revision, Cavell says “only a slave of (convention)
can know how it may be changed for the better, or know why it should be eradicated.
Only masters of a game, perfect slaves to that project, are in a position to establish
conventions which better serve its essence” (ibid., 120-121). Cavell also says that only
such masters can recognize revolutions within areas of inquiry as natural extensions of it
(he uses the example of science), when that might not be how the revolution is viewed by
others (ibid., 121). Presumably, those who fully understand certain forms of life—for
example, those who fully understand the conventions employed in judging Olympic
figure skating—will be able to determine how to revise the conventions operating within
that activity, and can offer justifications for doing so: “a justification for saying that a
different practice is ‘just as good’ or ‘better’ is that it is found just as good or better (by
those who know and care about the activity)” (ibid., 120). Such justifications may or
may not be explicit; they may also be accepted or refused.
But in This New Yet Unapproachable America, Cavell emphasizes that the
interpretations of Wittgenstein focused on the “social” aspects of his philosophy should
not be taken as assuring that everything we do can simply be reduced to convention,
because convention could exist between automata (41-43). Robots lacking selfconsciousness and the ability to recognize criteria, or speak of matters such as their
“convening,” could be (are) programmed to behave conventionally. Such a lack of self-
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consciousness marks a startling difference between the two types of conventional
behavior—one of humanity, the other of automata. (Where, then, does convention stop,
how far into human nature does it reach, and how can we distinguish human life from the
behavior of automata—a point of investigation Wittgenstein might say would cause us to
make an “inarticulate sound”? These may not be our most pressing questions, as the
close of The Claim of Reason demonstrates.)
Cavell uses the concept denoted by the word “stable” to explain that
investigations of criteria will reveal their dependence on context—they are “objectspecific” (The Claim of Reason, 15). We must rely on context, in Cavell’s reading of
Wittgenstein, in order to analyze the nature of our concepts. (As mentioned above, I
define a context, for Wittgenstein, as “all of the background factors relevant to
determining the meaning of some aspect of our experience or consciousness which we
are examining.”) Criteria for determining excellence in figure-skating will differ from
criteria for pain, and both will differ from criteria for establishing what counts as a chair.
Cavell acknowledges his debt to context, but does not think we usually need to overspecify what it is. In the case of language, for example, he says: “Giving directions for
using a word is no more prodigious and unending a task than giving directions for
anything else” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 17). He says he “would claim to have
characterized the context sufficiently (for the purpose at hand) by the statement that
something is, or is supposed to be, fishy about the action” (ibid.). In cases of what Cavell
would call the ordinary use of the concept “criteria,” we implement, change, and dismiss
rules or standards depending on the context (whether we are dealing with football
commissions, bar association committees, and so on) (ibid., 24). We cannot do that in
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other situations, such as those involving mathematics; we cannot make rules or change
them as easily, and this is because they reflect our natural forms of life to a greater extent
than artificially constructed environments such as football commissions (though some
ordinary cases of rules or standards may reflect very natural elements of our ways of
living, as well. The judgments of excellence pronounced at the Olympics may be
rarefied, but for all that, they do not, to me, seem entirely removed or discontinuous from
our natural forms of life). In contexts involving values, or considerations of what we
must do, statements about such values as obligation only make sense if they are operating
in a context in which there is understanding about what constitutes doing the thing well
or badly, though these do not constitute pure “imperatives” (ibid., 27, 30).
Cavell’s account of criteria, convention, and context raises doubts about whether
we will agree or understand each other. It also raises questions about determining what is
natural or normal. For example, if forms of life arise between different cultures that are
both recognizably human but issue in different values and emphases on what is
important, or what is right or wrong, then whose form of life is the right one, the better
one, or truly reflective of what is normal, or what is human? How do we resolve such
disputes even within a culture? But Cavell has confidence in our ability to correctly
discern, at least in many cases: “we know how to make sure, know what to do to make
sure and certain” (The Claim of Reason, 58) of our experiences. He is assured of the fact
of our attunement, and we need not suppose we must give up on this account of our forms
of life and our judgments of them even if we encounter disagreement. Some people may
simply be wrong: “You can’t talk to everyone about everything” (ibid., 197). Our
criteria are sufficient for many of our purposes. However, this is not to suggest that
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Cavell is unaware of how fragile these criteria can be—internal to our practices and
human forms of life; not guided by anything external to them (as a rail to infinity would
be).
Our criteria are not analytic, or necessary, Cavell says, and it seems plausible that
this might incline us toward skepticism about them. Cavell seems to suggest that our
shared criteria both secure us against skepticism and lead us to it, since they can be given
up, or are not “necessary” (Transcendental Etudes, 35-36). In “What’s the Use of
Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?,” Cavell relates that Wittgenstein “(struggles) with the
threat of skepticism” throughout the Philosophical Investigations. (And he thinks this
distinguishes Wittgenstein from William James and John Dewey, who, he argues, do not
grapple with it the way Wittgenstein does. This is one reason Cavell is not convinced
Wittgenstein is a pragmatist.)
But Cavell will accept rather than reject criteria. However, he knows this is not
the sort of account that will satisfy the skeptic.
Cavell on Language
When it comes to language, Cavell continually emphasizes that this extraordinary
human power is shaped by what we learn and share, and he never supports the idea that
we are caught up in rails to infinity that underlie it or guarantee its form. We learn not
only about language, but about the world, when we use ordinary philosophy, Cavell says
(Must We Mean What We Say?, 99). He argues “we learn language and learn the world
together, that they become elaborated and distorted together, and in the same places”
(ibid., 19); this is very “elaborate.” Once we look up a word in the dictionary, we already
know a great deal of language; we bring the world with us to the dictionary (ibid., 19-20).
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Cavell said of Austin that he sought “clarity” in philosophy by what Austin
himself titled a “linguistic phenomenology,” as mentioned above (the “title to [Austin’s]
methods,” Cavell says, in The Claim of Reason—99), which could be “achieved through
mapping the fields of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word” (ibid., 100). Cavell
does not see as close a connection between Austin’s work and the empirical investigation
of language as Austin apparently did or may have wished for. He also says Austin does
not devise a theory of language (Themes Out of School, 35), and wonders if he is “really a
philosopher, or is he rather a herald—as he seemed sometimes to wish to be—of some
unheard-of science of linguistics?” (Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 62). (As
explained above, the “science of linguistics” in question must concern further
examination of the difference between the world and our words; as Austin said,
sometimes we must “prise” words off the world.) Cavell’s analysis of language echoes
Austin’s own exploration of the ways in which we use words, and what that use reveals.
He also notes John Searle’s work on speech acts has been more famous than Austin’s
philosophy, which, Cavell says, began the entire line of philosophical inquiry
(Philosophical Passages, 44).
In his discussion of language, Cavell echoes Wittgenstein as well, seeing in
language use a form of life that is shaped by our public, shared meanings. He mentions
Wittgenstein’s “teaching of his obsessive emphasis on the publicness of language and on
the outwardness of criteria” (The Claim of Reason, 329), and he explicitly defends the
idea that “It is commonly taken as obvious, it is surely obvious, that for Wittgenstein
language is as it were a public, shared fact” (Cities of Words, 371). In the context in
which he says this, Cavell refutes those who do not think Wittgenstein ultimately
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endorses the idea that language’s publicly shared aspects determine the meaning of
language. Cavell is also raising the question of what this idea amounts to and how best to
understand it, in a way consistent with what he has said about ordinary language and
criteria.
Cavell also underscores “Wittgenstein’s insight that thinking, our use of language
with each other, occurs with no ground beyond what we can find in ourselves” (Cities of
Words, 114). There is no foundation that our language rests on beyond our shared
judgments, our shared criteria; there is nothing that guarantees that there must, or always
will be, such shared criteria. He says Wittgenstein argues we suffer from a problematic
conception of language, supposing it a “symbolism in an exact calculus” (Must We Mean
What We Say?, 51). According to Cavell, the Philosophical Investigations (again, the
only work Cavell analyzes in detail) disputes this idea that there is a skeleton of grammar
or rules underlying human language, which somehow controls it, or is responsible for the
essence of language and our use of it. Cavell says “Frege’s and Russell’s visions of a
perfect language set out their philosophical hopes” (Themes Out of School, 57), but in the
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein works to establish “everyday language does
not, in fact or in essence, depend upon such a structure and conception of rules, and yet . .
. the absence of such a structure in no way impairs its functioning” (Must We Mean What
We Say?, 48). Wittgenstein argues against a particular illusion, Cavell says: “perfection
or generality or completeness. One of its forms is the idea that the intelligibility of our
language rests upon a foundation of logic, or is secured by essences or rules. It is as
though he had asked himself, ten years after his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was
written, ‘How can logic show us the real form of language?’ and had to answer, ‘It
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can’t’” (Themes Out of School, 217). Cavell endorses Wittgenstein’s view that there are
no tracks laid down underneath our language use that catch us up in their grooves, if by
tracks we mean immutable laws or rules that somehow operate inexorably on human
understanding. Cavell questions whether the idea of such a foundation is even
worthwhile:
But on another step we may feel this idea of (lack of) foundation to be
impertinent, an old thought for an old world. (The idea of foundation as getting to
the bottom once and for all of all things is a picture Thoreau jokes about in
describing . . . the time he took measurements of the bottom of Walden, and times
such measurements become controversial) (This New Yet Unapproachable
America, 109).13
He says Wittgenstein uses the concept of the “game” as a way to explore the way
in which so-called rules or regularities are observed, but these are not rails to infinity that
determine our cognitive futures. Within our forms of life, Cavell supposes Wittgenstein
to be saying that we will gain a facility for how each form works: “knowing how to go
on, as well as knowing when to stop, is exactly the measure of our knowing, or learning,
in certain of its main regions or modes—for example, in the knowledge we have of our
words” (The Senses of Walden, 136).
He conceives of Wittgenstein as approaching the question “What must I know to
say what I must say?” (This New Yet Unapproachable America, 19). Yet Cavell also
acknowledges “The Investigations lends itself to, perhaps it calls out for, competing
emphases in its consideration of human discourse—an emphasis on its distrust of
language or an emphasis on its trust of ordinary human speech” (ibid., 32). Cavell says
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he goes in for the latter, perhaps because of his focus on the Philosophical Investigations
in particular, though indeed Cavell’s work reflects the impact distrust may have on our
experience, and the way in which it may result in the experiences of alienation, lostness,
or skepticism.
In Chapter 7 of The Claim of Reason, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of
Language,” Cavell provides the kind of detailed examination of language acquisition
which Wittgenstein more or less avoids in the Philosophical Investigations, though
Austin does not, in his work. And perhaps this could be considered a type of contribution
to the science of language Austin envisioned. Cavell asks “What do we teach or tell a
child when we point to a pumpkin and say, ‘Pumpkin’? Do we tell him what a pumpkin
is or what the word ‘pumpkin’ means?” He says his initial response was to say “You can
say either,” which got him thinking about the connection between how knowing what
something is links up with what it is called, as well as David Hume’s remark from the
Treatise, “We may change the names of things, but their nature and their operation on the
understanding never change.” (In engaging in this analysis, Cavell sees himself as
addressing two matters of language Wittgenstein addresses: the first is that learning a
name is learning its meaning, the second is that acquiring language is simply a process of
acquiring new words [The Claim of Reason, 173].) But he says this answer (“You can
say either”) can only be applicable to people who have learned a language, and, he
claims, we may not really be telling a learning child either what a pumpkin is or what the
word “pumpkin” means (ibid., 168-170).
How might saying “Pumpkin” and pointing to a pumpkin not be “telling the child
what a word means”? There are many sorts of answers to that. One might be: it
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takes two to tell someone something . . . You can’t tell a child what a word means
when the child has yet to learn what “asking for a meaning” is . . . Nor, in saying
“Pumpkin” to the child, are we telling the child what a pumpkin is, i.e., the child
does not then know what a pumpkin is. For to “know what a pumpkin is” is to
know, e.g., that it is a kind of fruit; that it is used to make pies; that it has many
forms and sizes and colors; that this one is misshapen and old; that inside every
tame pumpkin there is a wild man named Jack, screaming to get out (ibid., 170171).
Essentially, there are a number of very diverse and variable facts about our “form
of life” associated with pumpkins, which people come to understand through learning.
But what is happening in these situations? Cavell calls it a process of initiation. We
bring someone into our experience of human life, rather than imposing something
external onto them: “Instead, then, of saying either that we tell beginners what words
mean, or that we teach them what objects are, I will say: We initiate them, into the
relevant forms of life held in language and gathered around the objects and persons of our
world” (ibid., 178).
We can ask how language first started, and if this has any effect on its properties.
There may be no empirically verifiable answer to this, but Cavell provides a plausible
account of how it continues. Because it depends on criteria, and our shared forms of life,
languages could conceivably be much different than they are. Indeed, the concepts of
criteria and shared forms of life plausibly explain why languages differ, and account for
the different emphases and words that diverse cultures develop to express aspects of their
experience. No underlying architecture of language guarantees that language users will
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all arrive on the same page. If there is no underlying architecture of language, perhaps
there is an architecture of language connections that build up as children learn more and
more language, and more and more about the world.
Cavell wonders if “perhaps we are too quick to suppose we know what it is in
such situations that makes us say the child is learning something. In particular, too quick
to suppose we know what the child is learning”:
her word was produced about a soft, warm, furry object of a certain size, shape,
and weight. What did she learn in order to do that? What did she learn from
having done it? If she had never made such leaps she would never have walked
into speech. Having made it, meadows of communication can grow for us . . .
although I didn’t tell her, and she didn’t learn, either what the word “kitty” means
or what a kitty is, if she keeps leaping and I keep looking and smiling, she will
learn both (ibid., 171-172).
The child will learn how to go on. Cavell wonders “We say a word and the child repeats
it. What is ‘repeating’ here? All we know is that the child makes a sound which we
accept. (How does the child recognize acceptance? Has he learned what that is?)” (Must
We Mean What We Say?, 52), and in The World Viewed, he remarks, “(A child) might be
very puzzled by the remark, said of a photograph, ‘That’s your grandmother.’ Very
early, children are no longer puzzled by such remarks, luckily. But that doesn’t mean we
know why they were puzzled, or why they no longer are” (18). This could mean that
children are astute at reading expressions, seeing patterns, understanding different
instances of the same thing (recognizing a cat every time it appears, for example), gaining
an understanding of modes of representation (e.g., picture for person), and, crucially,
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mimicking their teachers. (What the child has learned, however, does not necessarily
have one, definite correct theoretical description.) What we appear to be witnessing is
the remarkable success of the process of initiation into forms of life. This form of life
will provide the basis for the institution of language.
Cavell means to emphasize important aspects of the process of education and the
way in which, throughout this learning process, our language skills build up to
increasingly complex language (and possibly cognitive) structures. (As a part of this
learning process, Cavell adds that we often accrue associations to words that are not
really part of their conventional meaning, which we may later remember.) This provides
a compelling example of education’s power, its influence on us, and the way in which
language, as Cavell describes it, expands from cases like “pumpkins” to “cities and
mayors . . . God exists . . . I cannot do otherwise . . . (and) Beauty is but the beginning of
terror” (The Claim of Reason, 172-173), to use his examples.
He characterizes this instruction as in part a two-way process in which we show
children what we do and then endorse what they do in response. (Children could flout
our instructions, or we could avoid endorsing children’s attempts to communicate with
us.) But, since he acknowledges this is not a picture of language that suggests a
scaffolding of rules or foundation beneath it, Cavell thinks, “We begin to feel, or ought
to, terrified that maybe language (and understanding, and knowledge) rests upon very
shaky foundations—a thin net over an abyss” (ibid., 178-179). But he says “Wittgenstein
does not seem unnerved by this experience, or this recognition. Should he have been?”
(Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 135).
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We may have been born into language, learned it, and no doubt it shapes our
thoughts (and perhaps our sense of what is possible; had it been different, we might be
too) to an unfathomably deep degree, but after reaching a stage on which we can reflect
self-consciously on language, we can say that we accept it. (We may not have any
choice.) We use it to communicate, relying on our judgment and experience. But, as
Cavell says, we are faced with questions about why this happens. Why do we accept
what our elders tell us, and why do they accept what we do? What would they do if we
did not accept the process of learning language? It would appear that one reason for this
is because the process of initiation into language also indicates initiation into
understanding of elements of communication as well as acceptance of authority.
Though we learn language, as Cavell has described, we are never finished
learning, as he goes on to say. We do not learn in advance every context in which a word
can be applied, and we also use words in ways that cannot be learned (for example, when
we use them metaphorically). We are never through projecting words into new contexts;
we do not limit their use to fixed ones, as he points out (The Claim of Reason, 180). Yet,
he says, a projection must be “appropriate” or “correct,” as he calls it (ibid., 168-169); we
cannot project words into new contexts arbitrarily, and this raises questions about why
and how our ability to project is limited by what a context will “invite” or “allow,” as he
puts it (ibid., 182-183). He alludes to this particular power: “words of a natural (that is,
of a culture’s) language . . . are . . . projectible into further (not-old, not-new) contexts.
(There is no place that words fail to reach; this does not mean that they go places
limitlessly.)” (A Pitch of Philosophy, 97). But it does not seem as if Cavell would
maintain that this projection is anything that can be described as “rule-governed,” and
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again, he appeals to Wittgenstein’s work to support his view: “Wittgenstein does speak
of forms of expression which we might think of as representing ‘a new move’ in a shared
language, to wit, those whose ‘grammar has yet to be explained’ . . . But (he does not say
of) such expressions that in explaining them we decide to adopt the rules which confer
meaning on them” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 54). Additionally, he claims we can
carry a word into new contexts without “being able to articulate the criteria in terms of
which it is applied” (The Claim of Reason, 122). The question is, how do we carry out
this “projection,” which is not based simply on rules or reducible to a mechanical
procedure, though it explains both our understanding of meaning and our life in our
culture? This will be the major question I address in what follows.
Cavell remarks on the Euripides passage in Austin’s work on several occasions,
wondering why it has not received more attention: “Not that any other reader I know of
How to Do Things With Words stops to wonder about it either” (Philosophical Passages,
53). He supposes this may be because it seems trivial—“to mention that brilliant readers
do not notice Austin’s reference to Euripides is to imply that they do not sense it to be
important enough—to Austin—to mention”—though Cavell uses it to make significant
points about intention, and emphasizes rather excitedly that Socrates uses the same quote
in order to avoid speaking in the Symposium: “I do like learning things, and I like
providing what might be news, such as that Hippolytus’s line that Austin cites is also
quoted by Socrates in the Symposium” (ibid., 63, 82). Curiously, Socrates, in that
passage, misquotes the line, essentially saying he did not take an oath with his mind; he
claims that he really has no obligation to go through with what he said he would do. He
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argues he does not need to deliver a eulogy to love, disclaiming his ability to do so after
hearing the eulogies already delivered. He says:
it seems I did not know how to make a eulogy, and it was in ignorance that I
agreed to take my turn to eulogise. “My tongue it was that swore; my mind is not
under oath.” Goodbye to my promise! I don’t intend to eulogise in that way (for
I could not do it) . . . (Symposium, 199a).
Here Socrates explicitly (though perhaps ironically) admits his “inner” mind has
no obligation to the “outward sign,” to use Austin’s language. Both Austin and Cavell,
however, would maintain that this type of performative act (if offered or taken seriously)
has indeed effected a change in the speaker’s circumstances and obligations. (Cavell
does not speculate about whether there are dramatic or philosophical circumstances
surrounding this quote that would differentiate it from Austin’s analysis. I think he
should have. Perhaps he really did want to just mention this—provide “news”—and
emphasize this point of connection. But it is impossible to impute a view to him on this
matter.)
Cavell significantly engages Austin’s views on the subject of intention, analyzing
the implications of context for Austin’s account of it, and examines what Austin says
about the phrase from the Hippolytus. Cavell uses Austin’s work on the Euripides quote
to argue that no matter what Hippolytus’s inner states may have been, he made a promise
to which he is bound: that promise, as part of shared language, commits him to keeping
it, regardless of his desire to get out of it.
Cavell says he disagrees with Austin’s analysis of the line (Philosophy the Day
After Tomorrow, 176) (he later refers to this analysis in Contending with Stanley Cavell:
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189). In the Seminar on “What Did Derrida Want of Austin?”, Cavell says Austin uses
the Euripides passage to claim that Hippolytus offers an excuse, rather than the oath
Cavell takes the words to be.14 Austin maintains, as explained above (40-41), that we
cannot assume a correspondence between outer words and inner states; he says words do
not function as true or false statements about inner states, and “our word is our bond.”
This is why, for Austin, the oath of Hippolytus is “a metaphysical dodge, or a deviously
motivated attempt at one, between saying and intending” (Philosophical Passages, 7576).
Cavell does not read the line in this way. He calls what Hippolytus says
“paradigmatic of oily efforts to renege on promises or vows” (Contending with Stanley
Cavell, 189) and points out that the “sacredness of promising is a familiar enough fact of
human life to participate in the action of tragedy” (Cities of Words, 177). Hippolytus has,
according to Cavell, committed himself to an oath, whether he wanted to or not.
The Greek sentence Austin calls classic and cites from Euripides and translates as
“My tongue swore to, but my heart did not,” is Hippolytus’s reply to Phaedra’s
nurse when she reminds him of his oath to keep her revelation a secret . . . But
Austin himself seems to be forgetting something about the Hippolytus, since he
apparently attributes the line to Hippolytus as a species of excuse, whereas
Hippolytus never uses it so, and indeed the pity and terror involved are some
function of the knowledge that the most casual of utterances may be irretrievable:
so my tongue swore without my heart—nevertheless I am bound (Philosophical
Passages, 62).
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Even if Hippolytus did not mean his words, nevertheless, he promised; and this is what
we would expect, given Austin’s own distinction between performatives and constatives.
As described above, Austin describes misfires as those performatives that are not
accomplished because something about the situation makes the performative illegitimate.
But abuses occur because something about the actor’s reasons is amiss. Cavell describes
Austin’s distinction in the same manner:
The distinction Austin draws is this: In the opening instances of performatives, if
when I say, for example, “I do,” it happens that the (other) circumstances are not
in effect then the act (the supposed performative) was not in effect, it was not
done at all (for example, it wasn’t the captain who performed the ceremony but
the purser); whereas if, in the later instances of performatives, when I say, “I
promise” (in the canonical circumstances), I have no intention of keeping it (I
have not met that particular “circumstance,” or condition), even so I have
promised (Austin phrases it, “I have promised, but”) (A Pitch of Philosophy, 107108).
Hippolytus committed an abuse, one that can be described as “hollow,” but it is
not void, as a misfire would be. Whatever his thoughts or feelings, they are not enough
to excuse him from the conventions of the social act he performed. Hippolytus’s words
are a commitment his thoughts cannot override. Cavell considers whether Hippolytus’s
intention could be central, the “organizing center” for attributing meaning to his words,
and he denies this. “This seems the reverse of making intention the organizing center of
the analysis of performatives, since in a sense in certain major categories of
performatives it shows intention to be inessential to whether a performative is in effect”
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(ibid., 108). Cavell supposes this is why Hippolytus is given this “moment”: “it makes
explicit the fact that (his intentions) will not count (for him) as determining whether he
swore, whether his words are in effect” (ibid.). One could argue, too, that the same goes
for Socrates, and the narrative of the Symposium reveals this. Socrates has to protest to
get out of the oath he makes and explain why he will give a different kind of speech.
Cavell and Austin both share the conviction that the surrounding circumstances constrain
possible meanings of terms. Though Hippolytus may wish to excuse himself, he cannot.
Neither, perhaps, can Socrates, though perhaps a point of difference here is that Socrates
thinks it obvious that the excellence of the eulogies preceding his turn has changed his
promise-keeping obligations, and he is joking around, which the others presumably
understand (also, the matter—giving eulogies—is not so grave, save for literature!).
While both Austin and Cavell would agree that the promise is in this case “hollow” or
“empty” though genuinely made, the difference consists in Cavell’s emphases that, first,
the way Hippolytus tries to dodge the implications of his premise is typical of the activity
of reneging on a promise; and, second, as such it is not a “metaphysical” dodge between
inner and outer, as Austin portrays it. (Perhaps here Cavell casts some doubt on the
reasonableness or coherence of Austin’s condition of “sincerity,” or on how it is to be
understood.)
Cavell on Intention in Language
Cavell argues that an intentional inner state does not override other determinants
of meaning in a context that depends upon the use of words, either written or spoken.
There may be many times when what is of paramount interest to us is someone’s
intention. A paradigm example is one’s intentions regarding the commission of a serious
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crime. But in those contexts where we ask ourselves whether meaning is constituted by
intentions or words—which must it be, we might ask ourselves?—the intention cannot be
central, the “organizing center,” as mentioned above. Cavell insists “I should urge that
we do justice to the fact that an individual’s intentions or wishes can no more produce the
general meaning for a word than they can produce horses for beggars, or home runs from
pop flies, or successful poems out of unsuccessful poems” (Must We Mean What We
Say?, 38). He says an investigation into what someone “really means” does not turn on
an investigation of the meaning of a specific word. The fact that people re-think the
terms that they use (that they have “second thoughts,” he says) indicates that they realize
words have meanings which their users cannot really subvert, at least not if they wish to
make themselves comprehensible to others. If, he says, we want to convey what we
mean, we have to choose the appropriate, shared words, or, if necessary, stipulate a new
meaning for the terms we use: “Changing the meaning is not wishing it were different”
(ibid., 38-39).
In fact, echoing Wittgenstein, he suggests we could not mean anything at all
through language if we did not have shared criteria for our words (sign-posts, both might
say) on which we all rely. He insists “you could not mean one thing rather than another
(= you could not mean anything) by a given word on a given occasion without relying on
a (general) meaning of that word which is independent of your intention on that occasion
(unless what you are doing is giving the word a special meaning)” (ibid., 39, n. 32). In
connection with this, he mentions that what we say often obviously depends on what we
intend, but intention should not be understood as a form of “wanting or wishing” (ibid.).
When, he says, we say something like “I mean by X, YZ” we are doing something
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performative to the word itself, or giving what he calls a special report, but not describing
wishes or intentions.
Cavell uses his concept of attunement, previously described, to express the
conviction that our language is shared. He says we are “attuned” when we talk to each
other, when, we might say, we draw on our shared criteria, consciously or unconsciously.
Cavell says, “(Attunement) is rather something that sometimes gives us the feeling that
the fact of language is like a miracle. Poets cultivate the feeling” (Philosophy the Day
After Tomorrow, 139). Cavell’s confidence in our attunement with each other recalls
Austin’s insistence that we do often agree, and even if we disagree, this does not mean
the disagreement has revealed a fundamental flaw in whatever subject about which we
disagree (he says, as pointed out above, we should not give up on physics simply because
we encounter scientific phenomena that puzzle us or challenge our notions of how the
natural world works). Our reliance on the shared meanings of terms is demonstrated by
our disagreement, Cavell says: “We can disagree in many of our beliefs, but that very
disagreement implies that we agree in the use of the words which express those beliefs”
(Must We Mean What We Say?, 240).
Cavell argues that our sharing of language even alleviates some of the problems
confronting writers (though not other artists) in the age of what he calls the modern:
“Writers do not share the severe burden of modernism which serious musicians and
painters and sculptors have recognized for generations: a writer can still work with the
words we all share, more or less, and have to share; he still, therefore, has an audience
with the chance of responding to the way he can share the words” (ibid., 187). (Yet,
significantly, Cavell points out “in modernist art the issue of the artist’s intention, his
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seriousness and his sincerity, has taken on a more naked role in our acceptance of his
works than in earlier periods” [ibid., 228].) This even extends to what he terms the
writer’s “faith,” the conviction that we also share the senses that accompany our words—
“confidence that what we are accustomed to call, say, the ‘connotations’ of words, the
most evanescent of the shadows they cast, are as available between us as what we call
their ‘denotations’” (The Senses of Walden, 104). Within language, we are likely to
acquire and share certain senses of words. For example, many of us acquire an
understanding of slang terms as those can be applied in various contexts; many of us
realize the word “cold” is usually not a compliment, though nowhere in its definition (in
the Oxford English Dictionary, at least) is its status as a term of compliment, or insult,
ever discussed. As an example, Cavell provides the associations carried by the term
“disinterestedness”: it “has never really stabilized itself as a word meaning a state of
impartial or unselfish interest, but keeps veering toward meaning the divestment of
interest altogether, uninterestedness, ennui” (The Senses of Walden, 117), as well as
“Debussy”: “A generation or so ago, ‘Debussy’ referred to music of a certain ethereal
mood, satisfying a taste for refined sweetness or poignance; today (at the time of his
writing) it refers to solutions for avoiding tonality: I find I waver between thinking of
that as a word altering its meaning and thinking of it as referring to an altered object”
(Must We Mean What We Say?, 184). (He also rues our various uses of the word
“normative.”)
This is an outcome of the process of learning language:
something does follow from the fact that a term is used in its usual way: it
entitles you (or, using the term, you entitle others) to make certain inferences,
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draw certain conclusions. (This is part of what you say when you say that you are
talking about the logic of ordinary language.) Learning what these implications
are is part of learning the language; no less a part than learning its syntax, or
learning what it is to which terms apply: they are an essential part of what we
communicate when we talk. Intimate understanding is understanding which is
implicit. Nor could everything we say (mean to communicate), in normal
communication, be said explicitly (Must We Mean What We Say?, 11-12).
He insists “the ‘pragmatic implications’ of our utterances are . . . meant; that they are an
essential part of what we mean when we say something, of what it is to mean something”
(ibid., 32).
He makes the case for this view in the process of quoting other words of
Emerson’s, from “The Poet”: “In every word he speaks he rides on them as the horses of
thought” (Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, 22). He reverts to metaphorical
language to make his point, as Wittgenstein and Austin do. Cavell says of this passage
that horses are metaphorically equivalent to words, which “(suggests) both that they obey
our intentions and that they work beyond our prowess” (Transcendental Etudes, 3); “The
idea is that the words have a life of their own over which our mastery is the other face of
our obedience” (ibid., 203). According to Cavell’s reading, words, as the horses of
thought, are both the signals of our intentions and instruments that control us. Horses are
often directed by the intentions of their riders, but riders depend on the cooperation and
performance of their horses. We do make our intentions intelligible through language;
language thus does function as a signal of intention. But, no matter how individual or
idiosyncratic the thoughts we formulate in language, when we use language to express
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them, we do so using means shared by other speakers of language. In that way, words are
instruments that constrain us. (It does, ultimately, appear to be internal to Cavell’s view
that a metaphor for metaphor tells us most directly what is happening in many literal
cases of ordinary language and meaning.)
Given what he has said about learning language and about intention taking place
within the confines of the institution of language, it is fitting that, when interpreting
Emerson, Cavell writes “language is our fate . . . (diction) is what puts us in bonds, that
with each word we utter we emit stipulations, agreements we do not know and do not
want to know we have entered, agreements we were always in, that were in effect before
our participation in them” (Transcendental Etudes, 72), and “language is an inheritance.
Words are before I am; they are common” (ibid., 92). This affects what we can mean by
them: “Words come to us from a distance; they were there before we were; we are born
into them. Meaning them is accepting that fact of their condition. To discover what is
being said to us, as to discover what we are saying, is to discover the precise location
from which it is said; to understand why it is said from just there, and at that time” (The
Senses of Walden, 64).
Now, although we inherit words, that does not mean that inheritance is static and
never develops. We also carry language forward, and do so in a way that might
considerably change the meanings of words over time (though perhaps, as Austin
suggests, many of our words never entirely desert their historical origins). Cavell argues
“the occurrence of a word is the occurrence of an object whose placement always has a
point, and whose point always lies before and beyond it” (The Senses of Walden, 27).
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His phrase “before and beyond it” is important; it signals the fact that our words can be
directed forward.
Cavell cites the work of Wittgenstein and Austin as support for his view. He
mentions Austin likened intention to “headlights” (he is apparently referring to something
Austin said in a seminar, and not to Austin’s actual work in “Three Ways of Spilling
Ink,” where Austin refers to the lamp a miner wears), and Cavell interprets this to mean
that intention might guide the way or cut through the dark in a given context, but other
elements of the situation are crucial for successful driving.15 In Cavell’s reading of
Austin and Wittgenstein, intention is something that takes place and acquires its
significance within the borders of settings or “institutions.” In language that clearly
demonstrates elements of their views, he says:
For Austin as for Wittgenstein intention is anything but something inner making
up for the absence of something outer; it lines the outer. Intention can guide the
variation of signal flags through a sequence of positions, but it cannot—that is,
that intention cannot—guide the establishing of the flags, and what counts as their
positions, and what the positions signify, and so on. In the absence of this
institution no such intention of variation is formulable. It may help to say: a
context is what allows such a thing as an intention to do so much and to be so
little. It is why some things you can do intentionally you can do inadvertently (A
Pitch of Philosophy, 111).
Cavell expresses the view that language, as a form of life, is shared by us, and that
shared institution determines which meanings are possible—the institution of language
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establishes the flags. As an example, he says “A poem, whatever else it is, is an utterance
(outer-ance)” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 228).
Cavell makes the persuasive point that intention is one factor among others in
determining meaning in language; it is not the “organizing center.” He claims Austin and
Wittgenstein’s work supports this view, which seems plausible. This view also seems to
logically follow from Cavell’s conviction that we are initiated into a language that we
then share with others. As language users, we are all participants in this shared form of
life, but this is an institution that already has its own flags in place, which our own
intentions cannot displace. Speakers’ or writers’ intentions cannot fully determine
meaning.
Cavell refers to a passage in Henry James’s story “The Birthplace” that reinforces
both the intuition that intention must take place within an institution with certain
parameters that control what is possible, and another intuition, that intention is central to
the determination of even inner meaning. The philosophical tensions are evident in the
passage Cavell quotes:
Husband: “’The play’s the thing.’ Let the author alone . . .
Gedge: there is no author; that is for us to deal with. There are all the immortal
people—in the work; but there’s nobody else . . . There is no such Person,” but
then “The evening air listened, in the warm thick midland stillness, while the
wife’s little cry rang out. ‘But wasn’t there—?’”
Cavell sees this as a dichotomy between those who claim intention can decide
solutions to interpretive problems, and those who claim intention should have no say in
determining them. It is a difference between a “W. C. Fields” view (the view that
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intention is not constitutive of meaning) and Humpty Dumpty’s (words mean whatever
Humpty Dumpty wants them to mean): “Even if some theorists speak as though intention
were everything there is to meaning, is that a sensible reason for opposite theorists to
assert that intention is nothing, counts for nothing in meaning? Is W. C. Fields our only
alternative to Humpty Dumpty?” (Transcendental Etudes, 96). Cavell notes his
consternation at being confronted by a philosopher who attended one of his talks, who
insisted Humpty Dumpty’s view of meaning is correct16; but though he does not think we
can call intention everything there is to meaning, he does not think it counts for nothing
or is irrelevant, either.
Instead, Cavell explains, “Intention is merely of the last importance. Everything
(else) has first to be in place for it to do what it does—as in putting a flame to a fuse”
(“Macbeth Appalled,” Cavell Reader, 213).17 I will provide an analysis of this figurative
language below.
In summary, Cavell emphasizes the shared, indeed “attuned,” nature of language.
He also emphasizes intention does not count for nothing in establishing meaning; neither
does it count for everything. He provides a moderate view of intention that recognizes its
importance for understanding our language use, but does not make the mistake of
supposing that our intentions can actually constrain the meanings of our shared words.
(There is a sense, however, in which our intentions create those words; they effect
changes in the world, as Anscombe and Austin might say, when we project them toward
the judgments of the future.) Both the shared meanings of words and our intentions are
important to the proper functioning and understanding of language. Language is
intentional, but it is an intentional element of human life that produces words on which

119

we all rely, words which are not identical to our intentions. Our shared reliance on them
is possible because of our attunement. Cavell gives importance to both intention and the
publicly available meanings of our terms.18
This is a “vision of language” that he says will “underlie the ordinary language
philosopher’s procedures, and which, for (Cavell), advances our understanding of
language and of human knowledge, or the conventionality of human nature generally . . .
underlying, or forming part of, the philosophy which proceeds by appeals to what we
should say when, to how words are normally used” (The Claim of Reason, 165, 167). It
is a vision of a shared form of life, which depends upon the criteria all humans share; this
secures our shared agreements and understandings about language, our form of life of
communication. We learn words—in “certain contexts,” as Wittgenstein says. Cavell
argues that this is not an enterprise underwritten by rules of cognition or grammar, but
learning and sharing, and it shifts around as our criteria and our understandings and
emphases shift around. But the vision of language is essentially a vision of one of the
most fundamental aspects of human experience which, despite its timeless continuity and
importance in the lives of human beings, does not acquire its authority because of the
operation of language rules upon our understanding. It acquires it instead from us, our
various forms of life, and the criteria operating within them. We not only learn words,
but we gain an understanding of how to carry them forward in new contexts: “We learn
words in certain contexts and after a while we are expected to know when they are
appropriately used in (= can appropriately be projected into) further contexts” (The Claim
of Reason, 168-169). Our ability to project appropriately is a criterion for our having
learned a word. As he makes clear in his analysis of Austin and the Euripides passage,
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and in his remarks on intention, Cavell also maintains that those words can be our bond;
our inner thoughts cannot override our collectively shared meanings for those terms and
what those words can also do—in certain contexts. In analyzing the Euripides passage,
Cavell reveals his commitment to a Wittgensteinian picture of language: language as a
shared form of human life, specifically, as Wittgenstein called it, a type of institution.
Within such a form of life, one’s own intentions or private inner states are shaped
tremendously by what occurs outside of them, and if a conflict should arise over which
element determines meaning—individual speakers’ intentions, or the shared meanings of
words?—what is shared in that form of life will prevail; individual intentions cannot
override the meanings, the uses, of words.
We learn words in certain contexts, words with publicly shared meanings, and
then, as participants in the shared form of life of our language, we carry them forward.
“At some point,” Cavell writes, “demonstration and monitoring come to an end, and the
other goes on alone, and within bounds of mutuality, or not. How far the bounds extend
is not given by, not transparent from, the concepts in play, which are in principle open to
the judgment of the future” (Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 138).
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CHAPTER 4
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PICTURES OF LANGUAGE FOR
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
The literature review above describes the contributions of Wittgenstein, Austin,
and Cavell to our understanding of language (what it can do as well as how it can mean),
the shared nature of our experiences, and touches on their conceptions of context,
judgment, and knowledge. Wittgenstein and Cavell in particular also investigate the
current state of philosophy and the experience of philosophical reflection. We have also
noticed Anscombe’s emphasis on “what we are doing” as an aspect of intention; intention
gives an answer to the “Why?” question. These philosophers provide a powerful
contemporary picture of the way language (and intention within the context of language)
works. Their views avoid the shortcomings of the unsatisfactory conceptions of language
described at the outset of this project. Among other things, their philosophy does the
following: (1) provides fodder for a more nuanced exploration of the role intention is
playing within philosophy of language, (2) is a significant improvement on the
structuralist picture more prominently supported in earlier decades, and (3) accords with
recent work in linguistics, which Austin in particular might have enjoyed. I consider
each of these points in turn.
(1) The “intentional” view of language (Grice as well as P. F. Strawson are
examples of proponents) can be contrasted with an “institutional” view, typified by
speech act theory and the work of Austin and John Searle.
The broad outlines of the institutional view should be clear following my
appraisal of Austin’s “linguistic phenomenology.” What is the “intentional” view?
Grice’s is probably the most significant, so I provide some details of it here. Very
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briefly, Grice links the meaning of expressions to the meanings—intentions—of
speakers.19 Those speakers’ audiences have to take up that communicative pitch
somehow; they have to recognize what speakers are doing. How does this approach
differ from approaches like Austin’s? The debate is complicated, and many objections
and revisions have been volleyed back and forth. I will mention one point, considered a
major problem. Language use is clearly intentional. But can the meaning of words be
hitched to those intentions?20 How can speakers mean anything unless they are meaning
with those commonly used tools, words—but then doesn’t speaker-meaning depend on an
antecedent word-meaning?
Michael Morris describes this objection as follows: “It is impossible to mean
anything by an expression which the expression does not (already) mean” (267) (he also
says this objection depends on the conviction that meaning something at one time is not
the same as a meaningful action at that time). He continues, “Grice himself seems to be
giving the words a kind of meaning which precedes the meaning of any particular action
of using the words. Moreover, the moment we think of words and sentences as a
resource to be used in actions of uttering, rather than as mere features of such actions,”
then, he says, we see the force of this objection to the intentional view:
If words and sentences are such a resource, they must bring their own properties
with them. And that will mean that you cannot mean what you like by them. It
will no longer be plausible to suggest that they mean, even on a particular
occasion, what you intend them to mean on that occasion. For it will be clear that
the whole point of your using the words is to use them to mean what they already
mean (267-268).
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Obviously, I find this objection persuasive (and I think the work of Wittgenstein,
Austin, and Cavell establishes that they do too), but I do not think we are simply making
noises or manipulating signs we have learned without intentional efforts and input. I
suspect that intention is more obviously at play when we are forced to invent new
language, or when we recognize that language is insufficient for our purposes.
Efforts have been made to demonstrate that there is no real inconsistency between
the intentional and institutional approaches within philosophy of language, and such
efforts are on the right track. Ruth Millikan writes:
Unlike the case of most technical skills passed down by imitation, but more like
the case of other conventional social forms, those effects that encourage continued
replication of a language form are not determined by the purposes only of the
agent producing them. The functions of language devices are fulfilled through
cooperation between speakers and hearers, and hence are determined by the
interests of both. Language devices will produce effects that interest speakers
often enough to encourage continued replication only if hearers replicate hopedfor cooperative responses often enough. And hearers will continue to replicate
intended cooperative responses often enough only if the results are, in turn, of
interest to hearers (Varieties of Meaning, 25).
This is a welcome emphasis on the shared nature of language and the role all of its
actors play in constituting its meaning. It would be a mistake to suppose only the agent’s
determinate acts control that meaning, and arguably, philosophy of language has paid too
much attention, in recent decades, to the possible meaning-determining nature of
intentions. (Though one might have worries about Millikan’s use of phrases such as
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“language devices” and “produce effects that interest speakers.”) And further analysis
should be done regarding the different contexts in which language and intention occur.
As just mentioned, I think our engagement with language is more clearly intentional
when its use requires our conscious input—when language fails us, or reveals a gap, for
example. And philosophers of language often emphasize speakers and hearers, but more
should be said about readers and writers. One of the most fundamental attributes of
writing is its ability to function as communication without a speaker present. That may
be why it exists. So the writer’s intentions, while of course important to the genesis of
those written words, cannot be said to “accompany” and control them once they are
available to be read. Intention may be less important in the investigation of written
language than it is in the investigation of spoken language, or it may turn out to play a
different kind of role, in any case.
(2) The work of these philosophers also point up deficiencies in the structuralist
picture of language. In Philosophy and the Vision of Language, Paul Livingston defines
the structuralist picture of language and demonstrates its problems, tracing confirmation
of this view in the projects of Wittgenstein and Quine, among others. (Livingston also
suggests that continental and analytic philosophy have pursued parallel investigations
into the nature of language and hopes “the usual dismissive attitude that one still finds
among practitioners of each ‘tradition’ toward the other can yield to a broader and more
responsible conversation” [132].)
Livingston writes:
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the structuralist picture of language consists in four interrelated central
commitments and a fifth, less central one that often (though not always) goes
along with the first four:
1. Language as a whole can be understood as a system or structure of signs,
words, propositions, sentences or other significant terms.
2. The logical, grammatical, or structural interrelations among these terms, as
well as their ordinary use in speaking or writing, are wholly or partially
constrained by a corpus of intelligible rules or regularities.
3. These rules or regularities are describable and their description can account for
the correct or normal use of terms in everyday interlocution.
4. On the basis of such a description, it is possible to determine the meaning or
meaningfulness of terms or combinations of terms used on particular occasions.
5. The rules or regularities that thus constrain the use of language are essentially
public, intersubjective, and social in character.
In “From Syntax to Semantics (and Pragmatics),” he describes the results that
followed Frege’s search for the logical underpinnings of mathematics. Livingston cites
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Tarski’s demonstration of the impossibility of
defining truth that can be applied within a system. Gödel and Tarski’s projects revealed,
for the analytic philosophers who followed them, the inadequacy of a (purely) syntactic
account of language structure.
Essentially, Gödel and Tarski, in looking for the “bare bones” (in Gödel’s case) of
logic underlying math, and trying to define the essence of a truth within a formal system
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(in Tarski’s), ultimately undermine any attempt to present an entirely syntactic
conception of a language’s logical structure.
Thus those who followed their work saw the need, as Livingston points out, of
“supplementing the purely syntactical analysis of a language with a ‘world-directed’
semantical analysis of the referential character of its terms and formulas” (67). But this
was not its only supplement: philosophers began alluding to “pragmatics” as well, a
category named by Charles Morris in 1938. Morris felt syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics would be sufficient to analyze signs logically. He thought this could
guarantee the objectivity of signs as well as clear up confusions about the concept of
“meaning,” but this did not, as one might suppose, lead philosophers to abandon the
structuralist picture of language:
the difficulties and considerations that led to the supplementation of syntax with
semantics and pragmatics did not cause any abandonment of the basic structuralist
picture of language as a regular totality of signs wholly governed by rules of use .
. . The results and tensions that could have demonstrated an inherent and general
instability within the structuralist project of analysis were instead taken only to
demand, within it, an expansion of the categories of analysis to include the other
dimensions of sign functioning that had been ignored by the purely syntactic
conception (67-68).
And Austin’s work casts doubt even on these “categories of analysis” (syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics). As Livingston points out, Austin significantly shows “the
essential inseparability of the pragmatic dimension from the other two, and hence of the
insuperable entanglement of any philosophical account of the basis of meaning with the
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problems of the pragmatic application of signs” (71). Austin’s work was also taken to
underscore that the perhaps chimerical “rules of usage” underlying language apply to
action and behavior, so, as Livingston mentions, subsequent conversations focused on
“public linguistic action and its relevance to the determination of meaning . . . the
structuralist picture of language . . . explicitly became the expression of a much broader
and more varied project of analytical and structural reflection on the relationship of
language to the ordinary life of its users” (71). This, of course, raises questions about the
nature of language users’ communities and the way in which those communities exhibit
regular and comprehensible language use. Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell direct us
toward the best available answers, at least at present. They emphasize our “attunement,”
our shared criteria, as language users.
(3) The contemporary work of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell also accords with
recent work in linguistics, especially new approaches to that subject. Austin advised us
to examine actual languages. I follow his advice here, peering briefly at Nicholas
Ostler’s recent, magisterial survey of the history of languages, centered on the reasons for
their development, the dimensions they take on, and, in some cases, their eventual death,
to emphasize that these philosophers’ views of language are borne out by the history of
the subject.
Ostler argues that he contributes an important dimension to the study of
languages: “to suggest ways in which it might actually matter what type of a language a
community speaks” (Empires of the Word, 23).21 He claims he is taking a new tack
within linguistics, focusing on the history and evolution of languages. He calls this
approach “the study of language dynamics,” or, as he says in a note beneath this, “more
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explicitly and technically, diachronic sociolinguistics” (558). In his explanation of his
approach to language history, which he notes has seldom been undertaken, he echoes
Wittgenstein and Cavell and their account of language-games and forms of life, saying he
is “understanding human societies: how language, in all its evolving variety, organizes
not just the human mind but also the large groups of human minds that constitute
themselves into societies, which communicate and interact, as well as think and act”
(558-559). What occurs within these language societies echoes what Cavell says of our
attunement in judgments, and the remarkable fact that it works: we share “routes of
interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of
fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what
forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—
all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’” (Must We Mean What We
Say?, 52).
Ostler’s history of the past five thousand years of language begins with literacy,
which is thought-provoking, since, as I emphasize, reading, writing, and speaking, though
all types of language, may present different conceptual issues and problems. This makes
sense for Ostler’s study, however, focused as it is on aspects of the history of language;
literacy and writing give us some proof as to what that history includes. But it does have
its limits. He traces the influences that play a role in the life of a language: its number of
speakers; immigration patterns; business practices, such as trade; and whether the
language in question is viewed as prestigious. Colonization has played a massive role in
the story of language around the world: Ostler claims there are “six colonizing languages
in the list of the world’s top ten languages by population” (325). He even notes some of
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the world’s largest language-speaking groups are people who regularly support
themselves by rice.22 He provides notable examples of the influences of different
language cultures on one another, and his approach to linguistics can be interpreted as a
study of how entire languages, and not just words, move into new contexts; all of these
factors play a role.23
Ostler echoes philosophers such as Cavell in emphasizing how words reveal the
associations and histories of all their uses:
A language that links together a speech community, even a vast one like the
global multitude who think and speak in English, is given its character not so
much by its phonetics and phrasings as by the patterns of associations that have
piled up on its words as they are transmitted down the generations. A language
bespeaks a history . . . This is one reason why study of a language has long
emphasized its literature, “the best that has been said and thought” (quoting
Matthew Arnold) using that language, as selected by its own tradition (516).
“But,” he immediately goes on to add, “not all the experiences in a language’s
long memory may have been hallowed by good writing.” (This can be connected to what
Austin would maintain—language can function as a repository for collective historical
wisdom.)
An overview of English indicates that language is subject to great change and
local variation, even if enough of it remains constant for it to merit its continuing name.
It can appear unrecognizable when different centuries or even decades of it are set side by
side. It is curious that a language so deeply influenced by the contexts surrounding it has
now, in the view of many linguists, attained such monolithic status, but Ostler gives us
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some idea of how this came to be. Language researchers wonder if English is
approaching such world dominance that it will always be with us, though Ostler’s work
demonstrates that some of the most apparently impregnable languages in history have
eventually vanished or declined. David Crystal laments the possibility that it may
become our only language, claiming that if English is all we have left to use in another
500 years, “it will have been the greatest intellectual disaster that the planet has ever
known” (191).24
Even if our language future may betoken a merging perhaps unsurprising in light
of globalism, it is unlikely that language will remain static. It will continue to develop
and change, to capture and reflect our realities. Supposing otherwise is simply to fail to
take account of what is occurring in linguistics. This is easy enough to do. Ostler quotes
Dante Alighieri (who recognized elements of the Romance languages in Latin), in order
to emphasize that languages can change and take on new forms, even if they do this
gradually:
Nor should what we say appear any more strange than to see a young person
grown up, whom we do not see grow up: for what moves gradually is not at all
recognized by us, and the longer something needs for its change to be recognized
the more stable we think it is. So we are not surprised if the opinion of men, who
are little distant from brutes, is that a given city has existed always with the same
language, since the change in language in a city happens gradually only over a
very long succession of time, and the life of men is also, by its very nature, very
short. Therefore if over one people the language changes, as has been said,
successively over time, and can in no way stand still, it is necessary that it should
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vary in various ways quite separately from what remains constant, just as customs
and dress vary in various ways, which are confirmed neither by nature or society,
but arise at human pleasure and to local taste. This was the motive of the
inventors of the faculty of grammatica: for grammatica is nothing but the
identity of speech unalterable for diverse times and places (De vulgari eloquentia,
i.9.8-11; quoted in Empires of the Word, 321).
(Perhaps Cavell would find it interesting that Dante uses the image of a young
person growing, and Wittgenstein that he mentions the language of a city.)
Language use is not disorderly; its progression is often gradual, as Dante
describes. Its projection does not result in chaotic flux in the aspects of life affected by
language, for language, as well as culture and art, exhibits a certain provisional stability
(Cavell emphasizes this as well; The Claim of Reason, 185). Indeed, its perceived
stability may have contributed to the impression of some philosophers that it masks an
underlying skeleton of rules. While many things change, much stays the same, at least
for long periods of time. To take one example, in discussing language development in
the Middle East, Ostler points out, “As one result of Semitic language persistence, it can
be shown that counting to ten has hardly changed here in over four thousand years, or
two hundred generations” (37).
But though we may see such stability, the process of language development is
infinite; it is never finished and closed off, as Cavell emphasizes.25 As Austin’s linguistic
legislators, we do not act like the Académie Française, founded by Louis XIII’s regime,
“to give certain rules to our language and to render it pure, eloquent and capable of
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treating the arts and sciences” (Empires of the Word, 409). For we are never done
learning.
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CHAPTER 5
THE IMAGINATION
Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell on the Imagination
We have reviewed the contributions of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell to the
study of language and related, philosophically significant aspects of human life, including
intention, shared judgment, and philosophy itself. Their work emphasizes not only
promising new directions for investigations of these matters, but also the imagination.
Having outlined Cavell’s debts to Austin and Wittgenstein and his views on intention and
language, which draw on their work, I turn to his account of the imagination (relating his
remarks to Wittgenstein and Austin’s remarks on imagination) and his account of the
projective imagination. Then it will be time to consider how the “bounds of mutuality”
work in projection. I will begin with a brief review of the remarks about imagination
provided by Austin and Wittgenstein before turning to Cavell’s account of imagination
and projection.
Austin says when we make use of the imagination, we do not fill in every detail
we could fill in; we do not entirely describe what we imagine.26 This seems especially
true of the way the imagination is employed when we read literature. He thinks the
imagination can function as a tool through which we can access and study examples for
consideration. But it raises questions, it is “feeble,” it is “wretched,” he says, and it is
impeded by its connection with our words. When we try to enlist ordinary examples, try
to get someone to imagine something, we use words to outline what we want someone to
imagine. And this may not be what we wish to do; we may not want to “blinker” the
imagination with our ordinary words and ordinary cases when we are trying to think
those away. The more we fill in the picture we attempt to imagine, the less likely we are

134

to disagree with others about whatever we are trying to imagine. (And perhaps the
further we get from employing the imagination.) It can fail us when we fail to
“appreciate” a situation, he says.
Recall that Wittgenstein has said we lack clarity about the role of the imagination;
he has questioned what is occurring when we use it; it can be used to obtain proof, and it
is subject to the will, as is the ability to perceive an aspect. (A failure to perceive an
aspect is not unlike the failure of the ear in music, according to Wittgenstein; they are
both subject to the will, but they also appear to be contingent on our ability to judge. One
may not be able to perceive either an aspect or the characteristics of music—or perhaps
not without great effort.) We can invoke it and control it in a way that we cannot invoke
the contents of perceptual states: he says we cannot imagine a leaf as green if it is not.
(Presumably he means not that we could not imagine a non-green leaf, which we can
easily do, but that we cannot actually change our perception of a green leaf into the
perception of something else, or perhaps that we cannot imagine a given leaf as green
when it is not.) But our imagination seems to be constrained in certain ways. We do not
imagine the length of a sphere, though we do the length of a rod. We think about what
fits. And our imagination is also engaged by the aspects of our experience that are of
interest to us. We do not often, or at least not usually, exert it over questions like whether
a stone has consciousness, though we could imagine circumstances in which we might do
so.
I will outline Cavell’s remarks on imagination itself before describing his account
of its projective use. The imagination is clearly important to his methods as a
philosopher. Cavell says he uses it himself to think of his language and life in order to do
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philosophy; he checks language and life against the wider context of his community. In
the course of that effort, he engages in a confrontation with what he terms his culture’s
criteria, and a convening of those criteria, which relates to his conception of
“convention.”
But he says the imagination is “the laziest, if potentially the most precious, of
human faculties” (The World Viewed, 150). In a phrase that recalls the language of fire
he uses to characterize intention, he writes “the imagination can . . . be fired by
information, (but) you cannot always know when the fire will strike” (The Claim of
Reason, 338). It is something that we can call to mind, out of its laziness. He also claims
our cognition is fundamentally constituted by it: “Our imagination, or our capacity for
images, and for the meaning or phenomenology of our images . . . are as a priori as our
other forms of knowledge of the world . . . Human forms of feeling, objects of human
attraction, our reactions constituted in art, are as universal and necessary, as objective, as
revelatory of the world, as the forms of the laws of physics” (The Senses of Walden, 103104).
Within the space of these remarks, Cavell says of the imagination that it is an
extraordinarily important aspect of our consciousness, relating us to the world in basic,
important ways; also, that in a way it is out of our control, and in a way it is not. It
appears to assist us in striking forward in our thoughts and our relation to the world, as
well as passively reacting to what the world imposes on us. There may be much we can
do to lay the groundwork for imaginative experience, but in some respects its power
appears unbidden. Cavell also says the imagination can be directed or controlled by our
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own thought processes. For like Wittgenstein, Cavell insists the cognitive faculty of
imagination is subject to the will.
Cavell wonders how we are to imagine competently; how to imagine just enough,
but not something that would change what he calls the context; he says the context cannot
be fixed in advance. It will depend on what it is we are asked to imagine and why:
“Whether a situation is fully described will, one supposes, depend on the point for which
it was being described” (The Claim of Reason, 158).27
Unsurprisingly, Cavell sees educational value in the appeal to the imagination.
And he sees it as a fundamental component of ordinary language philosophy. When we
use the strategies of ordinary language philosophy, we are often responding to requests to
imagine states of affairs or illustrative examples. Cavell says imagination in this context
“is the capacity for making connections, seeing or realizing possibilities . . . Imagination
is called for, faced with the other, when I have to take the facts in, realize the significance
of what is going on, make the behavior real for myself, make a connection” (The Claim of
Reason, 354). He explains “take the facts in” as “seeing behavior in a certain way” (this
“seeing” is what Cavell claims Wittgenstein would understand as “interpretation”). This
does not mean, he points out, that we invariably form visual images in our minds when
we use the imagination. Instead, he describes here an important way in which we gather
data, try to understand it, understand ourselves and others, and orient ourselves toward
our worlds and the people in them. According to Cavell, these strategies help us
understand the criteria for our concepts.
The imagination is also specifically named as the capacity by which we project
words into new contexts.
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What is the projective imagination?28 It is likened to “the nature of supposition”
(The Claim of Reason, 151). Cavell also says “language itself depends on the ‘capacity
for projection’” (ibid., 196); it is an indispensable element of our language use. He
equates it to the analysis of our concepts when he terms it a technique of both traditional
and ordinary language philosophers, “involved,” he says, “with investigating our
conceptualization, or projective imagination, of problems and situations” (ibid., 157).
For the ordinary language philosopher, according to Cavell, we rely upon it when we are
interpreting our conceptualizations.29 And it is influenced, in ways I will describe below,
by our myriad perceptions.
Cavell says we can access it by posing certain questions, such as those starting
with “What should we say if . . . ?” Such questions can invite us to project, as he puts it.
He uses examples such as “suppose you have three rabbits” and “think how you would
feel if that had happened to you” (ibid., 147). What happens when we suppose? We
summon the case to mind, and this occurs (at least usually) under our direction. No doubt
we often do this with an eye toward some other purpose, purposes such as solving a
computation problem, conceiving of the world in a certain way—anything from the
weather to rabbits to political states of affairs—and trying to understand or empathize
with another person’s point of view. We can hold the thought that we have three rabbits,
and we can put ourselves in another person’s shoes if we think about what happened to
someone else happening to us. Such examples illustrate the variety of ways in which we
can project. In the first case, we call to mind a state of affairs that is primarily
conditional: we imagine the three rabbits, though we do not have to conjure up a mental
image of the rabbits themselves. Images of rabbits may appear in our consciousness,
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with or without their hutches and food, though a specific mental picture is not necessary.
But a conception is suddenly there—the state of having three rabbits—that we can access
as needed. In the second case, we are asked to consider other people’s emotional states.
Cavell makes the claim that in considering other people’s experiences we are better able
to understand them, and presumably to empathize with them. For example, in a stage in
his argument about skepticism, Cavell uses the term “empathic projection” to describe
how we might recognize each other’s humanity (ibid., 423).
Once we do begin “calling to mind” the quite astonishingly inexhaustible
examples our imagination provides us, such examples set up their own terms of
investigation, and are insulated from the conditions of the real world that might be
thought to intrude upon them: imagined cases are “inaccessible to what in fact happens”
(ibid., 148). But there is logic to what we imagine; not anything can interfere with it:
“an imagined situation cannot, in logic, be other than it seems, or is described, to be”
(ibid., 155). This is illustrated by a story Cavell quotes, of a soldier being asked what he
would do if a battleship approached. He replies that he would torpedo it; when asked
where he got a torpedo, the soldier responds that it is from the same place as the
battleship (ibid., 151).
In some of its most powerful incarnations, the imagination bears a close
connection to facts. Like Wittgenstein and Austin, Cavell sees a link between
imagination and fact, or what is fitting to imagine: “The human imagination is released
by fact. Alone, left to its own devices, it will not recover reality, it will not form an edge
. . . Both imagination and experience continue to require what the Renaissance had in
mind, viz., that they be humanized” (The Senses of Walden, 75).
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Cavell distinguishes the case of supposing from predicting, as Wittgenstein does,
in Cavell’s reading of him. When the subject of “What should we say?” or “would we
call?” is raised, Cavell says Wittgenstein is not seeking a prediction, or asking how
frequently a word will be used: “He is asking something which can be answered by
remembering what is said and meant, or by trying out his own response to an imagined
situation” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 64) (this gives us knowledge of our grammar).
Cavell emphasizes this idea in his own work, saying that asking what we should say, how
we should consider some particular case, issues in not a prediction, but a request “that we
imagine one” (The Claim of Reason, 146; emphasis added).
Projection takes place because something about the new context will “invite” or
“allow” that new use of a term, to use Cavell’s words. As he says, “legitimate”
projections are “deeply controlled.” 30 Not any projection will do—in order for our
communication to function successfully, we cannot leap too far, as he puts it (The Claim
of Reason, 192). Our ability to project is unlimited, but it is not “accidental or arbitrary”
(ibid., 183).31 Though there may be variations in the circumstances under which
projection occurs, projections are not. Our use of the word “shoe” reveals such
orderliness, he says.32
In raising the question of what makes a projection appropriate or correct, Cavell
claims the “traditional” answers are that we recognize another “instance of the same
universal” or the “new object is similar to the old” (ibid., 169). He remarks “we have to
show how the new context is an instance of this old concept” (though he also
acknowledges it may not always be apparent how far we need to specify the projection)
(ibid., 196). And if a projection is puzzling, he says, it “may be made appropriate by
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giving relevant explanations of how it is to be taken, how the new context is an instance
of the old concept” (ibid., 192).
But we are unable to do this if we have not entirely learned how to use a word.
We cannot project unless we have a sense of how terms work.
A case of projection is provided by Cavell; he uses the example of “feed” as a
word that gets projected into a new context. The term “feed” is extended into a new
setting, the expression “feeding the meter.” Using a more “general” verb like “put”
would not necessarily be better, because, according to Cavell, it actually increases our
potential meanings to an unacceptable degree, resulting in a word that is flaccid in
meaninglessness. Also, “feeding,” as in “feeding pride,” allows us to access the language
of the emotions, he says. If we could not project at all, what would we have to imagine in
order to understand that? He thinks we would perceive a culture in which there is no
connection between things—everything is just “different” (ibid., 181, 182). Cavell
emphasizes that people would not project words if they conceived of everything about
which they communicated as “different,” if they saw no connections between contexts.
“Can everything be just different?” he wonders (ibid., 182), not only in language, but in
the world? But this is not what we do, how we engage with our world, he emphasizes.
For Cavell, the stability and tolerance in the meaning of a term ensure that we can
use it to cover multiple cases and apply it to new ones. He calls this flexibility, of which
projection is an example, the “tempering of speech” (The Claim of Reason, 185-186).
We shouldn’t puzzle over the generality of some of our language-games, Cavell
maintains; why shouldn’t we project? We grasp what these shared (or not-shared)
characteristics are if we grasp the grammar of the concept in question. For example, an
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understanding of the grammar of art will yield insight into the similarities, and
dissimilarities, among its constituents.
Cavell’s work demonstrates support for the idea that “similarity” affects our
ability to project. He points out that projections are controlled by what contexts invite or
allow, and he maintains that we can demonstrate that new applications of a concept or a
word are relevantly related to previous cases. “It is in the exercise of this form of
imagination,” Livingston writes, “that the standing and structural possibilities of the
language that I speak come into view. But at the same time, through this exercise the
possibilities that I can project onto the world—the routes of significance that I can
inhabit, the senses of meaningfulness that I can share—are shown in the variation of
situations into which they can be projected by me” (“The Sense of Finitude and the
Finitude of Sense,” 27).
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CHAPTER 6
THE PROJECTIVE IMAGINATION: MAPPING THE FIELDS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS LIT BY THE OCCASIONS OF A WORD
In this chapter, I extend the conceptions of imagination provided by Wittgenstein,
Austin, and Cavell to supplement my view of how we project words into new contexts.
In doing so, I shall support Cavell’s overall conception of the projective imagination,
though I will supply details that are not included in his account, and I will develop my
own view of the role imagination is playing in projection. While what I have identified
may not be the only way language users project, it is representative of a significant
portion of it. For the aspects of imagination and intention at work in projection underlie a
variety of language uses, and it is in our use of language that we can see evidence of this
phenomenon. These associated functions of the intention and imagination in our
language use have likely endured throughout the centuries, even if our languages
themselves have not.
When we project words into new contexts, we rely on a process that is
imaginative. The “imagination” of the projective imagination exhibits the following
characteristics, which justify its appellation as imaginative: (1) it is creative; (2) it is a
shortcut between verbal (and other) contexts, and contributes to our economy of language
(and I explain how this process works, relying on contemporary work by Colin McGinn
to emphasize just how widely imagination may be functioning in our use of language);
(3) it involves both active and passive functions of thought, but it may be primarily
unconscious, not performed according to deliberate acts of will; and (4) it is a powerful
tool for education as well as intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction, supplying “voice” for
us. It will become clear that projection, in various ways, is similar to metaphor (and the
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two categories of language use occasionally overlap), and I draw on arguments by John
Searle, A. P. Martinich, and Donald Davidson (as well as Cavell) to illustrate certain
aspects of metaphor and its connection to the projection of language. Having
characterized the process of language projection, I question a distinction Cavell draws
between projection and metaphor.
Austin, as Cavell recounts, called his “methods” “linguistic phenomenology”;
Cavell says they map “the fields of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word.” In
what follows, I sketch such a linguistic phenomenology, and what occurs when we
project words, igniting our fields of consciousness as we do so. I intend to demonstrate
that projecting terms depends on a not-often-conscious interplay of imagination in
conjunction with a “chance” that appears intentionless, though it is not entirely.
Ultimately, I maintain that the projection of words typifies something described in a
phrase of Wittgenstein’s: “Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the
imagination.”
First, however, I reinforce the idea that this process is not taking place because we
are wholly constrained either by our intentions or a calculus of rules.
It might be thought that in projecting, we are relying on rules or a calculus to
carry words into new territory (as Wittgenstein appears to have thought, at one time).
However, this is not a rule-governed process. Our ability to correctly project and
understand each other’s projections is going to depend not on a calculus, but on our
shared criteria and the attunement of our judgments Cavell describes, discussed above.
He outlines the process in a powerful passage from Must We Mean What We Say?:
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Nothing insures that (language) projection will take place (in particular, not the
grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures
that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we
do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response,
senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of
what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an
utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of
organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity
and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision
as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying
(52).
The ability to employ the projective imagination depends on our experiences, our
competencies as speakers and participants in language-using forms of life. Thus those
who lack the requisite experiences may not be able to respond to these appeals. Cavell
acknowledges that many competent speakers are able to employ the projective
imagination, though not all can do this in the same way. For example, a speaker who
comes from a different culture or form of life may not be able to project in the way that
members of another culture or form of life do—e.g., such a speaker does not understand
the normal practices of the “point” of the other group. Cavell writes: “Not everyone can
respond to this invitation; some have not yet been initiated into the forms of life which
control the power of supposition, some will never manage it, some have lost it through
personal damage. But any competent speaker can in fact respond, without hesitation, and
without the shadow of a doubt of correctness” (The Claim of Reason, 148). For example,
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those who do not speak English as their first language can miss verbal ambiguity when it
occurs in English phrases. We depend on our shared criteria to make this enterprise
comprehensible; it involves no more, though certainly no less, than that.33 Cavell does
not think it will always be clear why imagination fails, but does consider the possibility
that “you haven’t fully projected yourself into the situation” (ibid.). Recall the examples
(provided above) of experience as a guarantor of expertise, of learning. Nemours might
lack the ability to understand the woman at court is infatuated with him if he cannot
assess and truly understand the dimensions of human relationships, in which he is
experienced; someone may miss the racism the teacher points out to the student if one
lacks the ability to enter into thoughts about such aspects of our world. One reason for
our inability to project in this way may be due to our failures to participate in our shared
criteria, for whatever reason. For example, a failure of imagination may be due to a
failure of associated powers such as empathy, memory, and observation that arise from
our forms of life and experiences. The inability or unwillingness to understand the
instructive example of racism could mark such a failure of imagination.
Livingston emphasizes “the ongoing projection of words into new contexts is
neither arbitrary nor ‘determined’ by rules or norms” (187).
He says we must
negotiate the determination of appropriateness again and again, in each case
appealing to the interlocutor’s own senses of propriety, significance, and
relevance . . . there is no substitute, in the practice of ordinary language
philosophy, for the ever-renewed appeal to what Cavell calls the “projective
imagination” . . . this appeal must be renewed in every new case, and that its
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application in each case is, to some extent at least, an exercise of the imagination,
serves to mark it off from any comprehensive attempt to theorize the norms of
language and reason once and for all (188).
(However, here Livingston is referring to what we do in engaging in ordinary language
philosophy, not all ordinary interlocution. He thinks, as Cavell does, the ordinary
language philosopher makes explicit the projection we perform everyday as it is.)
Our shared criteria help us stay on the same page. Language use is not arbitrary,
because it is shaped by what contexts invite or allow; but it is not rule-governed, because
in using language in these ways we are not circumscribing grooves of tracks laid down
for us. The regularities or conventions our languages reflect and reinforce can indeed be
“rule”-like, or guidelines, though not if by the term “rules” we are understood to connote
an inevitability. In what follows, I explain how we are able to tell what a context invites
or allows (this is due to our imaginations), and how our imaginations interact with
language in such a way that we can be linguistically creative or combine words in new
contexts.
A glance at the history of language, like that provided by Ostler, demonstrates
that it could hardly be running on deterministic principles. Language may have some
deeper tie to our human biology than we have yet established, but its variability suggests
that even if communication of some form has always been or has become a human
constant, the form of that communication has not, and it does not reveal the regularities
we might expect were it based on “rules” of the type Wittgenstein is ultimately dubious
about. Instead, language reflects the convening of our criteria, though these are subject to
change, depending on our forms of life.
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This is not to suggest that some languages might not actually have the
characteristics of a calculus; some formal languages do. And, in codifying our rules of
grammar and the meanings of terms in dictionaries for languages such as English, we
could suppose these languages function as “rule”-governed systems. But it is not obvious
that a general language used for everyday purposes could have such a structure.
(1) The Creativity of Projection
Our imaginations help us recognize contexts into which words can be extended.
This process is imaginative, because it depends, on complex ways still to be entirely
enumerated, on perceptual inputs that provide grist for imagination and language. And,
crucially, it is imaginative because it depends on the recognition of the similarities
between two (or more) contexts (an aspect of our thought process that may be heavily
influenced by our perceptual information), and this process is frequently creative. It
involves the imaginative ability to make connections, a phrase Cavell also uses. Such
connections are not always obvious; they may be striking, novel, incongruous, involve an
element of surprise or the recognition of novelty. The capacity to make and appreciate
such connections is itself creative. A retrospective examination of the use of language in
some particular instance might reveal such connections, or make them apparent.
We focus on relative similarities,34 to recall a phrase of Austin’s: “we cannot
handle an indefinitely large vocabulary; nor, generally speaking, do we wish to insist on
the minutest detectable differences, but rather on relative similarities; nor, with our
limited experience both as individuals and as a race, can we anticipate in our vocabulary
vagaries of nature which have yet to be revealed.” We also leave open future
possibilities, as Austin recognizes in these remarks. Myriad future contexts await us. We
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do not know how we will understand or describe them, assimilate our language to them,
and carry our language on from them. But in noticing similarities, we continue to give
voice to our mental images.
But what do I suppose similarity, or the similarities between contexts, to be? We
may not be able to specify a precise list of the way in which the objects of our language
and thought are similar to others. It may be impossible to account for every case of
similarity or to catalogue exhaustively every such case that has or will occur.
Nevertheless, John Searle provides an interesting list of the “similarities” that can be
recognized between metaphors35 and the materials of context of which they make use,
and his explication of “similarity” respecting metaphor provides a look at how similarity
is functioning in making projection possible.
Searle explains similarity is a “vacuous” or unilluminating predicate that cannot
determine which properties are relevant for comparison, because each thing could be like
everything else in some way. He thinks there is no one principle that accounts for the
way metaphor works, though one can ask how one thing might remind us of another
thing. There are at least eight, and probably more, ways (sketched below) in which
something can remind us of another thing, or “call to mind” something else.
Nevertheless, we can be reminded of something else in ways that do not involve
metaphor, and we could conceivably think of things that “call to mind” other things
without communicating them to other people. (Searle thinks principles of “reminding”
must work to restrict these processes, in order to, first of all, ensure that the reminding is
taking place because of a metaphor, and second, determine whether that metaphor is
something that can be intelligibly communicated from speaker to hearer.36)
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Searle discusses various principles of interpretation that enable the
comprehensible “calling to mind” of other things. They are:
Principle 1: Things which are P are by definition R.
Principle 2: Things which are P are contingently R.
Principle 3: Things which are P are often said or believed to be R, even though
both speaker and hearer may know that R is false of P.
Principle 4: Things which are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they
believed to be R, nonetheless it is a fact about our sensibility, whether culturally
or naturally determined, that we just do perceive a connection, so that utterance of
P is associated in our minds with R properties.
Principle 5: P things are not like R things, and are not believed to be like R
things, nonetheless the condition of being P is like the condition of being R.
Principle 6: There are cases where P and R are the same or similar in meaning,
but where one, usually P, is restricted in its application, and does not literally
apply to S.
Principle 7: A way of applying principles 1 through 6 to simple cases which are
not of the form “S is P” but relational metaphors, and metaphors of other
syntactical forms such as those involving verbs and predicate adjectives.
Principle 8: Special cases of metaphor, such as, perhaps, synecdoche and
metonymy.
Possibly, Principle 9: Where an association between P and R that did not
previously exist could be created by the juxtaposition of S and P in the original
sentence.37
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Principles 3, 4, 5, and 9 apply especially frequently to the similarities that could
be said to exist between the contexts marked by the projection of a word. For example,
Principles 4 and 5 apply to Cavell’s example of “feeding” the meter: the condition of
“being fed” a coin is like the condition of “being fed” some food. Presumably, this may
come about because of circumstances that can be described by Principle 9; eventually,
this use of the word “feed” for both contexts can also be understood as an example of
Principle 3.
Now, Searle emphasizes that noting similarities between objects should only
function as an inferential strategy, not as the basis for an assertion of genuine likeness,
because such an assertion can result in a likeness’s being construed as part of the
metaphor’s meaning, when not all “metaphorical assertions are equivalent in meaning to
statements of similarity” (415). This is because assertions require a successful
commitment to matching truth-conditions; if the truth-conditions of the objects involved
do not correspond, there can be no assertion of likeness. For example, the fact that
“Richard is a gorilla” is a metaphor and implies that Richard has attributes that are
commonly or mythologically (but falsely) associated with gorillas does not mean that
there can be a real assertion of similarity, with the same truth-conditions, between
Richard and gorillas. Assertions of similarity can be inappropriate because the objects
under consideration, as they are being described by a metaphor, do not share any property
that could be asserted as a real likeness, or because one or both of the objects may not
exist or have any verifiable properties. Though metaphors can “call to mind” similarities
between objects, these similarities cannot always be formulated as assertions of genuine
likeness.
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Searle’s emphasis here is also applicable to the similarities marked by projection.
The similarities between feeding an animal and feeding a meter are not literal. We must
infer these connections, not actually successfully assert that what is true of the feeding of
an organism is likewise true for the “feeding” (if we can even say such a thing literally
exists) of a meter. So such inferential strategies assist us in seeing how one thing could
be considered like something else, or related enough to it that the term used in one case
can apply in the other. In many cases, the similarities are those marked by Searle’s list,
though no doubt there are more, and more still to be created.
The similarities that will be revealed by an examination of the contexts in which a
word occurs are the similarities best characterized by family resemblances, as explained
above in the literature review. There may be no one way things are similar to each other,
but a word’s new context will share some interconnecting relationship(s) with its
previous ones.
As an example of such similarities, we can consider our use of verbs. I begin with
Cavell’s own example. Why does the word “feed” work in the new context, or, as Cavell
asks in The Claim of Reason, “what makes a projection an appropriate or correct one?”
(169). In the case of the word “feed,” it is clear that “feeding” the meter can be
metaphorically associated with the act of supplying food; we “feed” the meter with coins
the same way we might “feed” a person or animal with food. This word seems to work
especially well here because we put coins in toward the top of the meter, often in a round
or oblong piece above a post, and that makes it seem as if we are putting coins into the
mouth in the meter’s “head,” just as we would when feeding a person or many animals.
We would not be able to do this if we did not recognize contextual similarities between
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the previous use of the word (feeding people and animals) and the new context (feeding
meters); we could not do this if we did not understand the way in which a verb like
“feed” could appropriately take on new uses.
Cavell says we “feed” the meter; Searle uses the example of the ship “plow(ing)”
the sea. Strictly speaking, we do not feed meters anything, nor do ships plow waves. But
there is something about the action of feeding the “head” of a meter coins that is
relevantly similar to the act of feeding an organism; there is something about the ship’s
prow breaking the waves in its path that is relevantly similar to the manner in which the
prow-shaped plow cuts through the soil in its path.
Many verbs involve movement, often words we use to account for the experiences
of our mental endeavors: we use such phrases as “holding a thought,” “calling to mind,”
we say we “summon up” or “conjure up,” “dig into the past,” and so on. We mention
inspiration itself, “falling into the mind,” and so on. We cannot actually hold thoughts,
call things into minds or let things drop into them; we cannot dig into pasts—two
contexts are frequently different in that one might refer to an actual event or action, the
other to an abstract entity. But researching the past is like what happens when we
uncover by digging; the feeling of inspiration is like having something tumble down from
up above us (sometimes it is literally like that). Austin says “bog down,” McGinn
frequently employs “shorn,” Ostler “blot”—as when he refers to one language blotting
out another—and in all of these cases, these movements are sufficiently similar to what
happens in the endeavors of thought and intellect they are used to characterize. “Blot,”
with its suggestion of a liquid stain and its spreading, blurring edges, is a particularly
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compelling way to describe how one language might seep into the province of another
and eventually extinguish it entirely.
The term “fire” and its appearances in the various ways we account for types of
illumination is another example of the way we trade on similarities between contexts:
specifically, intellectual illumination and actual illumination. The phrase “flash of
insight” makes use of the language of light and the way in which brightening our field of
perception is like brightening our field of cognition. It also trades on the speed with
which illumination takes place, when light floods a room, for example. In such cases, our
experiences, aspects of our perception, are converted to matter for our imaginations and,
finally (or perhaps simultaneously; see below), our language.
Similarities marked by crisscrossing, complex family resemblances are borne out
by other types of language use. This is apparent when we examine the most frequently
used verb in modern English, “run,” now the bearer of at least 645 meanings. This
number has been settled on by lexicographer Peter Gilliver, who worked on “run” for the
upcoming edition of the Oxford English Dictionary for over nine months. (Three words,
“set,” “put,” and “run,” resulted in months of work—indeed, years, according to Simon
Winchester—for those contributors to the next OED, slated to be published in 2037.)
“Run” may have ascended to the top of the list of meaning-laden terms in part because of
its facility for describing the movement of machines (e.g., trains “running on tracks”),
according to Winchester, but our language use also currently reflects variations in
meaning that are much older. How have we projected “run” into all of these contexts?
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This is due to family resemblances between these various meanings of “run,”
indeed, the hundreds of them—we see crisscrossing patterns of association and
connection just as Wittgenstein describes in explaining the associations between games.
Our uses of terms also mark how we do, or can come to see, dissimilarities
between contexts, eventually thinking one word works better than another, for example.
Winchester sees in “run” a less old-fashioned (and less British) term than “set,” the word
“run” displaced in frequency. And “put” may have contributed to the unseating of “set,”
for now we often say we “put” things places (on shelves, for example) rather than
“setting” them there. This may be due to the fact that “put” better suits our current
language use than “set.” Dissimilarity has crept in here; we apply “put” more frequently
perhaps because family differences are afflicting the usefulness of “set.” Thus our
projection is informed not only by family resemblances, but by these differences, or
breaks in use. (A curious current example is the phrase “a sight for sore eyes”: it is
apparently now being understood as a negative remark, instead of a compliment—as a
sight that might make eyes sore, rather than relieve their distress.)
We can also speculate about whether projection has taken place, even if we (I) do
not know the answer. The word “crane” is known to refer to a certain species of bird, or
to a certain way of moving—as our current version of the OED has it, “to stretch out
one’s neck; to lean or bend forward with the neck stretched out,” e.g. It is a very old
word, from before 1000 C. E., which can function as both a noun and a verb. But it has
another meaning—it refers to a piece of equipment, a tall, thin, swiveling machine that
can lift and transport objects. This use of the word, which etymological sources
characterize as metaphorical, appears in the late 13th century and shares its sense with
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equivalent words in German and Greek. Did the machine get its name, “crane,” because
it “called to mind” the bird, or the movement of craning? What type of crane is craning
one’s neck like? The bird, or the equipment?
Another case is provided by the stolidly useful word “clam,” which refers to many
things that have no apparent connection to each other, some invoked figuratively, some
not—shellfish, dollar bills, shutting down into silence, and, fascinatingly, a mistake
musicians make, either by missing a note or using the wrong one. And a “clambake”
doesn’t only refer to a meal of clams; it is the term for a musical work that contains a
significant number of such errors in its execution. “Clam” apparently derives from the
old German “klam” (“to press together or squeeze”), from which the shellfish gets its
name, because its shell squeezes together in this way (“klam” also gave us “clamp”). But
do we use this term because musicians may have associated their mouths with sealing up,
as clams do? Or does it stem from yet another sense of “clam”—the name given to
another kind of musical mistake, the kind made by those ringing bells in 18th-century
Europe, who on occasion rang the bells at the same time (and may have thus given us our
word “clamor”)? Or does it derive from some other source altogether?
A probably sometimes related (though not perhaps as often clearly metaphorical)
case of projection occurs when we apply the word for an existing concept to a new
instance of it, as when we extend terms like “art,” “law,” and “game” to putative new
examples of them. Thomas Hobbes engages in this kind of speculation, wondering at all
the meanings of the word “faith,” and at the close of the Categories, Aristotle muses over
the ways we use “having.” Hobbes calls these types of expression “equivocal” (he says
all metaphors are, “by profession”) and says they are the kinds of words that often bring
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things to mind different from what they originally referred.38 (Austin says words never
entirely shake off their histories; Hobbes thinks they can. Who is right—Austin or
Hobbes? I suppose it depends on the word.)
As reviewed, Wittgenstein says we project a word for a concept to a new instance
of it by use of language-games; Austin says some claim we project words in this way on
the basis of “similarity.” He has also said this aspect of our language use deserves closer
consideration, claiming we should supply a catalog of reasons for using the same term for
different things. Austin thinks this topic has been neglected and would be complex, and
would also require the study of actual language use, rather than ideal language.
Consider the application of Wittgenstein’s own example, “game,” to a new set of
circumstances. Why would we call some new arrangement a “game”? What is the
significance of the new context? Doesn’t something render the application of the term
appropriate in that situation? I will consider a current controversy that involves a game—
specifically, can a game be art? Can it, or has it already, gained entry to the category of
art objects?
Some maintain that video games are or can be considered art, because they exhibit
creativity and aesthetic excellence in their design and execution, and many have pointed
out that their quality has increased significantly in a relatively short span of time. Others
argue that video games simply are not art; they are games. The fact that they involve
interaction, at least one person manipulating the materials involved, is enough of a
sticking-point, according to some proponents of this view. (Though some forms of art
may include interaction with audiences.) Video games may exhibit creativity, or
aesthetic excellence, but many aspects of our lives do this that we do not consider art.
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If we eventually come to accept the idea that video games are art, this will be at
least in part because video games will be thought to exhibit enough of the characteristics
or partial similarities already exhibited by members of the family of art objects to gain
entry. Plausible candidates include demonstrating creativity and aesthetic excellence. If
video games are rejected from the art category, it will be at least in part because they lack
enough of these characteristics (they simply are not enough like other members of the
family).
(I find myself leaning toward the idea that video games are not art, though I
suppose my view could change in the future—if so, I think something would have to
change about our understanding of video games. We would have to consciously begin
appreciating them from an aesthetic point of view, I think, and this would have to be our
primary purpose in seeking them out. And I find that my views on this are affected by
my thought that video games were not necessarily created to be art, but to be games. [I
also think our tendency to call them video games may not last. In the future, might we
more commonly call them digital games, interfacing games, “interaction,” or something
like that?] Had our intentions toward video games, including our intentions about
creating them, been different, perhaps our conception of them as art objects would be too.
I realize they make use of attributes exhibited by the other arts—they include narrative,
visuals, and music, as film and theatre often do—and I accept that they may be
aesthetically remarkable in many respects, though I think part of our wonder at that is
affected by the fact that we are impressed, perhaps unduly, by the technological
advancements involved in creating them, and the speed at which those advancements has
occurred. I also realize their creation, and consumption, may produce aesthetic
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enjoyment or admiration. But, though I think they obviously involve aesthetic elements,
they are not part of the art category—at least not yet. They are no more necessarily art
objects than festivals, zombie pub crawls, or Halloween costumes—other endeavors that
can certainly be creative, but are not necessarily art, and were not, at least not as a matter
of course, intended to be. We do not characterize all graceful physical activity, including
great athletic speed and prowess in sports, as dance, even though elements of sport might
be thought continuous with elements of dance—and again, the intention makes a
difference. Nor should we think video games, despite the attributes they share with the
other arts, can fairly be classed with them.)
I mentioned above that we may feel that simply providing examples and pointing
out how they resemble other instances of the concept in question might well fail to satisfy
us. We might, for example, feel that the word “art” covers so many and various instances
of human activity that it is foolish to use one word for all of them, or we may feel that
this persistent usage must reflect something more than resemblances or similarities. Why
do we keep using that term? Why do we have such strong views about what should be
included in the category, and what should not? Isn’t there more to this?39 Might we not
be circling around something essential and universal in employing such a term? I would
suggest that in such cases, we need to heed Austin’s advice to prise our words off the
world. When we take a good look at the world, without thinking about what we call
things, I think we can see that there are considerable differences among the products of
human creativity that we have, at one point in human history or another, called “art”—
works of literature, ancient sculpture, contemporary electronic music, and so on are very
different things. Some members of the category are not even important enough to it to be
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included any longer (such as the furniture or china of previous centuries); some might
still be involved in our idea of it, but only tangentially (such as gardening). These things
really are different, out in the world, and our engagement with them changes. But in our
language, in our human concepts, our tendency to note similarities reveals a story about
how they all came to be called the same thing. (Such a story can be told regarding all the
different ways we use “run.”) Wittgenstein’s extraordinarily powerful metaphor for
language as a city, with its various developments and suburbs, is effective here: the word
“art” directs us to its own municipality. Some concepts are more difficult to delineate
than others; the concept of “terrorism” is a current thorny example. (Does it involve
targeting innocents? Who is innocent? Is it always political? How is it different from
war, if it is? Why or how is it unjustifiable when war is justifiable—if it is? Does it
always involve subnational groups, or can it be committed by governments?) But some
difficulties in analyzing our projections can be resolved by setting aside those terms and
considering the world they are marking. We are capturing that world in our languagegames, and this is not arbitrary, but it may be that we organize or classify objects in
certain ways because of our useful, economical ability to project, recognizing similarities.
And if something about our world changes, our criteria for our judgments, and our words,
might too. For example, if in the future video games become more closely associated
with art than they now are, we may project the term “art” toward them. (This may not
account for what we are always doing when we invoke “universals,” but it may helpfully
illuminate many of them.40)
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Once we begin to look for it, we can see the projection of language everywhere.
And everywhere we see it, we see that it is frequently marking, or concealing (sometimes
just barely), relevant similarities between contexts.
There exists an array of disjunctive possibilities that reflect ways in which newly
created instances of a concept are similar to previous ones. But we can also produce
connections or similarities that are unprecedented (a possibility included in Searle’s list
for metaphors), and our sense of what is similar to what may change and develop over
time, particularly as we extend our concepts toward new cases. (Note the sense of
movement involved in suggesting we extend concepts “toward” other contexts.) There is
more than one way of understanding similarity, and there are multiple ways in which
contexts are or could be similar. But to the extent that our capacity to project involves
the capacity to make connections between contexts that are similar in some way, this is
probably very often due to family resemblances.
So we project, creatively, on the basis of similarities between contexts, which
cannot be exhaustively catalogued, though the concept of “family resemblances”
provides insight into how it is occurring. This is an imaginative mental endeavor. And
recognizing how contexts are relevantly similar to one another is often a profoundly
imaginative act.
(2) A Shortcut
“One day one of us says ‘feed the meter’, or ‘feed in the film’, or ‘feed the
machine’, or feed his pride’, or ‘feed wire’,” Cavell says, “and we understand, we are not
troubled” (The Claim of Reason, 181).
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Language users are not always trying to map out contexts for projection that strain
credulity or the imagination; if this were so, the projection of words into new contexts
would not work as it does. We do not and could not preface our use of words in new
contexts with explanations of how the new use of the word corresponds to the previous
context(s).
If we were troubled, we could not do this. We would not be able to project; the
use of language might be completely different from what we now see. What would that
look like? The following are some possibilities. It would look like a situation in which
communication required continual explanation, summing up, calculation, or extension.
We might be constantly trafficking in stipulative definitions, or straining to make
inferences as if we had no conventional knowledge or memory of what our languages
require. (“He said ‘intention’ is a ‘miner’s lamp’—all right, this is what an intention is,
that is what a miner’s lamp is, they don’t seem to fit together . . . what does that mean?”
Actually, perhaps this would not happen, because if we were troubled by projection,
maybe we would never use such phrases as “miner’s lamp” for things like intentions.) Or
it might look like a system of rules artificially imposed—language invented and
maintained for specific purposes that do not change except through conscious processes
(though how would the need or desire for change be recognized?), as we use
conventionally devised symbols to denote possible conditions on the road, or formerly
used Morse code. (Perhaps such systems of representation are more useful and
applicable to further contexts the more skeletal they are—their indeterminacy renders
them richer. We could do this in our daily use of language, too, but we have found it
expedient to mark many more aspects of our world with our language.41) Or it might
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involve continual development. People might be constantly inventing new words, which
would not work very well when they attempted to communicate with others, for one
thing, and for another, it is unclear that we would have any reason to do that. Why would
any of us feel the need to invent new language on a regular basis? How would we even
know we could invent and try out new languages (even unsuccessfully), if we lacked an
antecedent concept of language like our own? If we did manage to continually invent
new words, perhaps launching them at those around us, how could we do that without
relying on those words or concepts we already know? Would we want to avoid any
perceived connection to our previous words? But why? As a matter of principle? To do
so would be yet another strained move. We might do this (and people probably have
fairly frequently) because of the sheer delight we take in the innovative possibilities of
language, but only up to a point. This does not characterize a primary way of using
language. Austin cautioned that we cannot handle an indefinitely large vocabulary. Nor
does it seem that we frequently need to, or actually, try to grow ours, and if we did, our
motivations for doing so (as well as our success at trying) would require further
examination.
Now, maybe we do not extend language only because plenty of it already exists
that we learn, and there is always more of it to learn. But, in general, if these peculiar
scenarios revealed the truth about language, language would require a level of foresight,
individual “authority” over words, and perhaps stasis, that it has probably never had. It is
far, far more spontaneous than that, even if much of what we use of it is learned, and we
inherit it and are in its bonds, as Cavell claims. It would also require a probably
sometimes hilarious inability to understand and relate to each other not borne out by
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actual languages, though in such a “language,” we would probably lack such a commonly
shared concept of humor. Presumably one of language’s advantages is that it is such a
fleet vehicle for our thoughts and various interactions with each other, even if it is not
perfect and does not capture everything we could think or is important to note. Language
probably would not be as useful a tool, or knife, for us as it is if it was a clumsy, blunt
one that we had to consciously think about wielding (and decide how to wield) every
time we needed it. Cavell said language is our fate. But it is also our human memory,
guiding us in what we do, on both a collective and individual level. The history of
language is the collective repository of all we have said, read, and written. It is also our
individual memory: we learn and retain word-meanings with astonishing facility,
regardless of our individual predilections for the enjoyment to be found in language. Just
as memory does in other contexts, it constrains, in language, what is possible.
And when it comes to the case where we project words, we do not use new words
all the time. Why not? Related to what is said above, if we did, we would be (1) noting
differences in a way that is artificial or contrived from the way we often do use language,
(2) if we did this too often, we would be at pains to make use of, or reinforce, a
conventional vocabulary we comprehensibly use and share, and (3) we would be
engaging in language-games that are much more strained and self-conscious than what
we actually find in our ordinary fluency, which disproves such an idea. Cavell says such
a society would be one where everything is just “different.” That is not our language
form of life. Instead, we see connections; our imaginative ability to project does
substantial intellectual work for us.
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When it does this, instead of one of the possibilities I have just considered, it is
working as a shortcut. It short-circuits through often dimly perceived (if perceived at all)
similarities of contexts. When all of the steps in this process are not explicit or clear, this
may increase our tendency to experience the imagination as beguiling, and to suppose
that it is not logical or connected to facts, for it may look as if there is no connection
between the word in its prior context and its new one. In fact, however, this use of the
imagination may be deeply “controlled,” to use Cavell’s words, by what we experience
and our forms of life. The imagination cuts a path through these contexts, lighting up
connections between them the way intention lights the fuse to the flame of our language
use, in Cavell’s terms. It is the flash of insight that permits us to make use of the
materials of our experiences and languages, much as occurs when we make and
appreciate art.
We do see connections, and this shortcut works because, at some point in our
language development, we are able to understand that language can move forward in this
way. Such uses of language may take us by surprise, causing a thrill of enjoyment or
cognitive illumination if they are new to us, or particularly illustrative. But in general, it
is unlikely that we will read Ostler’s description of one language “blotting” out another,
cast about for Ostler or an interpreter, and ask: “What is meant by that?” Our
imaginative linguistic capacity fills in the blanks for us. Now let us consider some
characteristics of this imaginative endeavor, particularly why it is a shortcut.
The first thing to say about this process is that it is fast. It often works without
our conscious tinkering, and it can be difficult to perceive or explain at all. We do not
self-consciously reckon up the similarities between contexts most of the time. In

165

deciding whether to extend or withhold a term from a new use, our linguistic
imaginations grasp the relevant factors and provide understanding. It makes sense to say
one language can “blot” out another; it is a particularly good way of making the point. It
makes sense to say insight can operate like a “flash.” In grasping all of this, I did not
engage in the mental equivalent of adding sums to reach my understanding of these
words and their applicability to another context. I will consider another example that
might be thought to require more rehearsal, the case of whether or not to apply the term
“art” to video games. We can think about this; I have thought quite a bit about whether I
would use the word “art” for video games. But I did not engage in some kind of
workaday speculation over the concepts “art,” “game,” and so on. I can investigate those
language-games, as Wittgenstein would point out, but I am using language full-blown, as
he would say, to think about this problem. I am using language as an expert; I am using
language with the proficiency of someone immersed in the form of life; and thus I am
grasping what is relevant to each case. My fields of consciousness are indeed lit by the
occasions of these words. All I have to do, if I want, is map those fields, and mapping
them will reveal the similarities (or dissimilarities—too many of them, and video games
do not make the category) described above.
In saying those fields are lit, I mean that I infer,42 often from one context of a
word’s uses to the other(s), and I frequently do so with a speed like light. Both
metaphor43 and projection more generally frequently depend upon inference for their
comprehension. This process can be highly reflective and conscious, in which language
users deliberate about a metaphorical subject or the projection of a term and the
candidates for its meaning. But it can also be as unconscious and mechanical as the most
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immediate of cognitive or perceptual steps. This can occur because the demands for
interpretation are not high, or because metaphors or projections, occurring in particular
contexts, can be so readily understood, perhaps over repeated occurrences,
comprehending them becomes as rote as comprehending dead metaphors (and perhaps
this is how some metaphors died). But understanding projections or metaphors,
especially if they are demanding, and giving metaphorical meaning to non-metaphors,
requires inference, even when that process is immediate or not obvious. The meaning of
metaphor that philosophers such as Searle and Martinich examine depends entirely upon
inference (and consequently a theory of metaphor must address how metaphor operates
according to inference).44
When we do infer in this way, we gather information from both our languages and
the world, and we are so thoroughly immersed in both that we do not need guidance,
except as children, to do this.
As a way of demonstrating this inferential process, I provide syllogisms to
illustrate what happens in some particular cases of metaphor or projection. I follow an
example of Martinich’s in doing so. Martinich believes it is possible, in the case of
standard metaphors, to build inferential arguments mapping out the analyzed meanings of
metaphors and ultimately producing true conclusions, even if they may contain one or
more false premises. One would do this by, first, presenting the metaphorical utterance
(literally false) as a premise; constructing a second premise that lays out the salient
properties the metaphor prompts one to note—this is the “major” premise; and third,
concluding what the metaphor means by specifying that the subject of the metaphor
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(whatever it might be) somehow possesses the salient properties pointed out in the second
premise.
For example, one could construct the following inferential argument for Searle’s
(fantastic) metaphor, “Sam’s car is a pig.”
P1: Sam’s car is a pig.
P2: Pigs have a hearty appetite for fuel.
C: The hearty appetite for fuel of Sam’s car is like a pig’s.
Another, less likely possibility:
P1: Sam’s car is a pig.
P2: Pigs have a distinctive shape (or make distinctive noises or . . .)
C: The distinctive shape of Sam’s car is like a pig’s (or the distinctive noise it
makes or . . .)
It is not necessarily the case that there must always be one identifiable property
(or set of properties) that a metaphor prompts us to note; the “or” in the examples above
is meant to indicate this. Indeed, in some cases it might be difficult to articulate the
property or properties we have been led to note at all. Yet frequently metaphors work to
call up the similarities that are being traded on, so we could paraphrase, or give some
sense of, what a metaphor means.
Now, I think we can do the same with projections, at least as a way of illustrating
what they frequently get across. We can map the fields of consciousness connected by
our shortcut. And the inferential argument we construct for a projection can mark the
disjunction of similarities captured by a projection. For example, I could suppose:
P1: A language blots out another language.
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P2: A blotting liquid can seep into or obscure other objects.
C: A blotting language is like a blotting liquid; a blotting language seeps into or
obscures another one.
(It is very curious that the word “blot” could also mean to “darken” or “dry,”
among other things. But I think the sense in which Ostler uses it is better captured by the
idea that some things seep.)
Martinich’s device for elucidating the meaning of metaphor is clearly related to
what Cavell has to say on metaphor, in “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,”
from Must We Mean What We Say? In that section of his work, Cavell argues that
metaphors can be paraphrased (which is in effect what Martinich’s procedure allows us to
do). (I later question a distinction Cavell draws between metaphor and projection.)
Cavell points out that types of language can be distinguished from one another on
the basis of whether they can be paraphrased and, if so, how (ibid., 74). He says “literal”
uses of language do not need paraphrase, but metaphors do, or we can use it to draw out a
metaphor’s meaning, by a paraphrase that concludes with “and so on” to mark the
perhaps infinite number of ways in which a metaphor’s sense can be captured (just as I
use ellipses in the syllogisms above).
As an example of the “literal” use of language, Cavell provides “Juliet (the girl
next door) is not yet fourteen years old.” If someone does not understand the meaning of
this, Cavell says we would try to clear up confusion by attempting to “put the thought
another way,” or essentially re-word or re-express essentially the same idea about Juliet’s
age. But if someone asks for the meaning of “Juliet is the sun,” one can paraphrase;
Cavell says we would “not try to put the thought another way” (ibid., 78), but would,
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instead, draw out possible meanings, which express different propositional content: we
would say
Romeo means that Juliet is the warmth of his world; that his day begins with her;
that only in her nourishment can he grow. And his declaration suggests that the
moon, which other lovers use as emblems of their love, is merely her reflected
light, and dead in comparison; and so on. In a word, I paraphrase it. Moreover, if
I could not provide an explanation of this form, then that is a very good reason, a
perfect reason, for supposing that I do not know what it means. Metaphors are
paraphrasable. (And if that is true, it is tautologous.) (ibid., 78-79).
Metaphors are distinguished from other uses of language by this type of
paraphrase which calls for “and so on.” As well, the “and so on” ending the paraphrase
of a metaphor calls for further examination: it is not unique to metaphor, for one thing.
While the “and so on” is indeed important, perhaps distinguishing, it is true of other
attempts to capture meaning that do not involve metaphor.
Cavell is aware of a recent problem bedeviling theories of metaphor: do
metaphors somehow depend on or exhibit “new” meanings, or is their construction the
result of lexical dictionary definitions that nevertheless give rise to these new moves in
language? He writes:
Two points now emerge: (1) The “and so on” which ends my example of
paraphrase is significant. It registers what William Empson calls the “pregnancy”
of metaphors, the burgeoning of meaning in them. (He believes this distinguishes
metaphor from some (“but perhaps not all”) literal speech, as well as from simile,
because similes are “just a little bit pregnant”—the “like” will lead listeners to
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suppose the comparison will eventually be made for them, according to Cavell,
and we will wait on it: “It is not up to me to find as much as I can in your words.
The over-reading of metaphors so often complained of, no doubt justly, is a
hazard they must run for their high interest.”) . . . (2) To give the paraphrase, to
understand the metaphor, I must understand the ordinary or dictionary meaning of
the words it contains, and understand that they are not there being used in their
ordinary way, that the meanings they invite are not be found opposite them in a
dictionary. In this respect the words in metaphors function as they do in idioms
(ibid., 79).
He says we do not paraphrase idiomatic expressions, we just “tell” what they mean, we
do not “explain it at all” (ibid.)—“either you know what it means or you don’t; there is no
richer and poorer among its explanations; you need imagine nothing special in the mind
of the person using it” (ibid., 79-80). We do, he seems to be saying, restrict ourselves to
a right or wrong answer, and are not faced with the potential interpretive complexity of
metaphor.
He continues,
Any theory concerned to account for peculiarities of metaphor of the sort I have
listed will wonder over the literal meaning its words, in that combination, have.
This is a response, I take it, to the fact that a metaphorical expression (in the “A is
B” form at least) sounds like an ordinary assertion, though perhaps not made by
an ordinary mind. Theory aside, I want to look at the suggestion, often made, that
what metaphors literally say is false . . . what are we to say about the literal
meaning of a metaphor? That it has none? And that what it literally says is not

171

false, and not true? And that it is not an assertion? But it sounds like one; and
people do think it is true and people do think it is false. I am suggesting that it is
such facts that will need investigating if we are to satisfy ourselves about
metaphors; that we are going to keep getting philosophical theories about
metaphor until such facts are investigated; and that this is not an occasion for
adjudication, for the only thing we could offer now in that line would be: all the
theories are right in what they say. And that seems to imply that all are wrong as
well (ibid., 80).
Donald Davidson, in “What Metaphors Mean,” tries to answer such worries. He
is not concerned with how metaphors work as the product of what speakers do with
language; he is concerned with what they mean, as words and sentences. An “ordinary”
fact about speech-governed communication, according to Davidson, is that it all depends
of necessity upon “inventive construction and inventive construal” (415). Any kind of
conversation requires (frequently imaginative) interpretive efforts on the part of those
involved in figuring out what some utterance means, he maintains. Davidson thus
forgoes discussion of context, speakers, hearers, and truth and falsity to pronounce that
metaphors “mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing
more” and thinks they require nothing “beyond the resources on which (this) ordinary
depends” (ibid.). Metaphors may be creatively constructed much of the time, and they
may make us notice something in particular, but they do not have a meaning in addition
to the literal meaning given by the words of which they are comprised. (They are also
within the domain of use, he says; but apparently Davidson’s concern is solely with
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meaning.) Attributing an additional meaning to a metaphor could be a result of confusing
what a metaphor says (its literal words) with what it makes us notice or “attend” to.
Now, because of this, Davidson thinks it is unnecessary to paraphrase or
somehow reword what is expressed by a metaphor. Meaning resides in the words used.
This does not signify that one can never elaborate upon or perhaps further explain the
point of a metaphor (but is this not elucidation of a metaphorical meaning?); it only
means that such efforts should confine themselves to drawing out what has already been
said by that metaphor. One should not go hunting for additional or new definitions, or
some mysterious methodology by which metaphor works.
Davidson criticizes several proposed explanations of metaphorical meaning. Like
Martinich and Searle, he finds fault with “extended meaning,” interaction, and similarity
theories and also explicates problems with “ambiguity” theories that posit plays upon
words occurring in metaphorical contexts.
He notes that in trying to pin down the “novel or surprising” likeness (416)
between objects of comparison, one might be tempted to come up with a definition, itself
metaphorical, that explains the metaphorical predication of this property. This could lead
one to devise a new meaning for the word or words being used. That is to say, if one
used a word metaphorically, that word would then take on whatever extended meaning is
suggested by the metaphor (so, the definition of “ocean” in “an ocean of time” could be
expanded to include that case in which there really are, lexically, such things as oceans of
time). The extensions of these words would then include metaphorical applications.
This, as Searle and Martinich also suggest, undermines the entire possibility of metaphor,
because the idea of “new” or “extended” meanings becomes akin to straightforward
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literal descriptions. All sense of metaphor “evaporates,” according to Davidson; “to
make a metaphor is to murder it” (417), if this is what metaphorical meaning is.
Davidson also maintains that the beguiling complexity underlying metaphor that
could lead to a perception of “ambiguity” about the words involved also results in errors
in attributing meaning. Positing that words used metaphorically become “ambiguous”
because of their suggestive power is an instance of putting the cart before the horse. If
words seem somehow ambiguous because of metaphorical use, such an “ambiguity”
would result after the comprehension of the metaphor, while one is reflecting on the
richness or aptness that is unfolded to the mind’s eye. Ambiguity would not occur before
or during comprehension, when one must interpret the metaphor based on the literal
definitions of its words. Additionally, ambiguity is unsuccessful in trading on “dual”
meanings that could arise in conjunction with metaphor: words always mean the same
thing. They do not mean something different lexically because of the way they were used
(Searle, Martinich, and Davidson all agree on this point).
Davidson also thinks it would be a mistake to understand metaphorical meaning
in terms of “literal” and “figurative” expressions, in which perhaps some rule could
ensure that words possess their usual, literal definitions and predication in addition to
some metaphorical definition and predication. These additional metaphorical meanings
could be mapped onto literal ones, in some shadowy interpretive manner, by the
figurative connotations of the metaphor. Davidson thinks this possibility is just as
unlikely, and it seems unnecessary and difficult to guarantee the layered figurative
meaning in such cases as well.
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Turning to another possibility, Davidson questions whether it might make sense to
view “the figurative meaning of a metaphor (as) the literal meaning of (its) corresponding
simile” (420), rather than viewing a metaphor as an elliptical simile. This would be too
simple, he says, because metaphors cannot always be equated with similes; additionally,
this suggests (as Searle and Martinich point out) that “everything is like everything, and
in endless ways” (ibid.). In the case of Max Black’s theory, Davidson claims, metaphors,
if they are elliptical similes, would need to say explicitly what similes say, because
ellipsis is not “paraphrase or indirection” but “abbreviation.” More significantly,
however, Davidson notes that a view of metaphor as elliptical simile does not explain
what similarities or features are relevant for comparison or notice.
Other forms of language, Davidson says, work in a similar manner to metaphor—
poetry can cause us to note likenesses, and it can do so by intimating. But “intimation is
not meaning” (421), he asserts.
Because metaphor occurs within expressions possessing literal meaning, they
display “normal” truth and falsity, according to Davidson (he does not specify how or if
these normal truth-values depend upon a context; I do not see how it is possible to assess
truth-values without one. Perhaps he is taking the presence of context for granted, as
when he mentions the “context of use” [whatever it is] below). Because of their
connection to literal utterances, metaphorical utterances are usually literally false. But
Davidson importantly acknowledges that “patent truth will do as well”—the “ordinary
meaning in the context of use is odd enough to prompt us to disregard the question of
literal truth” (422). Davidson understands that falsity is not the crucial test for metaphor.
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Finally, Davidson considers the effect of metaphor in order to argue that the
cognitive content of a metaphor (whatever it produces, once comprehended) should not
be imputed to the metaphor itself. Davidson thinks complaints about the unsatisfactory
nature of paraphrase are also misguided: if a metaphor does possess a specific cognitive
content, it should be possible to spell it out, even if its “effect is so much weaker” (424).
Davidson concludes that metaphors may indeed prompt us to notice certain things
or comprehend utterances in particular ways. But these results of understanding do not
mean metaphors work by conveying specific cognitive contents. For one thing,
metaphors might “mean” endless things; these possible meanings might not be
propositional in content; and these meanings might not be related to any kind of
verifiable truth. “No such explanation or statement can be forthcoming because no such
message exists,” Davidson writes (425), though he finishes by proclaiming that
“interpretation and elucidation of a metaphor are . . . in order.”
I would add that our ability to create and understand metaphor, which depends on
the aspects of imagination I am describing, is a pragmatic endeavor, as that term is
deployed in philosophy of language. Metaphors are produced by terms possessing literal
meanings, but, to borrow Wittgenstein’s insight, no more can be said: the resources for
comprehending metaphor lie not in any “special” meaning we can attribute to words in
their metaphorical use, but in a juxtaposition of those words with contextual factors
grasped, and perhaps propagated, by our imaginations—and in those cases in which we
move those terms into new contexts, our projective imaginations. When we project
imaginatively, or create metaphors, we are not necessarily inventing new words or new
meanings that must accompany each use; instead, our knowledge of the meanings of
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words enables us to play these language-games. Nevertheless, though they may not be
inventing new meanings for words, metaphors, and projections, do often have a
meaningful content that can be approximated by way of a paraphrase or syllogism, as
described above. What this often makes explicit is a cognitive shortcut that our
imaginations engaged in, often without us consciously observing this.
So we infer, and we do this very quickly. When we infer, we can often (though
perhaps not always) delineate the imaginative linking of contexts.
Suppose we had to, or decided to, clearly expound what we meant by each new
use of a term; suppose we appended definitions to each move we made in language
(announcing our creation of new metaphorical definitions, for example). That would
hardly be language as we use it. Just as we could not provide a rule for each instance of
the use of a rule, we do not provide a new definition (or application criterion) for each
new use of a term. We do not need to do this, and in some cases, it would probably be
difficult to do this. One reason for this speed is because we become, very quickly and
remarkably, adept natives of language and what contexts invite or allow. Cavell uses his
concept of “attunement” to reinforce our shared criteria, and, like Austin, mentions that
our disagreements often indicate the extent to which we do agree (and says writers,
unlike other artists, are able to rely on such agreement). We even share the connotations
and implications of our words, for they are learned and collectively reinforced as an
aspect of this form of life.
The projective imagination manages such matters for us. Even when we are not,
as language users, consciously taking stock of all this, our projective imagination is.
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But we do not only rely on what we know of language; our projections do not
only occur because we see a kaleidoscope of definitions, connotations, and denotations
cascading before us as we think and write and speak. The shortcut pulls not only on our
stock of knowledge about language, but from perceptual information related to our forms
of life, that is, those things we observe or perceive. Our imaginative shortcut is informed
by our shared criteria, the “whirl of life” around us. We absorb it from what we hear,
read, see, and understand in interaction with other people. Perceptual information is thus
a deeply important source of fuel for our imaginations. This results in a powerful
merging (perhaps simultaneous) of the cognitive and sensory, the “inner” and “outer.”
Those who are keen at understanding the ramifications of those criteria, and who
have a fine imaginative sense, can astutely comprehend or make use of projection.
Hobbes says: “men of quick imagination, ceteris paribus, are more prudent than those
whose imaginations are slow: for they observe more in less time” (33; emphasis
added).45 His remarks emphasize the speed at which the imagination can work, a factor
in the way we project, I maintain. He also may provide a hint about who is better able to
create and recognize projections. Those whose powers of observation are sharp in this
way may be better able to deploy projections and assess their value; many of them may
be gifted with respect to language, as we believe writers are. Something similar is
occurring in our use of wit. The perception of an opportunity for humor, of various kinds
(absurd, supportive, sarcastic, and so on—various types of humor are a subject for
thorough imaginative engagement and investigation themselves), can depend on a
lightning-fast assessment of the suitability of the joke for the intended audience, its
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likelihood of lightening the mood, or its impact in making a point. This can happen more
quickly for some people than others.
For example, it may be difficult to grasp, exactly, how we understand a style of
music has fallen out of fashion. We do not vote on this matter; no edicts are released to
the public. Some people involved in the music world may issue judgments, but these are
often not widely known, may differ from what is actually prevailing, and do not carry the
force of a curfew issued by law enforcement. (Even if we decided to institute such laws,
we would have to ask ourselves why. Presumably there would be a reason—we would be
codifying into law something we felt to have the force of fact.) Yet somehow we come to
know this. We may not be able to put a finger on the reason for it, but we develop a
sense of what is current in the trends of our daily lives. We have to know something by
experiencing or feeling it, according to Cavell. Once we do know this, feel it, it takes on
its own necessity, and by necessity I mean that those who can see that a style of music is
no longer current think that (to echo Kant) their judgment of this matter extends to
everyone in that society at that moment. To return to the example of video games, a
dominant aesthetic style in their construction has changed: in the 1990s, they made use
of the visual language of the “cyberpunk” genre, but throughout the past ten years, that
has apparently given way to warlike desert settings (perhaps because of the global
military activities of the past decade). One style prevailed; now another does. The same
could be said of styles of music.
It is irrelevant that some people may prefer now-unfashionable music, or may be
anxious for the styles to cycle around again and think newer styles are distasteful. The
point is that we have come to know something, and that something we know cannot be
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settled, and was not established, by appeal to rules or proven by a formula, but by our
shared criteria. But it seems to be true for all of us, nevertheless. How do we prove that
a style is dated? That is just something that people can discern, using judgment,
familiarity with elements of society, and so on. But we do not suppose this is only true
for ourselves. We suppose it applies to the wider society. If a musical style is dated, it
really is dated, for everyone involved, not just for one person.46
We may, in thinking about this, note the introduction of new terms into our
language (to take English as an example): terms such as “o.k.,” “trick or treat,” “the
whole nine yards,” and “parking meter” (“parking meter” entered the lexicon after the
first of them was erected in Oklahoma in the 1930s; Robert Hendrickson recounts a
minister was the first person arrested for an infraction47). The following examples should
resound with the musically sensitive remarks of Wittgenstein’s—for example, his
acknowledgment that we can have a “sensitive ear” for words.
Consider “o.k.” It may come from Martin Van Buren’s nickname “Old
Kinderhook” (a reference to Kinderhook, New York, where he was born). The letters
surfaced in the title of a group of his supporters for presidency, the “Democratic O.K.
Club.” Van Buren’s supporters used the phrase “o.k.” as a type of “battle cry,” and it
may have acquired its meaning of affirmation because Van Buren was considered “o.k.”
(as we would now understand that term) by his constituents. (It is historically notable
that supporters of his adversary, Harrison, made the metaphor of “keeping the ball
rolling” an actuality, constructing ten-foot “victory balls” rolled between towns in
support of Harrison’s candidacy for president.) H. L. Mencken thought “o.k.” the best
“Americanism” ever invented. It has spread around the world, and related terms bear

180

their own interesting histories, or failures to launch. “A-O.K.,” used during space flights,
became relatively common, but “nokay,” intended as the antonym of “o.k.,” has never
really taken off. And “o.k.” may, as Hendrickson speculates, give way to just plain “k”
(this is perhaps a current, paradigm example of the tendency to economize language).
“Trick or treat” is another curious example—a phrase that apparently originated on the
west coast of North America and made its way east in the first half of the twentieth
century.
We are not entirely sure where these phrases came from (“the whole nine yards”
is considered a notoriously difficult example), nor are they metaphorical; how are they
projected?
We hear these phrases and, with the swiftness and sensibility I have described, the
projective imagination takes these materials of our language use and moves forward with
them. I cannot say exactly how this transpired with “o.k.” But at some point, it appears
to have made sense as a “battle cry” to Van Buren’s supporters. This may have happened
because of contextual factors in their interactions with each other that changed the phrase
from Van Buren’s nickname to a phrase of affirmation.
Let us examine another case of projection which perhaps better illustrates this
phenomenon. We are currently witnessing an explosion of shorthand in our written
language, a shorthand that is itself a shortcut and that is breaking into speech.48 This may
be primarily due to technological developments and our use of cell phones and text
messaging. It was with us before, in various shorthands devised for telecommunications
for the deaf, hard of hearing, and speech disabled, and in the shorthands organizations
might devise for instructions and so on. It is not an unprecedented use of language.
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Nevertheless, communication over e-mail and cell phone is probably contributing to the
bulk of its current development. Now, why do we do this? For one thing, it is an easy
and fast way to get a message across. (Sometimes that is the reason people resort to
visual symbols, instead of words at all.) But this is particularly the case when we use cell
phones. As soon as one begins trying to text, one sees the value of ease and speed in
culling unnecessary words and shortening up the ones one does need. It just makes sense
to cut some corners; it even feels right, as our fingers slide across these devices. And
some of the shorthand phrases seem to intuitively make sense, as shortcuts on our
computer keyboards do. This is a merging of the sensory and conceptual; the need or
desire to shortcut with language in these cases can be informed by perceptual inputs we
are picking up in the context of typing, using screens, and so on. The two factors work
together to nudge a person toward texting in this way. Other factors may contribute to
this process, but these are certainly important. What is astonishing about this is that these
practices are, actually, taking root one person at a time, and this is presumably what
happened with “o.k.” as well as “trick or treat.” They spread, and language users
engaging in these practices find each other comprehensible without obvious tutorials. If
tutorials are called for, it is frequently for people who have been, for whatever reason,
removed from such methods of communication—such forms of life. Such is language,
and the construction and transmission of forms of life; in this case, a literally economical
use of language. (But unfortunately, the “new media” and forms of communication
impose an aesthetic of economy and speed, so we are more likely to be recognized as
“with it” if we use these shortcuts than if we adhere to old-fashioned modes of
expression, quite independently of any actual gains in convenience or economy. As a
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personal example: I often prefer e-mail to texting in those contexts in which it does not
make a difference, really, which is used, even though e-mailing has become less “with it”
than texting. A computer keyboard is still more comfortable to me for typing out a
message—indeed, I think it is superior, because it is bigger, and therefore better and less
clumsy for my fingers.)
And, to the extent that our use of language is economical, imagination, as a
shortcut, contributes to that economy. The economy of language identified by Austin
results from our ability to recognize similarities. Why use more tools than we need, or
create new ones where that is not necessary?
I suspect our fast, imaginative engagement with language is at work in other
contexts than projection. It probably assists us in translation and in learning more than
one language, and it certainly seems to be at work as we learn our native languages. Just
as we infer imaginatively when we understand projections, we probably infer when we
fill in the meaning of a word we do not know as we read or listen. We do not learn every
word we know by looking all of them up in dictionaries. It must be the case that we learn
them when they are surrounded by other words we do know, or by reading or hearing
them in relation to other words in context. Our imaginative engagement with language
helps us accomplish all of this. The imagination is also involved in our ability to create
new linguistic combinations. We all know language so thoroughly, so unconsciously,
that we do all of this without noticing our virtuosity. Cavell said that learning a language
is learning the implications of words—I can add that we learn how to make use of those
implications. Our imagination is very likely working to fill in these gaps where they
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occur, short-circuiting for us in the inferential manner described. It is likely at work to a
much greater degree in our use of language than has been adequately recognized.
In support of these claims, I call attention to Colin McGinn’s recent work in
Mindsight: Image, Meaning, Dreaming,49 for it issues a challenge for a reappraisal of the
imagination and launches an intriguing contemporary argument for its pervasiveness50 in
many areas of thought and philosophical reflection, including science,51 the nature of
meaning,52 and, significantly, language. He notes the revulsion many philosophers have
recently felt for associating meaning with imagery, but maintains that perhaps we need to
think more subtly about potential connections between them. I shall review and then
evaluate his brief account, which he intends as an opening volley into further exploration
of the imagination.
McGinn speculates that imagination is innate (Cavell does too—mentioned
above—though he may have been speaking loosely), as perhaps aspects of language may
be, because we cannot be taught to dream, for example, and dreaming, on his account, is
fundamentally imaginative. He argues “Just as we can understand sentences we have
never heard before, so we can construct and interpret images of things we have never
experienced before; we have a potential infinity of images; and all this creativity
proceeds from a finite basis of primitive elements” (194). This is less obvious in the
dreaming case than in the linguistic one, however—in the linguistic case, there exist a
finite number of words operating as primitive elements. The potential infinity can
develop out of primitive elements in a process he describes as an “imagination spectrum,”
which is as follows: Perceptual inputs contribute to memory, which forms the basis for
imaginative sensing. Imaginative sensing contributes to the ability to produce images, in
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turn leading to dreaming (of both the day and night variety), possibility and negation,
meaning, and finally “genuine high-level creativity”: “This comes on the scene once the
mind is able to envisage ways the world might be and can manipulate these
representations to form novel thoughts” (159-161). At this stage, we can contemplate
different worldviews, different scientific accounts of the nature of reality, and write
novels without hewing too closely to facts (161). He leaves aside the exploration into the
role imagination plays in the arts, sciences, and philosophy. “Thus it is,” he writes, “that
the simple memory image leads by stages to the highest flights of creative imagination”
(ibid.).
In McGinn’s view, “images are sui generis, and should be added as a third great
category of intentionality to the twin pillars of perception and cognition” (39). This is
quite natural, according to McGinn, emphasizing that imagery is profoundly familiar and
suffused throughout our mental existence. In remarks that echo Cavell’s emphasis on the
pervasiveness and importance of the imagination to our mental lives, he claims “Imagery
suits our minds very well; abstract thought can sometimes seem like an ill-fitting garment
by comparison”53 (198), and goes so far as to say, “We are adapted to images; abstract
concepts are a struggle. Thus we lapse into imagery at the slightest provocation. The
image is our most ancient and natural mode of cognition” (ibid.). But imagination itself
is not restricted to what we can image, as McGinn points out: “the cognitive imagination
(imagination so called because, according to McGinn, it takes “conceptual constituents,
not sensory ones”54 [128]) is employed in understanding, and this is not essentially
imagistic” (147). The cognitive imagination, McGinn says, relates to imagery in the way
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belief relates to perception. The cognitive imagination is informed by imagery, as belief
is informed by perception, but that imagination cannot be reduced to images.
McGinn’s work pays tribute to the long-perceived connection between imagery
and the imagination, creativity, and memory; he tangentially mentions intentionality and
children’s imaginative power; and, importantly for my purposes, he sees the imagination
at work in our use of language. Understanding, for McGinn, is memory plus imagination,
and he explicates our use of language to show this.
According to McGinn, our ability to use language depends on two factors: (1)
conventional aspects of a language that we learn and remember, and (2) the cognitive
competence involved in combining these tools in unprecedented formulations. To
McGinn, the first factor depends on memory, and the second involves imagination. The
two work together to produce understanding; the first is not enough. We construct and
understand new sentences and new possibilities by making use of more than our
conventional store of language information. The first factor will vary in its details
according to the language spoken, but the second is something all speakers possess, he
argues, regardless of the language they speak; the second, imaginative function underlies
all language use.
McGinn identifies other analogues between language and the imagination. He
thinks language itself may actually rely on imagery: 55
Very little is known about the phylogeny of language, but I think it is worth
considering the hypothesis that imagery played a vital role in the upsurge of
language all those thousands of years ago. The productivity of the image system,
its combinatorial power, its creativity, its complex intentionality—all these mirror
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analogous properties of language . . . the image system (may have played) a part
of the cognitive machinery that gave rise to language. At the least, the stimulus
freedom and productivity of imagery might prepare the mind for the elaboration
of language (22, 196-197).
Creativity is likewise shared by both language and the imagination, specifically
the creativity that is demonstrated by assembling new materials from existing ones.
“Linguistic understanding,” McGinn writes, “has often been described as creative,
combinatorial, productive: we can understand a potential infinity of sentences, and each
act of understanding is a small instance of genuine creativity . . . on the rich(er) view of
understanding entailed by the imagination theory, such talk seems literally true:
imagination is the source of creativity, and it is constitutively involved in the
comprehension of new sentences” (150-151). McGinn writes, “The freedom of the
imagination to generate new representations of every kind of intentional object is
precisely what language itself exhibits; so it is not surprising if the imagination lies
behind the creativity manifest in language use” (151). Indeed, for McGinn, the
imaginative faculty is ultimately responsible for linguistic understanding (157): “the
human instinct for language is bound up with the human instinct for imagination. That is,
the semantic component of the language faculty is inextricably linked with the
imaginative faculty” (153-154). This, for McGinn, marks an enrichment of our
understanding of meaning.
McGinn sees imagination as an aspect of human intellectual life that can proceed
from the simple to the complex, which depends on input from the senses and, in its more
complex manifestations, input from our concepts—and it may be unclear how this works,
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since concepts (as opposed to objects of perception) seem to be in some way constituted
linguistically themselves. (He also thinks this distinguishes us from other animals.) He
argues “In the end, most adult imagination is a kind of fluid merging of the sensory and
conceptual modes” (162). McGinn speculates that “It might even be true that without a
capacity for imagery, linguistic understanding would not be possible, because cognitive
imagination itself relies on mechanisms and processes that originate in sensory
imagination. To be sure, imagining-that is not reducible to sensory images, but it may yet
be true that it is an outgrowth of image formation—that it is what happens to the sensory
imagination when it goes conceptual” (157-158).
We see how McGinn’s account works: we receive perceptual information (which,
suffice it to say, is extraordinarily vast and complex); as we learn and grow, our minds
consolidate all of this through memory and imagination, until we reach a kind of
intellectual maturity that may be, if McGinn is right, more deeply imaginative than many
philosophers have recognized. I would add our intellectual, imaginative maturity is not
necessarily in the business of making this obvious to us; it just makes things work for us.
I think more empirical research needs to be done to establish that the
“imagination” (however that is understood) is innate. McGinn’s insistence that we were
not taught to dream is very interesting. But we were not taught to sense, or to use words
in all the various ways we can use them, either (even if learning may play a role in the
way we construe or relate to those senses, and our words), and by his own account,
perceptual inputs, such as sensing, are more elemental than imaginative sensing. But I
think McGinn thoughtfully emphasizes the link between memory and imagination and
provisionally accept the analogues he identifies between language and creativity. I do
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think imagination is profoundly involved in language use, particularly innovations in
language. It is not clear to me that a universal imaginative ability underlies all language
use, though I find this claim plausible, and I can adduce some examples that point in that
direction. A compelling indication is supplied by the visual and spatial terms used to
characterize music. All over the world, we claim notes are “high” or “low,” “light” or
“dark,” “bright,” “open,” and so on. (This example is also interesting because it is
profoundly metaphorical, and it combines imaginative inputs—the visual and spatial are
related to the aural.) How can visual and spatial terms be applied to an art that many
think is the most abstract there is, and which does not literally embody any of these
physical qualities? In whatever way this works, it does effectively characterize music,
and recalls the especially fascinating experience of synaesthesia, in which listeners see
colors as they hear sounds. (The art movement of “color-music” was an attempt to play
upon the regularities of just such experience.) And it has been deployed in various
different languages at different points in history, without occasioning continual notice;
such descriptions of music work well for us. In “The Meaning of Color Terms,” Anna
Wierzbicka argues there may be a universal human basis for this experience.56
Another tantalizing possible example is provided by creoles. Ostler points out
creoles all work similarly, even if they are constructed from different languages. He
explains we learn languages three ways: children learn their native languages from adults
who share a stable language community (as Cavell thoroughly describes); they learn a
creole, if they are in a society that lacks a shared stable language (and adults devise
pidgins when they lack such a stable common means of communication); or we
consciously set out to learn new languages as adults. Now, creoles all tend to have a
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common structure, he says, no matter what languages they are created from. The first
two ways of learning, though, Ostler emphasizes, have nothing to do with the
characteristics of the languages being learned. But the third might. He argues the
languages we pick up as native speakers form what is called a “substrate,” the residue in
our minds of the languages we know, and, though this is not settled by linguists, that
substrate “may impose a constraint on the kind of language that can then be successfully
learnt” (553). So we might, according to Ostler, come up with new versions of a
language, versions influenced by our substrates; or we might face a barrier to learning
new languages because of it. Ostler speculates this may be why English failed to catch
on in Japan following World War II, in spite of speakers’ efforts to master it, as well as
why Britons never took up a Romance language: “the structure of British—still perhaps
bearing the influence of a pre-Celtic substrate—was rather different, above all being a
verb-initial language: verbs come first in the sentence. It would have been harder for
Britons to learn to express themselves in Latin than it was for Gauls, and this stubborn
fact may be at the root of why France today speaks a Romance language, but Great
Britain does not” (556). This does indeed suggest that one’s acquisition of a first
language may constitute a fundamentally different kind of knowledge than acquisition of
other languages, such as a second (I think Cavell’s account of how we learn language
underscores this idea); it also suggests the very substance of our thinking is deeply
affected by the languages we speak. Ostler supposes this may be a factor in the
dissemination as well as the decline of languages, while acknowledging that, as linguists
note, many factors (including non-linguistic ones) may be responsible for such
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developments. The notion of the substrate is a fascinating one, suggesting that our
language acquisition may irrevocably alter our patterns of thinking.
Linguists do not agree about what these data mean, as Ostler says, but they may
point in the direction of some universal aspects of language. People have wondered if the
variation exhibited between languages is evidence of irreducible differences between
language systems, or if there are underlying universal similarities shared by all languages.
Why do creoles work in the same way? Perhaps such language-games—which provide
an opportunity for us to witness language being created from the ground up, by people
who do not understand each other—suggest deeply shared human forms of life. Might
substrates account for the differences we do perceive, differences that might obscure
universal similarities? Recent, very controversial research speculates about a common
“ancestor” language, positing all languages derive from this one.57 It is plausible to
suppose these aspects of language may be revealing something to us about universal
elements of human experience, including imaginative experience, in support of McGinn’s
thesis. They may also provide grounds for understanding how or why languages might
diverge or eventually reflect differences, when they do. Certainly Ostler’s review of
languages suggests they are deeply affected by the forms of life in play at different times
and places in history.
Some other considerations related to McGinn’s hypotheses: It is striking to me
that McGinn mentions how active the imagination is in children, and it is children who
also exhibit such remarkable ease in acquiring language. There may be a reason that
children are so imaginative at the same time they are rapidly acquiring language. Perhaps
the facility with which they do both is due to the fact that imagination and language are,
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as he argues, connected. But this process may also reveal a dulling of the imaginative
powers as we age. McGinn has said imagination “is constitutively involved in the
comprehension of new sentences.” If so, why can’t it better function in helping adults
acquire new languages, with all their new words and sentences requiring comprehension?
Particularly when adults have a store of experiences on which their imaginations can
draw, which Hobbes saw as a strength—but does imagination, in general, begin to drop
off with the passage of years, as does the average ability to acquire new language?
I propose that the imaginative power at work in our comprehension and use of
language becomes so loaded down doing cognitive work for us that our ability to
perceive it as imaginative may be strangled by the weight of these daily processes. This
also, incidentally, distinguishes our language uses from other human activities that can
rise to the level of art, as language can. For many of the arts are further removed from
our daily activities than language. We may engage in physical activities that are close to
drawing, painting, or dancing; we may speak in a way that brings us close to music. But
we do not have to sing, or draw, or dance on a daily basis—that is, we do not have to use
those forms of art when moving or speaking. Many of us do use language not only daily,
but sometimes all day long, however, and the words we use are the same we appreciate
and use in creating literature (transformed by context). This trades on our shared activity
of using language, “in ways the contemporary ‘languages’ of painting and music do not,”
as Cavell puts it (Must We Mean What We Say?, 210). He says writers, unlike other
artists, are able to rely on such agreement. This has its advantages; we are full
participants in a shared form of life, and we gain such proficiency in it that we do not
even need to think about what we are doing with it, much of the time. But it can make
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language’s connection to imagination harder to see and to cultivate.58 In the course of
imaginatively informing so much of what we think and say, in the course of imagination
functioning at perhaps its highest and most automatic levels, it can become difficult to
understand that the way we deploy it is connected to our creativity. (It can also be
responsible for the fact that some writers are not convinced of the power of their own
ability. I have overheard an art professor say he has noticed this is not a doubt he sees in
his talented visual-arts students, who, he says, seem confident of their abilities in a way
talented writers are not.)
I also find it plausible that we move from perceptual inputs up to the highest
reaches of creativity, as McGinn claims. We start with basic perceptual inputs, and we
end with engagement in philosophy, science, and other creative endeavors. This is a
fruitful suggestion that marks the close of his work. Hobbes’s comment may provide
another hint here about how some may reach beyond ordinary language use into more
challenging intellectual and creative endeavors that depend on imaginatively informed
language use—perhaps those whose imaginations are most fleet can most assuredly do
this.
Recognition of the value, and, in my view, the various functions of the
imagination may be increasing following a long-standing philosophical tendency to
suppose reason and imagination (or rational and creative thought) at odds with one
another, the first the orderly and truly clear and reasonable way of thinking and problemsolving, the second unruly, unpredictable, and unreliable, among other things. Though
there may be differences in these two general tendencies, their similarities in advancing
knowledge and intellectual life should not be underestimated, either. And McGinn may
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be right to suppose that our cognitive abilities are constituted by imagination much more
pervasively than we have supposed; that the imagination helps to build our cognitive
abilities, from our basic perceptions up to the highest reaches of creativity, and is
extraordinarily fundamental to our language use.
That language is our inheritance, as Cavell said. Much of what we do in language
is learned, along with, as he has said, our learning of the world. Probably much, if not
most, of our language use travels the roads others have laid down for us. (We now learn
“o.k.”; we do not project it as did language users of the past.) Projection might not make
up most of the language created throughout individual lives; I am not aware of constantly
projecting as a matter of course. But our languages include the various accumulated
projections of many users over time. Roads are laid down in part because of human use
of this shortcut. We are constantly using these tools we share in new and unprecedented
ways and combinations to express our convictions, experiences, and so on, and this is due
to our possibly natural facility with imagination.
(3) Active and Passive Elements of Imaginative Thought: The Role of Intention in
Language Projection
But for all that, it still seems astonishingly effortless. As I keep mentioning, this
process is often not analyzed, and we are not always aware of it. Do we choose how or
why we project words in the way we do? For example, do we ever decide “’Feed’ works
better than ‘put,’ because ‘put’ is too general”? Much of the time, it seems we do not
consciously make such choices. We do not often think about the projection involved in
our languages, once we have learned how to use them. And we do not need to, if Hobbes
and McGinn are right—our experiences and almost automatic processing of the
perceptual data for the imagination consolidate into a shortcut that some may be able to
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use more readily than others, but even an average or compromised ability to use language
creatively is quite remarkable. I am not suggesting we do not often put great conscious
effort into communication, but simply that the conscious effort is not required, as a matter
of course, in order to communicate at all. We are not weighed down from even engaging
in language by the type of wielding problem described above; we do not have to
deliberate and use language due to our individual acts of will, the way we do have to
concentrate at least much of the time when we program or fix machines. Why not?
This is because our intentions, in this context, are constituted by our imaginations.
Our apprehension of the similarity between the contexts of “feeding” a person or animal
and “feeding” a meter depends on our imaginative skills, but those skills often need no
prompting, because our will, while present in our use of language, does not need to be
visibly working or consciously consulted in order to make this happen. The very
possibility of intending that—e.g., that we should go feed the meter—depends on the
presence “in the language” or “in the imagination” of this extension, or its possibility. I
now investigate what this shortcut reveals to us about the connection of imagination to
intention and the will, as these make their appearance in our projection of terms.
The imagination itself has been characterized in the work of many philosophers
(including Wittgenstein and Cavell) as either passive or active, and it is worth looking
more closely at this distinction (as perhaps Austin would agree), because the distinction
marks different levels of awareness of the functioning of will. While the distinction may
ultimately be difficult to maintain, as was Austin’s between performatives and
constatives, it does mark some significant differences in the functioning of the will in our
imaginations.
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In drawing attention to these two fundamental ways imagination can work, Cavell
is in the company of other philosophers such as Kendall Walton, who draws a distinction
between deliberate and spontaneous imagining. The difference is the first requires the
imagining subject’s consciously intentional exercise of imagination; the second does
not.59
I will characterize the passive aspect of imagination first. It appears to flicker and
flare up of its own volition, which may be why Austin emphasizes its “feebleness,” and
Cavell its “laziness” as well as its “preciousness.” For when it does flame into full
power, it is responsible for some of our most important intellectual experiences,
experiences so precious we may well wish we could better control or access our
imaginations.
One important element of imagination that seems outside our conscious control is
basically connected to inspiration, and the way in which it can appear to strike unbidden.
An example of this process is provided by the many cases of artistic creativity that do not
obviously appear to result from conscious processes. Inspiration of this kind can even be
sought for its own sake. In fascinating passages about music, Cavell alludes to
inspiration, and though he does not explicitly link it to the projective imagination in these
passages, what he says provides a way of demonstrating how the ability to recognize
contextual similarities may appear inspired in this manner.
In Must We Mean What We Say?, he quotes Ernst Krenek, a Schoenberg follower
(and, interestingly, an artist inspired in some of his own efforts by Nestroy):
Generally and traditionally “inspiration” is held in great respect as the most
distinguished source of the creative process in art. It should be remembered that
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inspiration by definition is closely related to chance, for it is the very thing that
cannot be controlled, manufactured or premeditated in any way. It is what falls
into the mind (according to the German term Einfall) unsolicited, unprepared,
unrehearsed, coming from nowhere.
(Curiously, Ostler defines einfallen: it variously means to “collapse” or “cave in,”
to “invade,” for winter or night to encroach; for game birds or musicians to “come in,” or,
crucially, for a thought to “occur to somebody” [304].)
Krenek goes on to write “This obviously answers the definition of chance as ‘the
absence of any known reason why an event should turn out one way rather than
another,’” but, in the course of describing how composers may try to invite inspiration
untainted by plans or expectations, he points out they are “conditioned by a tremendous
body of recollection, tradition, training, and experience” (195).
Krenek’s remarks underscore the idea that there is something especially valuable
about the unbidden nature of such inspiration, inspiration that is out of our apparent
control. This experience is pleasurable, and can heighten the enjoyment we take in our
powers of imagination. The “pleasure” is compounded the less intentional it appears to
be. (Why is this? Why is a creative experience that seems to come from nowhere, or by
chance, such a valuable one?60) Puzzling as it can be, it is a truth of the process of
composition.
The second, active function of the imagination includes those cases when it is
under our control, or at least consciously used by us for a variety of purposes, as an
object of our will. For example, Cavell says this depends on what we call a “flip” in
ourselves, which “is reversible, and, in particular, subject to will” (The Claim of Reason,
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354). He conceives of the will as a type of strength but also “as a perspective which I
may or may not be able to take upon myself. So one may say that the will is not a
phenomenon but an attitude toward phenomena” (ibid., 361). Its failure presumably
indicates some failure of the ability to imagine. When he characterizes the will as linked
to the function of imagining, Cavell is perhaps providing an account of the way in which
imagined thoughts can seem to appear in ways that lack our agency.
McGinn marvels at this aspect of our thought when he considers how perceptual
inputs become raw material for the imagination: “This is quite a remarkable
phenomenon: from being utterly resistant to the will, the percept is transformed into a
plaything of the will . . . The wonder is that percepts retain their sensory identities
through this drastic transformation: it is that very percept I experienced yesterday that
now comes back to me in the shape of a memory image—only now no longer a percept at
all” (169, n. 44).
Now, both aspects or cases of the imagination could be involved in the projection
of words into new contexts. (It also seems as if one could actively decide to passively
give oneself over to the workings of one’s imagination and see what results.) Projection
can occur when language users are “inspired” to see and use a word in a different way (as
happens in the first, passive case), and when they deliberately do this, setting out to limn
a word with new possibilities (which could happen in the second case). The second
instance could be invoked when, for example, philosophers propose certain stipulative
definitions. And both involve corresponding “passive” and “active” modes of intention.
It is in the second instance that intention is more clearly invoked in the process of
directing the functioning of the imagination. There might also be a kind of a spectrum
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between the two types of exercise, so that it would be hard to say in many cases whether
an occurrence of this was (exclusively) an instance of passivity or of activity (or whether
it was completely conscious or completely unconscious). It is an open question which
happens more often, though it seems less likely that people are often consciously
directing the uses and meanings of their terms, including new meanings that apply to
different contexts. But both involve consulting similarities determined in advance by the
connections between contexts.
I contend that language users are often quite unaware of this use of their
imagination and intentions. They do not need to attend to it, because it takes place within
the publicly shared network of language. Language users did not consciously decide to
sync intentions when projecting “o.k.,” I speculate. Instead, that projection may have
been “improvised.” We can, literally and figuratively, improvise within our languages
when we project terms, and we could not do this so readily if we did not share language.
We might not be able to do it at all; we might be at pains to make every move in our
languages in the strained fashions considered above. Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell
have all emphasized that intention, as a determinate act of will, cannot control the
meanings of our terms. We can now see the significance of this while examining
projection and imagination. Once again, intention, as a determinate act of will, while it
occurs in our language use, frequently recedes in its ability to determine meaning (and
can vanish from our conscious attention) when we project words.
In Must We Mean What We Say?, Cavell points out “improvisation implies shared
conventions” (204). That is true of language as much as it is of music. Because language
is a publicly shared tool, containing words whose meanings are not overridden by our
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intentions (as Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell all maintain), we are able to improvise
with it. Our skill is “improvisatory” because (1) when we undertake uses of language
such as projection, language itself provides us with a structure in which many of our
“moves” or performances are settled in advance, but it nevertheless permits some room
for our own engagement or imaginative understanding, and (2) though we can be aware
of this, to varying degrees, we do not always know or self-consciously think about what
is coming from this process or what we are doing with it.
In a note in his work, McGinn raises the following questions, among others: “The
whole subject of intentionality and attention has not been investigated sufficiently. How
basic is attention to intentionality? . . . How important is the voluntariness of attention to
intentionality?” (168, n. 35). I propose the following answers to his questions, directing
them only to intentionality within the context of language. Our imaginative ability to
project is obviously intentional, but it does not always require a great deal of our
attention. Voluntariness of attention is not necessarily basic to the intentionality that
takes place in language, and this is probably largely, or mainly, due to the fact that we
have learned it so thoroughly (it is one of the most remarkable of human abilities) and
share it; we need not consciously consult it at every move we make in a language-game.
An argument about music that Cavell makes provides a striking analogy for our
imaginative ability to project. Of music, Cavell writes it is:
within contexts fully defined by shared formulas that the possibility of full,
explicit improvisation traditionally exists—whether one thinks of the great epics
of literature (whose “oral-formulaic” character is established), or of ancient
Chinese painting, or of Eastern music, or of the theater of the Commedia
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dell’Arte, or jazz. If it seems a paradox that the reliance on formula should allow
the fullest release of spontaneity . . . The context in which we can hear music as
improvisatory is one in which the language it employs, its conventions, are
familiar or obvious enough (whether because simple or because they permit of a
total mastery or perspicuity) that at no point are we or the performer in doubt
about our location or goal; there are solutions to every problem, permitting the
exercise of familiar forms of resourcefulness; a mistake is clearly recognizable as
such, and may even present a chance to be seized; and just as the general range of
chances is circumscribed, so there is a preparation for every chance, and if not an
inspired one, then a formula for one (Must We Mean What We Say?, 201).
These remarks could be made about the language of our words as well as the language of
music. We use conventions with which we are thoroughly familiar, and though we may
not always find solutions or clearly discern mistakes, we are circumscribed by a range of
chances that could be inspired or pursued by a formula.
We may not be paying attention to this skill we deploy, but how inspired is it?
How much of it comes from nowhere? I suspect a good deal of our language use does
reflect our prior learning and experiences, novel though our projections may seem. The
workings of inspiration are not always apparent, indeed appear to come from nowhere,
and that is part of their charm. Inspiration is a peculiar phenomenon, but it is often made
possible by what has transpired before it, and it is not often entirely arbitrary. I recall a
writer’s description of a moment that inspired her: while running, she heard the sound of
a foghorn, and it spurred a creative breakthrough. Yet that occurred partly because
foghorns had, in the past, been background noise in a setting in which she had previously

201

worked. Often past experiences influence us in this way. Different times of the year
incline me to listen to music that I know I am associating with prior occurrences of those
seasons, and musicians, to take Krenek’s example, are affected by the training they have
absorbed and their innumerable experiences. Similarly, language users may
“linguistically legislate” in ways that are likewise inspirational and seem arbitrary, or
difficult to account for, though language users are also profoundly influenced by the
wealth of knowledge, conscious or unconscious, they possess about their language.
Language users are often such expert users of it, so conditioned by exposure to its various
neighborhoods, that it would be difficult to maintain that any of their uses of words were
truly inspired, “fall(ing) into the mind . . . unsolicited, unprepared, unrehearsed, coming
from nowhere,” as Krenek put it.
Wittgenstein said “Speech with and without thought is to be compared with the
playing of a piece of music with and without thought” (I, 341), as mentioned above.
Here, as elsewhere, his brief, powerful words direct us to similarities between language
and music.
At any rate, once we have projected words into new contexts, towards judgments
of the future, those judgments themselves can involve both aspect of the imagination:
supposing, assessing, and analyzing why the new context works in conjunction with the
former one, why the new use of the term is similar to the old. This itself is an
imaginative act. Cavell said of Wittgenstein’s methods of making points that they call
for a “matching aesthetic effort to assess: for example, to see whether their pleasure and
shock and anxiety are functions of their brilliance.” When we pause to speculate over
how and why words can be projected, including projections that involve metaphor, we
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may well do the same. (For example, I recently marveled over the title Breathless Zoo
for a book about taxidermy.) And we may adopt an active role in directing our
imaginations, though we may also grasp projections without attending to what we are
doing. When we comprehend why a projection works, we may rely on this active aspect
of imagination, or the passive—taking into our minds what has fallen there as if from
nowhere, which we recognize and understand as a legitimate use of language because of
our own improvisational, imaginative way of using it and, sometimes, contributing to its
development.
(4) The Aesthetic and Cognitive Value of the Projective Imagination
Projective uses of language capture just what we want to convey in a manner that
is more compelling than would be the expression of thoughts or ideas without such
crisscrossing across contexts. When we do become aware of this language use, by
projecting or comprehending projections, we often enjoy it. We are acting as composers
and conductors of language use in such cases, and this is more engaging, for many
reasons, than would be the use of speech lacking such connections to make our points (or
just using “different” words for different things, as Cavell puts it). We are working with
a stock of materials already at our disposal, of course, but we are changing them,
enlarging them, and when we do introduce new terms into our languages, we often wind
up projecting them into new contexts in just this way.
As a shortcut that makes connections, can economize language, and marks the
improvisational virtuosity of language users, the projective imagination is also a source
of aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction, as is the “chance” of some inspiration, and the
experience of imagination in general—the type of satisfaction that occurs when we think
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that it really does make sense to say notes are “dark” or “light,” that a song “gets bigger”
at certain points. Our language use reveals an unspoken relish for this shortcut of our
language-games. As an aspect of our ability to communicate, we rely on this facility,
perhaps often, or even originally, for pleasurable reasons, and we see its shadow in
rhetoric and other forms of wordplay. We also use it to inform, to educate, and this
section will examine the ways in which projection is both aesthetically and cognitively
satisfying. I include an analysis of an image provided by Cavell to account for the role of
intention in language.
The bulk of our language projections may involve those connections between
contexts that are most useful, that play upon the most obvious similarities of contexts or
strain our powers of understanding the least. We see how easily “cold” can answer as an
adjective to so many cases. Inference works so speedily in many of these cases as to be
imperceptible; we may never be conscious of it. Now, there are some figurative language
cases of which Cavell says “it may be right to say: I know what it means but I can’t say
what it means” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 81)—his example is Hart Crane’s
expression “The mind is brushed by sparrow wings.” The cognitive workings that render
projection so immediate and invisible may prompt such a thought. But we often can
think about what such projections do mean, if we give the matter some attention. When
projections are so useful, that is because they accord so well with connections we are
likely to endorse, even if we do not do this consciously. They reveal what is most
strikingly true for us, as genius does; they underscore universal or at least widely shared
aspects of cognition or experience, as genius does. We call someone a genius who gives
voice to something recognizable. Often the fact that the genius is the first to do it leads

204

us to characterize such a person as original. But we do not often call someone a genius if
we do not recognize or endorse the product of that skill (even if the recognition only
comes much later).61
We may also privilege or most admire those projections that depend on greater
powers of concentration, a more insightful or nuanced awareness of potential connections
between contexts, or funny, inspiring, witty projections. (This is perhaps how literature
has developed many of its characteristics.)
Projection can also mark a failure of voice, or the only way to adequately give
voice to one’s philosophical ideas. Note the lack of precision of terms surrounding the
discussion of intention in Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell; they are reduced to groping
with such metaphors as “fire,” “horses,” “institutions” with their flags, and so on to
provide a better picture of what is happening with intention within the context of
language than a less figurative account might. In those cases in which it is difficult to
explain matters precisely, such as the struggle to adequately characterize intention and
language, figurative language that involves or initially relied on projection can be
immensely helpful. Paradoxically enough, it can make matters more clear than they
would otherwise be.62 Such terminology can be educational.
For example, consider an anthropomorphizing phrase, lightning “finding its way
to ground.” The lightning is not consciously thinking about finding its way anywhere,
but this is an illustrative way of putting the matter. It accounts for the way lightning
appears to be willfully snaking toward the surface of the earth; the movement is so
directed it appears intentional (more intentional, indeed, than many of our uses of
language). I could say instead “some lightning results from discharges of energy between
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the clouds and ground.” But I would miss accounting for what this element of nature
often looks like. Philosophers of language have noted that language can affect our very
ability to speak or articulate our lived perceptions. (Though no doubt it cannot do this
perfectly for all of them.)
As an example of the importance of this type of figurative language to education,
I analyze a phrase of Cavell’s. Cavell makes use of elusive imagery to make his points,
but this is frequently an effective way of expressing what he is trying to say with any
degree of directness, and the tendency to do this, he says, is borne out by Part II of the
Philosophical Investigations, which, he says, trades on the poetic. He says intention is a
flame to a fuse, but it is not of first importance, and all else must be in place for it to do
its work. What does this mean? I analyze each of these conditions in turn, explaining
how intention is a flame, and what it is setting alight.
“Intention is merely of the last importance”—Why is intention of the last
importance, not the first, or of some intermediate level of importance? I interpret Cavell
to mean that intention completes the meaning (of the sentence)—when all the shared
meanings are already in place, there is always still room for the intention to skew it one
way or another (and in fact, without the intention, we would be lacking something
essential). Intention factors into our use of words, but it is constrained by the meanings
of those words, meanings that have been developed by language users over generations,
in some cases. Words do exert some control over us, as Cavell means to suggest in
discussing Emerson’s poetic image of horses. They have meanings we cannot ignore,
and this control is evident in the nature of language use itself, because language use
depends on shared agreement about the meanings of words.
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What would it mean to argue that intention must be of first importance? In my
view, this would suggest intention directs the meanings of all of our terms and is what we
must seek out when we face interpretive difficulties (and this is often what happens).
When we use the wrong word, this has not always been construed as a simple error, the
wrong tool on the wrong occasion. Instead, philosophers often speak as if we need to
track down the intention, find out what was actually meant, as if this controls for the
meaning of the word. The view that intention is of the first importance is typified by
versions of the “intentional fallacy.”63
Can intention (as it is manifested in language) work in this way? If it does, that
suggests it is causally responsible for all of our meanings. When we use languages, the
tools of our language embody our intentions. But this view is mistaken, for reasons I
have catalogued. Suppose we commonly invented new private languages, intending new
meanings. In escaping fate, we upend memory. If we wished this to be anything more
than a mental exercise, if we wished these to be actual languages, we would then have to
share these new words. We could try to structure a set of meanings and word-usages
about which we never tell anyone. But for something to count as a legitimate language
for more than one person, it must be shared. We would have to alert others to the
meanings of new words, or the new meanings of old words, and then presumably the new
language would only function because its users accepted the meanings of the terms
publicly shared by all of them. As noted above, if we did not do this, we would be
incomprehensible to each other.
It is perhaps foolish to speculate about the origins of language, but I suspect this
was a necessary step in its development and eventual “institutionalization.” However
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human beings developed language, the intention and the ability to use and direct speech
or words (or at least to initially make noises that could function or turn into
communication) depended on this sharing. Language is an intentional behavior, to be
sure. It would not exist as we know it otherwise. But it is not language in the fullest
sense if it is not shared, and this feature may have taken precedence over the centuries to
the point where Cavell can now say intention is of last importance.
Perhaps in its earliest stages of development (for example, when we construct
creoles), language exhibits a greater reliance on intention. (Though even then I would
not argue intention was of first importance. Thought itself might be, but not intention.)
One way in which this may be visible is in observing the effort made by two people who
do not speak the same language to try to understand each other; they devise a makeshift
method of communication, often relying on signs or gestures. (This is in fact what
happened in the development of Nicaraguan sign-language.) (Donald Davidson presents
such a picture in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”; Richard Rorty characterizes this as
two people “coping with each other as we might cope with mangoes or boa constrictors—
we are trying not to be taken by surprise” [14].) Here, intentional efforts are quite
apparent, but these are directed at making oneself understood and understanding another;
they are directed at setting up a language. As time passes, and human beings rely on their
shared meanings, and children learn languages in the way Cavell describes, these visibly
intentional behaviors recede.64
“Everything (else) has first to be in place for it to do what it does”—Cavell says
everything has to be in place for the flame to light the fuse. Within the context of the
institution of language, as he has outlined it, drawing on the work of Wittgenstein and
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Austin, I interpret this to mean that our words make up the flame for the fuse. They must
be the comprehensible tools on which we rely to communicate. Many other things must
be in place, too, such as our shared institutions and judgments, those aspects of human
community that make our language use possible. We share not only the meanings of
words, but, as Cavell has said, connotations and denotations of terms; we share
understandings and conventions about language and what to do with words in certain
contexts. We are attuned to each other, and this establishes a shared place in which our
intentions work.
“Putting the Flame to the Fuse”—Anscombe and Austin, as well as Wittgenstein,
discuss intention in a general sense, as a phenomenon that occurs in myriad ways in
human consciousness and action. Cavell is aware of these different aspects of intention
and sometimes alludes to them. But in describing it as a flame to a fuse within the
institution of language, he is alluding to something more specific. He is referring to the
form it takes in a more limited context, the context of its connection to our language use.
Within this context, it is most like the third sense of intention that Anscombe describes:
it refers to the intention underlying or motivating such actions, in this case the action of
using language, in whatever form that might take.
As Wittgenstein has said, it is in language that we can mean something by our
words, and this reveals the directedness of intention in our language use. It is one
instance of that aspect of human agency that is revealed in human thought and action.
When we mean in language, when we use it, we intend. Intention is fundamental to our
language use, even when it appears to be absent. Our degree of awareness of it may vary
from occasion to occasion. Sometimes, we choose our words with great care, and
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consciously reflect on what we will say and how we will say it; such uses of language
reveal various levels of intention. At other times we speak so automatically or
unreflectively that we would have a hard time isolating any thought that went into the
words at all, even if they are entirely reasonable, we mean and accept them, and are
expressing complex or detailed ideas.
Such cases are clear examples of Wittgenstein’s recognition of the fact that
intention does not “accompany” speech as something that can be clearly separated out
from it, possessed of its own essence and function regardless of what flows from it.
Wittgenstein provides the insight, mentioned above, that intention, though it is such a
constitutive element of both thought and action, does not appear within them as a
phenomenon that is separable from them (neither does meaning): “Meaning is as little an
experience as intending . . . They have no experience-content. For the contents (images
for instance) which accompany and illustrate them are not the meaning or intending” (II,
xi), and, he says, “The intention with which one acts does not ‘accompany’ the action any
more than the thought ‘accompanies’ speech. Thought and intention are . . . to be
compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with
a tune” (II, xi).
To explain this point further, we could anthropomorphize the heart muscle and
compare this fundamental component of the circulatory system to intention. The heart
muscle appears “intentional,” constantly pumping blood, and exhibiting predictable states
(save for cases of injury or illness), but it is a subject for examination independent of the
blood it directs into other regions of the body. The heart muscle’s actual physical
attributes are separable from the blood it “intends” to pump. Intention within the context
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of language use is not like this; it is variable, and there is no fixed component there if we
go to look for it—much as Wittgenstein says we will demolish an artichoke if we go
looking for its essence and peel away its leaves until nothing remains: “In order to find
the real artichoke, we divested it of its leaves” (I, 164). At those times we speak
automatically—times in which, for example, we are talking without even being aware of
how our words came about at all—we are also behaving intentionally, but the intention
does not seem as clearly present, or, at any rate, the intention to say just that is not as
present. In these cases, the intentional use of language almost seems more like
improvisation or chance. They also resemble hard cases of intention that Anscombe says
are captured by the acknowledgment “I don’t know why I did it.” These instances of
language use may register as passive or the workings of an automaton, but in fact they
reveal how automatic, and sometimes unconscious, our language use becomes. (This
differs from the case in which speakers of different languages try to understand each
other, as just noted.) This does not mean it is not intentional.
But even if intention cannot be separated out from the workings of language, as
the actual heart muscle can be from the overall context of the circulatory system in which
it functions, intention is fundamental to language. The features of our language, such as
the words we share that exert the power Cavell describes over what we can mean, would
be inert elements of human existence without intention; without intention, as mentioned
above, language itself might not exist at all. Intentions quite literally light up those words
and make the spark of communication possible. We are the actors who put the flame to
the fuse, in Cavell’s term. In some way, intention may have constituted language. But
these phenomena are not identical. When a musician plays the violin, we do not say the
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music created is the intention, though playing the instrument is intentional. Our
investigation of language use may reveal generations of intentions that have hardened
into traces that other intentional actors recognize and accept. Anscombe and Austin
argue that our words can effect changes in the world. When words do this, they are often
a way of making intentions visible in the world.
The intentionality of our language use indicates our degree of control within the
institution of language. We are controlled by the meanings of words, our tools; but we
can use and combine those tools in ways that reflect our thoughts and agency. Our uses
of these tools often reveal our potential for originality and creativity, which are not
limited by the fact that the meanings of our words are shared. And sometimes our use of
a shared word begins to slip beyond established meanings and gather new ones. So we
are controlled by words, as Cavell would say, but our use of language is deeply
intentional, and this intentional use of language indicates our control of the process. In
explicating this phrase of Cavell’s, I reaffirm much of what I have been arguing about
language, meaning, intention, and the imagination.
Now, I can say all this, but I miss the power of Cavell’s way of putting it in doing
so. Cases of projection and metaphor can often convey ideas more effectively, indeed
speedily; they give voice to what we wish to say in a fashion that can be intellectually or
aesthetically satisfying, or both. Think of all the times we use the word “see” when that
is not what we are actually doing, but this is such a useful way of describing matters.
McGinn weighs in on metaphors, saying of them they “can be more or less apt, more or
less evocative, and so on,” and thinks this is to be expected, since the imagination plays a
role in their construction (135).
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Finally, it is significant that all of these philosophers use metaphors and other
figurative language repeatedly throughout their works (consider the image of the “rails to
infinity”). Max Black thought it distasteful to draw attention to a philosopher’s
metaphors, but I disagree. Wittgenstein constantly uses metaphors and analogies, often
visual and musical ones. Hans Sluga remarks on this aspect of the text, saying
Wittgenstein uses “a precise and stylish language, often with the help of surprising and
illuminating images and metaphors” (The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 29).
To consider just a few: in the Preface, he supposes it is possible his work might “bring
light into one brain or another” (xe) and calls his work an “album” that provides a
“picture of the landscape” that was left after he had pruned and rearranged much of his
“sketches.” When claiming that a search into the nature of “deriving” will cause the
concept to vanish, he uses the image of an artichoke, as mentioned above. In
emphasizing that we must adhere to everyday thoughts, rather than “subliming”
conceptions of knowledge that he argues “we are after all quite unable to describe with
the means at our disposal,” he says we must avoid fixing “a torn spider’s web with our
fingers” (I, 106) (a phrase Cavell alludes to in Must We Mean What We Say?—96). He
compares words to chess-pieces (I, 108), rule-followers to machines, the word
“language” to the word “invent” (I, 492), the endpoint of our justifications to bedrock,
and uses the term picture on so many pages of the Philosophical Investigations that its
use warrants an investigation of its own. A continual comparison is made between the
judgment involved in language and thought with that involved in music, which I am
emphasizing. He likens understanding a sentence to understanding music, as mentioned
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above. Language and music are alike too in the extent to which they can be competently
carried out without self-conscious reflection, as I emphasize.
It is worth considering the numerous metaphors Wittgenstein uses to describe
language itself. As we have seen, he likens it to a city. He claims the functions of words
are like tools in a toolbox—“The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of
these objects” (I, 11); next, he says they are like the features in the cabin of a locomotive
(I, 12), all with their different functions. He also says language “is a labyrinth of paths.
You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place
from another side and no longer know your way about” (I, 203). And it “is an
instrument. Its concepts are instruments” (I, 569).
Austin does this as well, referring to the “miner’s lamp” of intention and the
“sun” that is the discipline of philosophy, and Cavell’s work is redolent with metaphor.
He calls words “knives,” because they can have different uses. He and Austin both rely
on the imagery of flame or fire, as noted above. Cavell calls the “good city” and Plato’s
republic the “city of words”; in the book of that name, he compellingly likens
metaphysics to “a world of frozen meaning,” following Wittgenstein (Cities of Words,
109). And he compares the turned spade striking Wittgenstein’s bedrock to his pen
(Philosophical Passages, 178-179). McGinn enlists the metaphor of the “mind’s eye”
(41) (though he says that what we are doing when imagining is engaging in a kind of
“mindsight” that actually is not metaphorical) and disputes the idea that when we
imagine, we generate “replicas” of those objects we imagine which would “(fester) in the
souvenir shop of (our) imagination” (72). (He also quotes Frank Ramsey’s metaphorical
description of a belief as “a map by which we steer” [142].)
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Cavell sees in Wittgenstein’s work a connection between the image of
architecture and everyday life, noting the scenes of the builders at the beginning of the
Philosophical Investigations. The scene of the builders contains
(the) simple invoking of philosophy’s ancient sense, if not often thematized, of
intimacy between its aspirations and those of architecture, whether in Plato’s
descriptions of public spaces for philosophical encounter, or in Descartes’s and
Hume’s specification of private spaces for it; or in the pride Kant takes in what he
calls his architectonic . . . or in Heidegger’s identification, in his late essays, of
thinking as a kind of building and dwelling (from “Epilogue: Everyday
Aesthetics,” in the Cavell Reader, 375).
And Thomas Hobbes provides a powerful comparison between the gradual
workings of nature and the gradual workings of the senses:
As standing water put into motion by the stroke of a stone, or blast of wind, doth
not presently give over moving as soon as the wind ceaseth, or the stone settleth:
so neither doth the effect cease which the object hath wrought upon the brain, so
soon as ever by turning aside of the organ the object ceaseth to work; that it to
say, though the sense be past, the image or conception remaineth; but more
obscurely while we are awake, because some object or other continually plieth
and soliciteth our eyes, and ears, keeping the mind in a stronger motion, whereby
the weaker doth not easily appear. And this obscure conception is that we call
phantasy or imagination: imagination being (to define it) conception remaining,
and by little and little decaying from and after the act of sense (27).
Hobbes’s use of the term decaying is especially evocative.
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Such an overview confirms the aesthetic and cognitive value of metaphor for
these philosophers. It is noteworthy that in relying on them, they are often trying to
explain difficult philosophical matters, such as intention. In using figurative language in
these ways, they attempt to explain and get others to understand. They are engaged in
extending and sharing our knowledge, and this is a fundamental context in which
projection occurs.
The value of figurative language in conveying information is not restricted to
metaphor, though it is often metaphorical. This may indeed be one reason figurative
language developed. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says metaphors can set things before us,
make us see them. We marvel at this more and more the better the metaphors become.
Having explained how this imaginative process works when we project words
into new contexts, I finish by noting that it relies—in creation and in understanding—on
the type of judgment that Wittgenstein elucidates. We cannot consult a rulebook for this,
only the standards—indeed, the criteria—appropriate to our culture and forms of
knowledge. As mentioned above, Cavell points out arguments over aesthetic or political
matters may be different than arguments in logic and science. But he also says this
should not incline us to think arguments about aesthetics, morality, or politics cannot be
good arguments. The account of the projective imagination Cavell provides and I enlarge
upon is not an account of a phenomenon that is easily subject to empirical investigation
or, perhaps, logical deduction. We test its plausibility by age-old philosophical
methods—considering whether it is rational; considering, too, whether it accords with our
experiences, what we really feel to be the case. But this is enough. A theorem cannot
demonstrate the “matching aesthetic effort” it takes to analyze Wittgenstein (or
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projections). But we do not need that to judge such uses of words as Wittgenstein’s, and
our many projections, as apt.
This analysis also accords with something Anscombe says in Intention. There, as
Austin affirmed, she said it was about “what we are doing,” which can give an answer to
“Why?” questions. This account of the projective imagination supplies an explanation of
what we are doing when we project words, as well as why and how this is happening.
And when it does successfully work, it effects changes in the world—the “word-toworld” matter of fit.
The Distinction Cavell Draws Between Projection and Metaphor
As will be clear from what has been said above, the imaginative projection of
language works in a fashion similar to the way in which imagination informs metaphor,
at least in some respects mentioned above, but not only in those ways. It is also the case
that the way in which context can be primed for the projection of words is not unlike the
way in which contexts permit metaphor, and some projections are metaphors. When
these occur, they are frequently playing on recognizable similarities between contexts,
and Cavell says the phenomenon of projection often prompts the response “All language
is metaphorical.” (Cavell himself does not supply an argument for this, admittedly very
strong, claim; I do think he accepts and endorses the pervasive power of metaphor. It is
clearly a hallmark of his work.) However, here I take issue with what Cavell says.
He notes a difference between the two uses of language: “what is essential to the
projection of a word is that it proceeds, or can be made to proceed, naturally; what is
essential to a functioning metaphor is that its ‘transfer’ is unnatural—it breaks up the
established, normal directions of projection” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 189-190).65
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He is right to make a distinction between projecting a word and using metaphor.
Though they seem related to me, they are not identical. For one thing, not all projections
are metaphorical, and some projections may be metaphorical in one context, but not in
others—“run” is an example. But, though projection and metaphor can be distinguished,
I do not believe they can be distinguished as Cavell has described that here. Metaphor
does not proceed unnaturally, at least not in general. In this respect it is more like
projection than Cavell allows.66
What Cavell presumably means is that as we stretch out the meanings of our
terms in the course of language projection, this occurs organically (indeed, often invisibly
to many language users), whereas the frequently startling power of metaphor derives
from its tendency to require greater cognitive leaps both in creation and understanding—
and also allows it to be interpreted as metaphor, rather than just projection. To Cavell’s
way of thinking (as he expresses it here), we might see a new use of the term “art” or
“game” as quite unremarkably projecting those terms into new territories, yet the
language-games involved in such a metaphor appear much more novel, perhaps truly
unprecedented. The first case might be thought to involve variation within, or activity on
the periphery of, our form of life; the second might be thought to involve a whole new
stage in our language-games. The difference is recalled by the distinction we often draw
between uses of language we would consider pedestrian and everyday and those more
elevated and often deliberately aesthetic occurrences of words in our literary art forms.
We see a difference, clearly, between our ordinary use of greetings, requests,
explanations, and so on, and the works of Shakespeare Cavell analyzes (even if those
works may make use, in part, of just these ordinary words). Often something extra is
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posited of the literary context—we seek out structure, meaning, symbolism, and so on
that we do not ordinarily seek out when using language in non-literary contexts.
But I think Cavell is wrong to draw this distinction. For one thing, it is incorrect
as an account of projection and metaphor. Some projections could be “unnatural,” some
metaphors quite natural. The projection of “o.k.” into all its various locations must have
strained convention at one point or another, and “nokay” never even succeeded. And the
metaphor Cavell analyzes, “Juliet is the sun,” appears so natural as to be unremarkable.
Projection and metaphor may differ in that projection is a broader category than
metaphor, and the degree of self-consciousness required to create projections may be
lower. But there are many affinities between them. Projection and metaphor are alike, as
outlined above, in that they both involve (1) judgments of similarity in creation and
understanding, (2) inference, (3) innovations in language that often depend on existing
words and concepts, (4) paraphrasability, or “definability” of some kind, (5) the power to
be striking, educational, and generally effective in conveying points, (6) and also alike in
that they can become automatic (metaphors become dead metaphors). In fact,
projections, once ensconced in our language use, are precisely like dead metaphors.
Many expressions may have been figurative uses of language at one time, but have died
or become rote as they usefully filled multiple roles. Language changes, but it may be
possible to trace its development in just this way, and this may be why it can answer to
Emerson’s description of it in “The Poet”: it is “fossil poetry.” And both projection and
metaphor can be done “naturally” or “unnaturally.” It is therefore hard to mark a
distinction between them as sharply as Cavell does. Such a distinction is difficult to
draw, in any case, and both are likely proceeding from the same, or related, powers of
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linguistic imagination. I address points (3) and (4) below in more detail to stress that the
two uses of language are, unsurprisingly, more alike than might at first appear.
(3) Both projection and metaphor are innovations in language that nevertheless
depend on what has come before them. When we go back to examine the process by
which words were projected, or used metaphorically, after the fact of their use in this
way, we often find that the extension of the words reveals the new context “invites” or
“allows” such a language move. Thus, when describing the work of Robert Brandom,
Livingston points out that we are commonly able to engage in a type of explicitation of a
standard, after the fact of its use (Brandom uses the example of retrieving a principle
from our review of legal decisions—to use an example of Ronald Dworkin’s from Law’s
Empire, we might find the principle “we should not profit from our own wrongs”
underlying certain cases when we look back at a set of legal rulings). We can also
engage in this kind of explicitation following an instance of projection or metaphor, and
at least locate the reason the use of language (projective or metaphorical) occurred
(though, as Livingston points out, we need not do it, and we do not need to do it in order
to apply standards. He also thinks we probably cannot do this in all cases, at least not in
a way that will be indisputable, or obviously correct as an explication of what we
“implicitly” did in the first place).
Perhaps in some cases the similarities between contexts that make metaphor
possible are so difficult to discern (or require such leaps of creativity) as to seem
unnatural; but they do, in general, seem to traffic in what contexts “invite” or “allow.”
As with projection, that is part of their power.
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(4) And, crucially, and as described above, Cavell notes that metaphors can be
paraphrased. For example, in his account of “Juliet is the sun,” he says “Juliet is the
warmth of (Romeo’s) world; that his day begins with her; that only in her nourishment
can he grow” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 78-79). Would it be possible to draw out
the potential meanings of this metaphor if not for the fact that Juliet’s warmth is
relevantly similar to the sun’s, that she is part of the beginning of his day as the sun is,
that she nourishes him as the sun nourishes life, as Cavell says, and add in another
interpretation of our own—her position as center of Romeo’s existence is relevantly
similar to the sun’s position as center of the planets in the solar system? I doubt it. In
providing paraphrases of metaphors, we often are (even if inadvertently) calling attention
to the ways in which contexts are similar, even if not obviously so. It is also quite
natural, to use Cavell’s phrase, to do and recognize this. Indeed, if there were no
connections to make explicit between metaphors and their possible paraphrases, between
words and their meanings in the various contexts into which they are projected, these
aspects of our language use would be meaningless, incomprehensible. Suppose I devised
a metaphor (or projection of a term, though in this case I will use a metaphor) that is
difficult or impossible to comprehend—“The crane is a sun.” What do I mean by that? I
myself do not know, and chose the phrase for just that reason. But if I try to find a
meaning, I do so by considering the ways in which the words map relevant similarities
between contexts. Perhaps I mean “The crane (piece of equipment) is high in the sky,”
as, to our perception, the sun is. Perhaps I mean “The crane (a species of bird) is
gloriously or radiantly beautiful,” as, to our perception, the sun is. Searching for
potential meanings, we search for potential similarities between contexts, even in those
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cases where a metaphor is not clearly intended. (We would also need to know more
about the context in which the phrase is being used to know what kinds of similarities are
being invoked.) If we were to try to understand intentional uses of language that are
puzzling in any way, our first step might very well be to elucidate similarities between
contexts, to try to paraphrase them. We would have to link such uses of language to what
we know or can understand. And if we could not do this, what would language mean?
What would our paraphrases and metaphors mean? Cavell writes: “To understand a
metaphor you must be able to interpret it” (Must We Mean What We Say?, 172). It seems
plausible to me to suppose that, likewise, to understand a projection of a word, one must
be able to interpret it. (Nevertheless, it does not seem to be required that this
interpretation consciously take place—this might be a difference, at least of degree,
between metaphor and projection.)
This is hardly unnatural, though there are projections and metaphors both that
may strain our comprehension or our sense of what is acceptable within our languagegames. For example, which “reading” of my crane example is better? Are there other
options that would be better than both I have provided? (Clearly, context would inform
the choice of preferable “meaning.”)
Strain ourselves too far or too often, however, or append explanations at every
turn when we use language in these ways, and I submit that projection, and metaphor,
would no longer be what they are. We do not shout out words without our reasons, if we
wish to be meaningful; we do not make new noises or signs or write unprecedented
symbols, intending these as new uses of language, and expect others to understand us.
The connections are not always obvious, and that is part of the pleasure of the
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imagination in creating and discerning them. That does not mean the connections are not
there. Just as philosophers are beginning to rethink the previously enforced divisions
between imagination and inspiration, on the one hand, and rational thought on the other
(or the erroneous limiting of the occurrence of imagination and inspiration to certain
contexts), so we need to reconsider the extent to which projections, and metaphor, are not
arbitrary, but do indeed reinforce connections, and what is “invited” or “allowed” by new
contexts.
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CHAPTER 7
ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH/CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have provided a description of the imagination at play in our projection of
language. Our intentions in such contexts are frequently inspired, improvisational, and
constituted by our imaginations. And all of this is possible because of our shared criteria;
because of what we have learned, and what allows us to take our place in our various
forms of life. Surveying some facts about the history of language reinforces the idea that
projection—not only of words, but languages themselves—takes place because of the
convening of our criteria and our collective language use.
What can projection reveal to us about our cultures, our language use, our
understanding of our concepts and ourselves?
Projection demonstrates what we share, as well as what we do not. However, the
fact that we do not all speak the same language—that there have been thousands of them,
some radically different from one another—does not commit us to relativism about
human truth and knowledge. Much of our human life is shared; much has remained the
same throughout the centuries. Instead, this fact raises questions to continually examine
about how and why our languages and cultures diverge; who has been closest to the truth
at one point or another in history, and who has not; and what people have emphasized,
discarded, or never noticed.
It also demonstrates, according to what I have outlined, that such features of our
fluency in language occur after our process of initiation. Do we have to be initiated into a
language in order to make projections? Yes, I think we do. We cannot project unless and
until we are adept language users; we must have learned “how to go on,” as Wittgenstein
says. Once we have learned a language (and a world) and thus learned our words’
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implications, as Cavell put it, we can make further use of those tools. (Perhaps that is one
reason those learning a new language beyond their native tongue sometimes struggle with
the figurative elements of the new one.)
Projection demonstrates our enduring human interest and facility with figurative
language as well as our ability to grasp and appreciate this filigree of our communication.
It is illustrative; it is educational; it is beautiful, and there is more to be made, I think, of a
potential link between philosophy of language and philosophy of art on just this point.
Projection is a testament to the power of that finest of human gifts, the imagination, even
when it is not perceived or lauded as it should be, and further surveying philosophical
engagement with the subject of the imagination will remain an ongoing interest and
subject of research of mine. Perhaps it is even more interesting when it is combined with
our other intellectual powers, as projection in the case of our language use appears to be.
I find myself puzzling over a point of difference between Hobbes and Austin: is
Hobbes right to argue that words can stray far from their sources, when Austin does not
think they do? Also, Cavell has said that we learn the world as we learn language, but he
notices there can be a disconnect between the two, and Austin rightly argues that
sometimes we need to pry words off the world. How well do words and the world
match? The match must meet a certain benchmark of efficiency, if we are to get by in
language at all, and if, as Austin said, we generally avoid pulling in more language than
we need. But where does the match fall short, and what is revealed when it does?
I have mentioned that philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Austin
provide a positive program for further work in philosophy of language. Their claims
about language, truth, and meaning are salutary corrections to some influential work in
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that field. For one thing, they do not try to delineate a system of rules or intentions
responsible for our language use, beyond the “rules” or regularities provided by our
forms of life and criteria. They have presented views of language that are marked
improvements over two conceptions that have been historically significant. Their
considerations also support Pascal’s claim—custom is our nature.
But simply saying this can recall behaviorism and the criticisms rightly leveled
against it. Cavell’s work demonstrates that knowledge, in this field, is shadowed by
skepticism, a skepticism that we may not feel (or may not feel in the same way)
elsewhere. Perhaps we find ourselves at a point in the philosophy of language marked by
a retreat from structuralist conceptions of rules, but the advance toward a better solution
is not yet clear. Nevertheless, these philosophers have indicated promising directions for
investigators of language to pursue.
I am personally interested in something mentioned above—the different contexts
in which language occurs (writing, speaking, and so on)—and would like to further
pursue questions into these matters. I think such investigations will reveal the necessity
for a difference in the treatment of intention within those contexts of language. Here,
though, I think we may founder on the type of concerns that led Wittgenstein to break off
into silence. There may be no better explanation of the role intention plays in projection
than the one I provided above—words take on new meanings one person at a time. Are
there conditions that make this more likely than not? For example, does the aptness or
paraphrasability of a projection, or its appropriateness for a certain time and place, have
anything to do with the success of a term’s new meanings? At what point does the
potential new meaning of a word reach a critical mass of acceptance? Are the meanings
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or uses of words changing faster now than they ever have (at least in English)? Is
spelling lagging speech more than it used to (at least in English), and is technological
change one reason for this (it has certainly motivated language change in the past)? Is the
science of linguistics Austin envisioned possible, and can it answer questions like these?
Other, deeply mysterious questions remain, about the connection between the
projective imagination and the aspects of human life from which it develops. Where or
what is the projective imagination? Exactly what aspects of mind does it arise from, and
how? What is the relationship between our biological talents or tendencies, our interests,
and the prevailing aspects of culture and language that constitute our criteria and enable
us to project? Is there one, and if so, how does it relate to the diffuse forms of life that
provide material for the imagination? How will research in linguistics shed light on these
questions? Does language variation itself result from cultural or psychological variation?
Or is it the result of, or influenced by, certain genetic developments?67 How are the
inputs of our imagination working together? What exactly is the connection between
language and music?68 What light might the study of “new” languages—such as the sign
language developed in Nicaragua, and the Warlpiri rampaku of Australia69—shed on
these subjects? Is it the case that projection represents a transition between the “inner”
and the “outer” worlds that allow us to do it?
Just how widespread is the imagination in our general engagement with the world,
and how widespread are aesthetic and inspirational aspects of human life? I suspect they
are much more widespread than many philosophers have supposed. While McGinn’s
analysis of the imagination and its connection to language is sketched briefly and raises
some questions (for example, about what is “innate”), he provides an interesting
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affirmation of the importance and pervasiveness of the imagination. Cavell’s own work,
as well as Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s, provides a vivid example of the power of allusive
language to raise ideas and make philosophical points.
Some of these questions invite and deserve empirical investigation, and no doubt
that will reveal that projecting terms sometimes depends on prosaic factors: ignorance,
opportunity, shifts in interests, mistakes, and so on. But some projections depend on an
ingenious exploitation of possibility and great linguistic imagination. How is that
prowess developed, and how does it combine with what we learn and propagate in our
cultures?
I am also curious about the difference, or the gradience of difference, represented
by the “active” and “passive” constituents of imagination, as well as the degree of selfconsciousness that may mark the difference between metaphor and projection.
What difference would a globally shared language make to all of these matters?
We would have reached a development in human life that we have not, so far as we
know, ever encountered: human life not divided, and enriched, by different languages—
all those languages that (to link language again to music) have sounded so different from
one another, as much as their writing and their associated functions have differed.
Suppose English takes over, a possibility Ostler examines. If this does happen, what will
have happened to our human forms of life? Will we have reached an unprecedented
human common ground—overcome the perceived challenge presented by Babel? 70 What
will that mean for our intellectual endeavors, our judgments, our shared forms of life,
including philosophy? Will that indeed be a loss, as Crystal suggests? For, as Ostler
points out, the speaking of more than one language immeasurably enriches the lives of
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those who can do it (I certainly wish I could claim as much). So many languages do and
have accounted for so many forms of life, what we have found important enough to put
into our languages, and what we have missed—it is a shame not to know all this. A story
of Themistocles from Plutarch attests to the richness, to use Plutarch’s term, of language,
and to the power of inhabiting, for oneself, the universe each language represents:
(King Xerxes) gave Themistocles leave to speak his mind freely on Greek affairs.
Themistocles replied that the speech of man was like rich carpets, the patterns of
which can only be shown by spreading them out; when the carpets are folded up,
the patterns are obscured and lost; and therefore he asked for time. The king was
pleased with the simile, and told him to take his time; and so he asked for a year.
Then, having learnt the Persian language sufficiently, he spoke with the king on
his own . . . (Plutarch, Themistocles, 29.5) (quoted in Empires of the Word, 5).
I suspect that if we ever reach such a “common ground” of language, this will be
due to pragmatic and global developments in our use of it. We will lose much, no doubt.
We will gain, too, and it is impossible to say what the future could hold—what new
opportunities will open up for us. We will create new judgments, of that future and any
to come. The gradual nature of this process ensures a stability that often endures at least
for some period of time, even if it is not immutable. But we cannot count on it. Our
languages have their own ideas. In Must We Mean What We Say?, Cavell writes “one is
never sure what is possible until it happens” (73). And as I have been emphasizing, no
system of rules can guarantee what will happen, and what shape our languages will take.
But whatever that is, it will reflect past usage as much as present and future, our linguistic
memory as much as our fate, recalling some other lines of Eliot’s, from “Burnt Norton”:
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Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
Speaking of the past, in the early seventh century B. C. E., Ahiqar remarked, “For
a word is a bird: once released no man can recapture it” (“The Words of Ahiqar,” quoted
in Pritchard). Ahiqar not only provides an example, hundreds of years old, of the
tendency to invoke imagination, projection, and indeed metaphor in explaining this
feature of language. He also uses that example to describe how those words fly forward
to meet the judgments of the future, compelled by the power of our own, intentiondetermining, improvisational imaginations.
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ENDNOTES
1

The famous passage is as follows:
Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations.—
For someone might object against me: “You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of
language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of
language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts
of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself
most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language.”
And this is true.—Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I
am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word
for all,—but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this
relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all “language”. I will try to explain this (65,
31e).
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, cardgames, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say:
“There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see
whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that
is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat:
don’t think, but look!—Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships.
Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many
common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is
common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with noughts and
crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of
patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall
and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and
at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-aroses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have
disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; we
can see how similarities crop up and disappear.
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail
(66, 31e-32e).
He goes on to claim “I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family
resemblances’” (67, 32e).
2

“the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying
something” (6-7).
3

“Besides the uttering of the words of the so-called performative, a good many other things have as a
general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action. What
these are we may hope to discover by looking at and classifying types of case in which something goes
wrong and the act—marrying, betting, bequeathing, christening, or what not—is therefore at least to some
extent a failure: the utterance is then, we may say, not indeed false but in general unhappy. And for this
reason we call the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the
doctrine of the Infelicities” (14).
4

“When the utterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport to invoke is disallowed or is botched:
and our act (marrying, etc.) is void or without effect, etc. We speak of our act as a purported act, or
perhaps an attempt—or we use such an expression as ‘went through a form of marriage’ by contrast with
‘married’. On the other hand, in the Γ cases, we speak of our infelicitous act as ‘professed’ or ‘hollow’
rather than ‘purported’ or ‘empty’, and as not implemented, or not consummated, rather than as void or
without effect” (16).
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5

“Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech
situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act.
Moreover, comparing stating to what we have said about the illocutionary act, it is an act to which, just as
much as to other illocutionary acts, it is essential to ‘secure uptake’: the doubt about whether I stated
something if it was not heard or understood is just the same as the doubt about whether I warned sotto voce
or protested if someone did not take it as a protest, etc. And statements do ‘take effect’ just as much as
‘namings’, say” (139).
6

Paul Livingston explains that Austin and Gilbert Ryle were “ordinary language” philosophers who,
among other things, were interested in the “standard” and “non-standard” uses of words. In his 1953
“Ordinary Language,” Ryle says: “Learning to use expressions, like learning to use coins, stamps, cheques
and hockey-sticks, involves learning to do certain things with them and not others; when to do certain
things with them, and when not to do them. Among the things that we learn in the process of learning to
use linguistic expressions are what we may vaguely call ‘rules of logic’” (quoted in Philosophy and the
Vision of Language, 75), and his remarks recall Wittgenstein’s work in the Philosophical Investigations
and prefigure Cavell’s. Livingston points out that ordinary language philosophy was unfairly denounced as
“conservative” and “the cult of common sense” by Ernest Gellner in Words and Things, and this attack,
though unmerited, contributed to the present habit of viewing ordinary language philosophy as something
that has past. Livingston maintains instead that ordinary language philosophy practices are worthwhile and
could be (or are) very useful to the type of critical considerations we should undertake (76).
7

He also relates ordinary language philosophy to the work of Emerson and Thoreau. In This New Yet
Unapproachable America, he says Emerson and Thoreau “underwrite” ordinary language philosophy (79).
As an example, he claims “Thoreau is doing with our ordinary assertions what Wittgenstein does with our
more patently philosophical assertions—bringing them back to a context in which they are alive. It is the
appeal from ordinary language to itself” (The Senses of Walden, 92).
8

See Charles Petersen, “Must We Mean What We Say?” (http://nplusonemag.com/must-we-mean-whatwe-say). Petersen summarizes the argument of In Quest of the Ordinary as follows:
the logical positivists fled the world, attempted to create an artificial realm of absolute certainty,
scientific, where thought would be practically mechanical; the ordinary language philosophers,
then, returned to the ordinary, fleshy world in an attempt to bring out what their peers had left
behind; but the ordinary language philosophers did not quite return to the original, “ordinary”
world; rather, the encounter with the abstract, mechanical world changed the very experience of
the ordinary—made it appear in a new light, akin to looking at a flesh-and-blood human after an
encounter with an almost lifelike automaton; thus “the return of what we accept as the world . . .
(presented) itself as a return of the familiar, which is to say . . . the uncanny.”
He also notes that Cavell’s work is unusual because of its approach to the potential connections between
philosophy and literature: rather than approaching literature to find philosophical ideas in it, Cavell lets
them emerge from his own experiences with literature—lets them surprise him, as Petersen puts it.
9

The modern, academic, philosophical journal article could be problematic for a variety of reasons. The
article can be a quite remarkable expression of precise, impressive, and often subtle intellect, of course. It
can also be an example of just how far we can take human thought. But its current dominance may eclipse
the variety of other formats in which philosophy can take place, written and verbal, and drain its readers of
the wonder and excitement that bring many to philosophy in the first place.
10

See, for example, “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?” in Emerson’s Transcendental
Etudes.
11

There are at least two dimensions of “authority” here: (1) who is entitled to speak, and (2) for whom
they are taken to speak. In some cases, such as art criticism, we might have a restricted class of qualified
speakers, but in a sense they still speak for “all of us.”
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12

Cavell’s phrasing here does suggest a sense of doing something active, i.e., bringing together the criteria,
as if convening a group or a convention. This does underscore his sense of reflection on culture, culture as
we experience it. However, this is not inconsistent with my conviction that there is not necessarily an
actual meeting of people who decide explicitly on our criteria. For these criteria can appear to “come
together” or convene without anyone actually doing this—as zeitgeists somehow manifest themselves,
though people do not consciously (at least not always) set out to make them happen.
13

It does strike me personally as an old thought for an old world.

14

“Why does Austin at a certain stage invoke Euripides? What he says about Hippolytus is that instead of
acknowledging that the ordinary human being’s ordinary word is his bond, is binding, is given to another
being, Hippolytus wishes (as Austin seems to remember him) to use the fact that he said something without
meaning it to excuse his word from the status of a bond . . . This distinction between tongue and heart
represents for Austin a metaphysical dodge, or a deviously motivated attempt at one, between saying and
intending” (Philosophical Passages, 75-76).
15

“both genius and intending have to do with inclination, hence with caring about something and with
posture. Austin, in a seminar discussion at Harvard in 1955, once compared the role of intending with the
role of headlights. (This material is published under the title ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink.’) An
implication he may have had in mind is that driving somewhere (getting something done intentionally) does
not on the whole happen by hanging a pair of headlights from your shoulders, sitting in an armchair,
picking up an unattached steering wheel, and imagining a destination . . . Much else has to be in place—
further mechanisms and systems (transmission, fuel, electrical), roads, the industries that produce and are
produced by each, and so on—in order for headlights and a steering mechanism to do their work, even to be
what they are” (Transcendental Etudes, 96).
16

“(In linking W. C. Fields’s suffering of convention with Humpty Dumpty’s claim to be master, by his
very wishes, of what words shall mean (and thinking of his fate), I find I have not forgotten a passage
during the discussions of Must We Mean What We Say? the day I delivered it in 1957 (at Stanford, it
happens). Against a certain claim in my paper, one philosopher cited Humpty Dumpty’s view of meaning
(by name) as obviously, in all solemnity, the correct one. This was, I think, the first time I realized the
possibility that parody is no longer a distinguishable intellectual tone since nothing can any longer be
counted on to strike us in common as outrageous)” (Transcendental Etudes, 96).
17

Cavell and Austin both make use of the imagery of light or flames; Austin wonders if flames should be
understood as things or events.
18

As I have been explaining, Cavell discusses intention in the context of language. This is the setting in
which he assesses Hippolytus’s words and Austin’s interpretation of them. But Cavell’s work reveals (at
least implicitly) that intention may have different characteristics, and may function differently, depending
on the context of human agency in which it occurs.
Intention is deeply important to the workings of human thought, action, and behaviors such as artmaking, Cavell says. It is indispensable to our understanding of how they work: “The category of
intention is as inescapable (or escapable with the same consequences) in speaking of objects of art as in
speaking of what human beings say and do: without it, we would not understand what they are” (Must We
Mean What We Say?, 198). But, he says, in non-artistic contexts, intention differently functions as excuse
or justification, not as a celebration of the ability to intend at all, which is, he goes on to say, one of the
remarkable aspects of art. Intention is not an aspect of human life that will always reveal itself to our
investigations in the same way (as Wittgenstein emphasizes). And, as pointed out above, Austin claims it
is such a general feature of human action that we do not often characterize it in any particular way in our
language use, and we may not, he says, call attention to intention in our language unless we explicitly want
to claim we did not intend to do something.
19

A theory of meaning for language—words, sentences, or some combination of the two together?—is, in
my view, one of the most difficult subjects of analytic philosophy of language. I will not try to resolve that
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problem here beyond saying that I do not think it can be successfully done by hinging too much on
speakers’ intentions.
20

This type of view also raises problems about what exactly those intentions are, as well as when and how
they are in play when we use language.
21

“How new and unprecedented are modern forces of language diffusion? Do they share significant
properties with language spread in the past?
How will the age-old characteristics of language communities assert themselves? In particular,
can all languages still act as outward symbols of communities? And can they effectively weave together
the tissues of associations which come from a shared experience? Can each language still create its own
world? Will they want to, when science—and some revealed religions—claim universal validity?” (25).
22

The top twenty languages, catalogued by Ostler: Chinese (Mandarin), English, Hindi, Spanish, Russian,
Bengali, Portuguese, German (standard), French, Japanese, Urdu, Korean, Chinese (Wu), Javanese, Telugu,
Tamil, Chinese (Yue), Marathi, Vietnamese, and Turkish (526).
23

Ostler makes many fascinating comparisons between languages. He reflects on similarities of the
language careers of Egyptian and Chinese, seeing in their countries’ relatively large populations and selfimages the secret to the languages’ long endurance. He also sees parallels between Arabic and English:
“both have a written history of about one and a half thousand years, have been spread around the world by
speakers who often knew no other language, and have bodies of literature that freight them with
associations many centuries old” (521). He sees parallels, too, in the complacency and myopia of ancient
Greek and contemporary English speakers. And he explains how some languages may have more in
common than others they might not be expected to mirror in any way:
Persian—as a language—has far more in common with languages of Europe or northern India than
it does with Arabic or Turkish. Despite 1200 years of practice, the phonetic distinctions in Arabic
which Westerners find hard to master, s, z, t, d versus ṣ, ẓ, ṭ, ḍ, and alif versus ‘ayn, are difficult
for Persian speakers too. The Persian word for ‘is’ is still ast, like Latin est, German ist, Russian
yestʸ and Sanskrit asti (108).
Ostler emphasizes the aspects of culture that contributed to the spread or success of certain
languages, and adduces evidence of these aspects of culture in words themselves. For example, he notes
that the power of Gaulish derived at least in part from its technology—horse-drawn conveyances and
impressive ironwork. He says the history of the word “iron” demonstrates this: though “iron” derives from
different sources in Greek, Latin, and Celtic, the Germanic word for it comes from the Celtic, which we
would expect, according to Ostler, because the Celts may have contributed to the development of
ironworking in northern Europe. The Arabic term for a European in Eastern countries—feringī—reflects
the French presence in that part of the world once upon a time (407). The Akkadians developed a new
word for “scribe” (sēpiru) in place of ṭupsarru (“tablet writer,” from the Sumerian “dubsar”) after they
began using new materials for writing (ink with either leather or papyrus instead of tablets). (Interestingly,
Ostler reports that becoming a scribe in Egypt marked a pinnacle of professional achievement: “The
Egyptian scribe represented from the earliest documented times the acme of ambition. This is amply
confirmed by the kinds of texts that were copied in the scribal schools . . . In the Satire on Trades, the
scribe boasts ‘I have never seen a sculptor sent on an embassy, nor a bronze-founder leading a mission’”
[155-156].)
The world scene of language was vastly altered by European imperialism and the printing of
books in Europe. This ended the reign of Latin, and Ostler notes the interesting fact that the printing
industry was seen as overwhelming: “The tide of new, unfiltered, information was too much for some. In
France in 1535, King François I—briefly, and without effect—declared the printing of any books at all a
capital offence” (326). Printing also standardized, so to speak, or advanced the influence of certain
dialects: for example, Ostler points out “the main sources of book-writing in English, Oxford and
Cambridge, were also located in the same broad dialect area, often known as southern West Midlands”
(472).
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Ostler’s examination of English relates its astonishing ascendance over recent centuries. Its position may
be unprecedented: “Asked in 1898 to choose a single defining event in recent history, the German
chancellor Bismarck replied, ‘North America speaks English’” (xxi).
Yet it is a young language, and it is made up of the parts of many others. English only dates to the
fifth century C. E., and French, Latin, and Greek have supplied it with most of its terms. (Though it
contains many Norse terms, which constitute perhaps up to 7% of the language [Empires of the Word,
314].) But it is more like Chinese and Malay than other European languages. For example, English uses
subject-verb-object word order; it relies for its complexity on the arrangement of simple words; and its
verbs and nouns are rarely inflected (ibid., 476). It has also changed a great deal in its short time span.
“Mutual intelligibility has no doubt always been assured in each generation as between parent and child,”
Ostler writes, recalling Cavell’s account of how we learn languages, “but this is not enough to guarantee
that the language has stayed the same down the centuries. We can’t easily understand what was written in
English before the sixteenth century, and if we could hear their speech, we should probably have difficulty
with our ancestors in the eighteenth” (525).
And, significantly, its spelling lags in development behind speech. Ostler notes “spelling has not
been revised to keep up with changes in pronunciation” (476), likening this to the situation in Chinese: “As
a result of the complexity of relation between spelling and sound, a large proportion of the primary
teaching profession, in England at least, was until recently of the opinion that phonics are more confusing
than helpful when teaching children to read and write: hence the notorious ‘Look and Say’ method, which
essentially treated each word as if it were a Chinese character. As with Chinese, one can say that, for
learners, the English language has been literate too long” (476-477).
(As another marker of the difference between written and spoken language, Egyptian language
changed more drastically in its written, rather than its verbal, form. But that written form has no known
precedents. Arabic script, too, has been more widely adopted than its language [Empires of the Word, 97].)
Even in English, acceptance and understanding of dialect vary, with language users in the U. K.
demonstrating greater ease with a greater range of dialect than U. S. users of the language, who often dub
dialects even if they are variants of English (as we have done with Australian English and, often
embarrassingly, with African-American or Southern U. S. dialects).
But it has spread powerfully, so powerfully that many wonder if it is the language of the future,
the only one in which we will make judgments of future projections. How and why did this happen, and
how and why so fast? Ostler provides some explanation:
Amid the general splurge of galloping wealth creation, there was a particular surge in the power
and speed of communications. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed progress that was
unheard of, first in inventing, and then in speedily applying, all over the world, systems for
transport of people and merchandise. Perhaps even more impressive is the parallel progress made,
largely using electronics, in systems to transmit and store all sorts of information . . . Almost every
one of these new technologies was invented by a speaker of English—Stephenson, Fulton, Wright,
Bell, Baird, Edison—or by a speaker perhaps of another language who had to work in the Englishspeaking world . . . And even when they were not . . . it was English-speaking developers, such as
Henry Ford or the film-makers of Hollywood, who first demonstrated what could be done with the
new media on a truly vast scale. This inevitably meant that the key talk about these achievements,
how to replicate them and what was to be done with them, took place above all in English. For
scientists and engineers, but crucially for businessmen, English has been the language in which the
world’s know-how is set out. Never since cuneiform writing set up Akkadian as the diplomatic
language of the Near and Middle East has technology been so effective in spreading a language
(511-512).
25

“If what can be said in a language is not everywhere determined by rules, nor its understanding anywhere
secured through universals, and if there are always new contexts to be met, new needs, new relationships,
new objects, new perceptions to be recorded and shared, then perhaps it is as true of a master of a language
as of his apprentice that though ‘in a sense’ we learn the meaning of words and what objects are, the
learning is never over, and we keep finding new potencies in words and new ways in which objects are
disclosed. The ‘routes of initiation’ are never closed. But who is the authority when all are masters? Who
initiates us into new projections? Why haven’t we arranged to limit words to certain contexts, and then
coin new ones for new eventualities?” (The Claim of Reason, 180).
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For example, we do not imagine just how many stripes a tiger may have when we imagine a tiger.

27

“How do we know how much to suppose or imagine when we are asked to suppose or imagine
something? How do we know that some possibilities are relevant, serve only to flesh out the skeletal
context we have had drawn, whereas other possibilities would change the context sketched? . . . What will
be story enough to get someone to imagine what you invite him to consider is not fixed . . . To ask us to
imagine what we should say in a given situation, you will have to give enough story to rule out relevant
possibilities and avert whatever misunderstanding may or will arise. How much you will have to include
is, and need be, no more fixed than how much you will have to say or do to get someone to see what you
are pointing to . . . or to get someone to understand what you mean” (The Claim of Reason, 152).
28

“Projection” itself is the term for a category much broader than the phenomenon Cavell outlines (it
contains other, different kinds of mental states, including closely studied psychological phenomena
concerning our interactions with others). Projection is not always linked to imagination, either.
Nevertheless, when the two occur together, in the way Cavell describes, the phenomenon is distinctive for
its linking or connecting of contexts on the basis of their similarity, as I will describe.
29

“If the invitation to respond to imagined contexts can prepare or lead us to answers for such questions,
then it is, so far, a fully legitimate and revealing enterprise . . . The issue between (traditional and ordinary
language philosophy), so far as it concerns the appeals to what is ordinarily said . . . concerns the nature of
the sort of appeal to ordinary language which is relevant to philosophizing. The sort of appeal which I have
taken as relevant is . . . a way of reminding ourselves of our criteria in employing concepts. Just now I said
that the philosophical appeal to ordinary language essentially involves responding to imagined situations”
(The Claim of Reason, 153-154).
30

“But though language—what we call language—is tolerant, allows projection, not just any projection
will be acceptable, i.e., will communicate. Language is equally, definitively, intolerant—as love is tolerant
and intolerant of differences, as materials or organisms are of stress, as communities are of deviation, as
arts or sciences are of variation. While it is true that we must use the same word in, project a word into,
various contexts (must be willing to call some contexts the same), it is equally true that what will count as a
legitimate projection is deeply controlled . . . I might say: An object or activity or event onto or into which
a concept is projected, must invite or allow that projection; in the way in which, for an object to be (called)
an art object, it must allow or invite the experience and behavior which are appropriate or necessary to our
concepts of the appreciation or contemplation or absorption . . . of an art object” (The Claim of Reason,
182-183).
31

“any form of life and every concept integral to it has an indefinite number of instances and directions of
projection; and . . . this variation is not arbitrary” (The Claim of Reason, 185).
32

“that condition of stability and tolerance I have described as essential to the function of a concept (the
use of a word), can perhaps be brought out again this way: to say that a word or concept has a (stable)
meaning is to say that new and the most various instances can be recognized as falling under or failing to
fall under that concept; to say that a concept must be tolerant is to say that were we to assign a new word to
‘every’ new instance, no word would have the kind of meaning or power a word like ‘shoe’ has” (The
Claim of Reason, 185-186).
33

“Our ability to communicate . . . depends upon our mutual attunement in judgments. It is astonishing
how far this takes us in understanding one another, but it has its limits; and these are not merely, one may
say, the limits of knowledge but the limits of experience. And when these limits are reached, when our
attunements are dissonant, I cannot get below them to firmer ground. The power I felt in my breath as my
words flew to their effect now vanishes into thin air. For not only does (another) not receive me, because
his natural reactions are not mine; but my own understanding is found to go no further than my own natural
reactions bear it. I am thrown back upon myself; I as it were turn my palms outward, as if to exhibit the
kind of creature I am, and declare my ground occupied, only mine, ceding yours” (115).
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A cognitive strategy that is useful in contexts other than the projection of language, though there may
indeed be, well, similarities between those contexts and language. For example, in understanding other
people, or aspects of human nature, it can often be more helpful to focus on our relative similarities to them
than our differences. Could this be related to our tendency to affirm similarities in the use of language?
35

I will avoid trying to provide a comprehensive account of metaphor, as I have of intention and
imagination. As with those concepts, I restrict myself to discussing certain examples of the phenomenon.
Nevertheless, I will mention some important developments in the investigation of the theory of metaphor
and the views of three contemporary philosophers.
Theories of metaphor attempt to account for a way speakers or writers communicate one thing and
mean something else, or at least something more. This process is common in language and results in
relatively little confusion. Attempts to describe metaphor itself have not been so straightforward. It is
questionable whether metaphor is better understood as a subject for semantics (concerning the meaning of
words and sentences—A. P. Martinich, The Philosophy of Language, 4), or pragmatics (concerning what
speakers do with language). Semantics hooks meaning to truth and reference, while pragmatics examines
the kinds of acts speakers perform and is concerned not only with reference, but often context (ibid.).
Donald Davidson’s theory of metaphor is semantic, according to Martinich (413), because it is
concerned solely with meaning and does not address the context of use or intention (at least not directly).
The views outlined by John R. Searle and Martinich are pragmatic, because they describe meaning as a
product of speakers’ intentions and context.
Other major theories of metaphor have emerged which these philosophers examine; all attempt to
describe how metaphor works. Theories of ambiguity or additional meaning posit “new” or “extended”
meanings for words that occur in metaphorical settings. The interaction theory, advanced by Max Black,
among others, claims that there is an “interaction” between the literal and metaphorical semantic contents
(their “meaning,” once comprehended) of certain expressions. The simile theory proclaims that metaphor
really functions as simile with the “as” or “like” left out. Davidson, Searle, and Martinich find fault with
these common conceptions of metaphor, sometimes for similar reasons. Another problem of metaphor
involves determining just how such expressions can convey meaning, when they are often false or
nonsensical if taken literally. This problem is emphasized by the conviction that a person speaking
metaphorically is often speaking truly. Searle and Martinich account for this fact by enlisting various
strategies to draw out non-defective meanings for metaphors. But they, in addition to Davidson,
acknowledge that there can be literally truthful metaphors, and Martinich goes so far as to say that those
who insist that metaphor is false speech are being naïve. And Searle and Davidson mention that the context
can occasion language users to decide whether an utterance should be construed metaphorically.
Additionally, there are difficulties involved in determining just what exactly a metaphor does
mean. Martinich, Searle, and Davidson concede that there may not be only one suitable interpretation of a
particular metaphor.
Related to all of the issues raised in the examination of metaphor is, then, an interest in how it
works, because the way it works determines what it means (though certain metaphors may have more than
one meaning), and whether it is true. Searle, Martinich, and Davidson present well-taken criticisms of
other conceptions of metaphor, such as interaction and comparison theories.
36

Three steps can help one decide whether a metaphor is occurring, and what the meaning of that metaphor
might be: if, first, an utterance seems like a possible occasion for a metaphor (something would be wrong
with it if it were construed literally), so the context will suggest the (or an) appropriate method of
interpretation; second, the attribution in such an utterance of ‘S is P’ encourages one to specify how P is
intended to call R to mind (one must look for “salient, well-known, and distinctive features of P things”—
the “heart of the problem,” as Searle acknowledges—“Metaphor,” 423, 426), and finally, the list of
“salient” features must be narrowed down somehow to a range of likely meanings.
37

Hearers may seek these principles out if confronted with “obvious falsehood, semantic nonsense,
violations of the rules of speech acts, or violations of conversational principles of communication” (in the
last case, violations of Grice’s cooperative principle or conversational maxims, for example) (422). These
principles are not assertions of similarity; they only pave the way for constructions of assertions of
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similarity (which would require paraphrases, though paraphrases might not seem as meaningfully apt as
their metaphors). They do not cause any semantic content to “interact” with any other; they enable one to
move from comprehension to recognition of what is intended by a speaker. The three-part structure of
Searle’s analysis specifies the manner in which metaphor is recognized within comprehensible
communication; how it works (by enlisting strategies of interpretation that are probably not exhausted by
his list); and what it might mean (because presumably these principles enable one to restrict the range of
possible meanings). Searle believes he has avoided some of the difficulties facing comparison and
interaction theories because of this three-part structure, and he has crucially noted that metaphor must take
place within the context of speech acts communicable from speakers to hearers.
At the least, Searle thinks a theory of metaphor should address how, in saying “’S is P’”
(metaphor), “one can mean and communicate that ‘S is R’” (hopefully exhibited by a paraphrase) (412).
Metaphorical utterances differ from literal utterances not only because of their different uses of word or
sentence meaning, but because metaphorical utterances require an “extra element” of understanding: “the
utterance of an expression with its literal meaning and corresponding truth-conditions can, in various ways
that are specific to metaphor, call to mind another meaning and corresponding set of truth-conditions”
(412). Searle wishes to determine how this can happen and what is meant by “calling to mind,” itself a
metaphorical expression. He examines the weaknesses of other theories of metaphor—the comparison and
interaction views, and simile versions of the comparison theory. In Searle’s opinion, comparison theories
generally fail to clarify the distinction between a metaphor’s meaning and the inferential process that
results in its understanding, while semantic interaction theories confuse metaphorical meaning with
sentence meaning (locating the “semantic” content of a metaphor in the sentence on which it depends).
Searle thinks the comparison and interaction theories of metaphor are inadequate in outlining the
principles by which metaphor works—how it becomes possible to say ‘S is P’ and have that mean,
intelligibly, that ‘S is R.’ Searle thinks that the principle of “similarity” by which comparison theories
work is problematic, because apprehending a similarity between objects should be a part of generating and
interpreting metaphors, and not a concrete component of metaphorical meaning.
In the case of semantic interaction theories, Searle points out that although a speaker’s utterance
can occasion a change in meaning, that change does not take place in the literal definitions of the words
used. The change or different use is speaker’s utterance meaning, not sentence meaning. And he notes, as
Davidson does, that if a lexical change did occur in words used in a metaphorical context, what we take to
be metaphor would no longer occur, but would be a case of “new” or “extended” uses of words (“. . . it is
only because the expressions have not changed their meaning that there is a metaphorical utterance at all”
[413])—in fact, such a situation characterizes projection, or dead metaphor.
Semantic interaction theories also emphasize that metaphors must occur within “literal uses of
expressions,” because they supposedly operate according to the “interaction” between literal and
metaphorical meaning. In such cases, metaphorical meaning is suggested by the literal meaning of the
words used. But Searle argues that the assumption that “all metaphorical uses of expressions must occur in
sentences containing literal uses of expressions” (415) is incorrect. Mixed metaphors, for instance, do not
occur in these contexts. In Searle’s example “The bad news congealed into a block of ice,” the words are
being used figuratively, not literally, to posit metaphorical meaning. (Presumably context would suggest
that the expression should be interpreted metaphorically, otherwise it would probably be
incomprehensible.) Additionally, the idea of an “interaction” between literal and metaphorical meaning is
itself a dubious or metaphorical idea and sounds, to me, like a vague reference to some aspect of the
inferential process.
The view of metaphor as an elliptical simile is also unsuccessful, according to Searle, because a
statement of similarity cannot account for the way in which one moves from ‘S is P’ to ‘S is R.’ A strategy
for interpretation is necessary to specify which properties are being “called to mind” in a metaphor, but the
similarity theory is inadequate because it cannot specify these properties and the way in which they are
allegedly similar.
38

“This equivocation of names maketh it difficult to recover those conceptions for which the name was
ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the drift, and occasion,
and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves; but also in our own discourse, which being
derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth not unto us our own conceptions”
(Human Nature, 37).
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I think there is, but I have a hard time saying more about it than what I am saying here.

40

Some concepts cover instantiations that are more central to the term than others. Painting is a paradigm
example of a core “art”; gardening has not been.
41

How would a language that was constrained by a fixed code look different from our own actual ones?
For one thing, it might more obviously employ deliberate intentionality. It might also resist the kind of
change that natural languages exhibit.
42

I leave aside the difficult question of whether some comprehension can be so immediate that it is not
really inference at all, but more like perception. I think much of projection, and metaphorical
understanding, is inferential.
43

Inference and context determine whether an utterance is metaphorical and possesses meaning, whether it
is true or false or indeterminate in truth value. And when the terminology of speech act theory—
“speakers,” “hearers,” audience, intentions, and so on—is used in discussing the meaning of metaphors, I
do not think it should be used to specifically presume actual persons or intentions or occasions of use, but is
adopted to reflect a way of comprehensibly explaining the understanding of metaphor as a communicative
endeavor that relies upon unmetaphorical lexical definitions.
44

Davidson says that intimation is not meaning; nor is intimation peculiar to metaphor; but I would argue
that intimation, understood as the inferential endeavor that makes projection and metaphor possible, makes
meaning.
45

He also says “they shall conjecture best, that have most experience” and says that older people are better
at this than younger: “they remember more; and experience is but remembrance” (33).
46

In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Richard Rorty makes a contribution to philosophy that is not
incompatible with those of Wittgenstein and Cavell: among other things, he argues that the foundationalist
picture of philosophy is wrong. Rorty argues that within philosophy of language, Davidson’s work refutes
the conception of the “intrinsic nature” of language; it is, instead, contingent, Rorty claims (9).
Rorty also argues that literature offers more resources for certain philosophical projects than
philosophy itself currently does. (In a well-chosen example, he discusses how the fine work of Vladimir
Nabokov calls our attention to human absurdity and wickedness.)
47

Robert Hendrickson, The Facts on File Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins, 4th ed. (New York:
Checkmark Books [Infobase Publishing], 2008).
48

It is interesting that this trend may reverse the pattern much language use takes—moving from speech
into writing.
49

McGinn muses, “I can’t help reflecting how neglected consciousness was until recently. Will
imagination receive the same kind of belated recognition?” (198, n. 5). His book involves explaining all
the ways imagination functions in and enriches our lives, and elevating the investigation of the imagination
to its rightful level: “Imagination needs to be given more credit in any account of the human mind. In this
book I have tried to give it the recognition it deserves” (163).
It remains to be seen whether imagination will undergo such a reappraisal, though this project is
intended to support such an aim. And, if it does, it remains to be seen whether its results will support
McGinn’s view. The imagination is a suggestive and rich concept that may well have the resources to
explain, and contain, the various phenomena of our mental lives with which McGinn links it.
50

“the imagination is the combinatorial faculty par excellence; its facility in producing newly envisaged
possibilities is perfectly suited to the generation of new acts of understanding . . . imagination is in its
element in the production of representations of possibilities. The productivity of imagery is the sensory

239

precursor of such productive cognitive imagination, and it may well be this property of imagery that
encouraged earlier theorists to advocate an imagistic view of meaning; if so, they were onto something
sound, even if images are not the right imaginative products to invoke” (151).
51

“The role of imagery in science is also well attested: see Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the
Mathematical Field. To me this shows that we never quite leave imagery behind, even in the most abstract
and sophisticated of pursuits. (I suspect that images play a significant role in shaping philosophical
opinions.)” (198)
52

“It is the impressive motility of images that suggests their affinity to meaning, not their phenomenal
character” (194).
53

Here, McGinn is using “imagination” solely in the sense of “visual imagery,” thus discussing something
different, more specific, from some of the phenomena that Cavell and Wittgenstein call “imagination.”
54

A distinction that might not ultimately make sense; it might “bog down,” as Austin would say, upon
closer examination.
55

Much of the philosophical literature focuses on the visual aspect of imagination, but imagination clearly
makes greater use of other perceptual inputs than the visual, and this is true of language. For example,
auditory imagination is compelling and deserves more attention than it has received, not only in its own
right, but in connection to language. Within language, as I am pointing out, we see traces of not only visual
but other kinds of cognitive imaginative work. And many philosophers discuss the imagination in relation
to aspects of thinking that are not visual. (For example, Cavell suggests, as explained above, we
“suppose,” and this does not necessarily involve visual imagery.) There is also fascinating crossfertilization between such domains as the visual and the auditory and the imagination’s interaction with
them. Some philosophers mention both: in “Imagination and Perception,” P. F. Strawson alludes to “a
picture in the mind’s eye or . . . a tune running through one’s head.” Wittgenstein appears to recognize this
in his intriguing linkage of music and voice.
Music is not only a product but a stimulant to creativity, and it seems reasonable to suppose that
the human affinity for sounds demonstrated by our often profound attachment to music is playing a role in
the projection of our terms. We hear language; we speak it to be heard. Indeed, music is frequently an
extension of our speech made beautiful. This is not to discount our other perceptual inputs. I accept that
visual imagery is no doubt playing a major role in our language use. And I realize not all language is
spoken or heard (what light might sign language shed on these issues?). Also, no doubt many adjustments
in our language are coming from written language; the use of acronyms and the proposed eventual
shortening of “o.k.” to “k” (and “o.k.” itself) may be influenced by, or coming from, writing. Language is
complex, it takes many forms, and all those ways in which we use it affect our projection of it.
We get our word “barbarian” because the Greeks thought the non-Greek tongues around them
sounded like “bar,” “bar.” In this note in the history of language, I see confirmation of how important what
we take from our aural surroundings can be for our use and projection of language. Onomatopoeia may
derive its power from this aspect of the projective imagination. “Trick or treat” is another case—a phrase
that originated in mystery and spread elsewhere and yet, in its legacy, is called out, heard.
56

Cognitive Linguistics 1, Issue 1 (2009): 99-150. The article begins with the sentence “The hardest things
to observe are those which one sees every day.” Also see Floyd Ratliff, “On the Psychophysiological
Bases of Universal Color Terms,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 120, No. 5 (1976).
57

See, for example, Merritt Ruhlen’s work in two books from 1994, On the Origins of Languages: Studies
in Linguistic Taxonomy (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994), and The Origin of Language:
Tracing the Evolution of the Mother Tongue (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994). In the latter
book, Ruhlen argues “Human language came into being just once . . . all languages that now exist (or ever
have existed) are (or were) altered later forms of this original language.” Also see Quentin D. Atkinson’s
recent Science publication, “Phonemic Diversity Supports a Serial Founder Effect Model of Language
Expansion from Africa” (Science 332, no. 6027 [2011]), and Nicholas Wade’s review of this research in the
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New York Times. In Wade’s article, biologist Mark Pagel is quoted as saying language “retains a signal of
its ancestry over tens of thousands of years” and claims language is one reason we became so dangerous.
58

Which is not to suggest it cannot be equally difficult to access or develop the imagination in the context
of the other arts—and, as with language, one reason for this difficulty may on occasion be increased age.
59

Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

60

The hypnogogic imagery we occasionally experience (in this “passive” way) is also pleasant, but why?

61

Consider Emerson’s remark, quoted by Cavell in Transcendental Etudes: “The deeper (the scholar)
dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he finds, this is the most acceptable, most
public, and universally true.”
62

It can also cause problems. Feminist philosophers of science have undertaken careful evaluations of
metaphor, for example, lamenting the (sometimes inaccurate) imagery used to describe the process of
reproductive fertilization.
63

Examples can be found in the works of E. D. Hirsch, Jr., and Larry Alexander. See Hirsch’s Validity in
Interpretation and, as an example of Alexander’s, his work with Saikrishna Parakash, “Is That English
You’re Speaking?”: Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility” (San Diego Law Review 41
[2004]).
64

Perhaps they also begin to recede as our thoughts and our knowledge move from explication in language
to gesticulating, to losing voice; to inferences that move at a speed rendering language frustrating or
unnecessary.
65

“in this, these uses are like metaphorical ones. Such uses have consequences in the kind of understanding
and communication they make possible. I want to say: It is such shades of sense, intimations of meaning,
which allow certain kinds of subtlety or delicacy of communication; the connection is intimate, but fragile.
Persons who cannot use words, or gestures, in these ways with you may yet be in your world, but perhaps
not of your flesh. The phenomenon I am calling ‘projecting a word’ is the fact of language which, I take it,
is sometimes responded to by saying that ‘All language is metaphorical’. Perhaps one could say: the
possibility of metaphor is the same as the possibility of language generally, but what is essential to the
projection of a word is that it proceeds, or can be made to proceed, naturally; what is essential to a
functioning metaphor is that its ‘transfer’ is unnatural—it breaks up the established, normal directions of
projection” (The Claim of Reason, 189-190).
66

Now, in Cavell’s discussion of metaphor and some of the remarks about it he uses, drawn from literature,
I detect an uneasiness about paraphrasing metaphors, because it seems as if doing this to them will destroy
their unique nature. In fact I think this may be partly responsible for the view that metaphors cannot be
paraphrased. I would like to raise some questions about this: does Cavell share this unease? And is the
paraphrase of a metaphor so different from other kinds of paraphrase that are possible? If so, how?
Also, Cavell believes the “and so on” of metaphorical paraphrase distinguishes it from simile, and
says that, though metaphors function like idioms in that they rely on standard dictionary meanings of words
to accomplish something else, they are not like idioms, because (1) we do not have to explain idioms, (2)
idioms are found in the dictionary, and metaphors are not, which means we can catalogue idioms, but not
metaphors, (3) providing the meaning of an idiom is like translation, (4) metaphors are “wildly” false,
idioms only “quite false”—they can actually happen; people can “fall flat on their faces.” (Additionally, as
Livingston points out, we can make up metaphors spontaneously; we cannot do this with idioms.) Also,
some other uses of figurative language (in Cavell’s example, Hart Crane’s “The mind is brushed by
sparrow wings”) cannot be paraphrased or explained at all.
Should we accept these points? I question the distinction Cavell draws between idiom and
metaphor, as I question his distinction between projection and metaphor. Idiomatic uses of language are
not always so simple; metaphors are not always so complex. For that matter, I also question the reason he
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gives for the difference between metaphor and simile. Granted there is something unique about
paraphrasing a metaphor, but is the process really so far from defining or (especially) giving a rendition of
a simile?
67

Daniel Nettle provides an overview of three theories of linguistic evolution. The first, the “chance”
theory, postulates “there is a set of all language configurations consistent with the properties of the human
mind, and where on that landscape a particular language moves is a random walk” (“Language and genes:
A new perspective on the origins of human cultural diversity,” 10755). He says this does not mean all
language possibilities will or can occur, and one reason for this is psychological “cost”: to take one case,
he writes “it has been hypothesized that word orders where the object of the sentence routinely precedes the
subject impose” such costs (Ostler, as mentioned, provides a related type of example). This theory does not
suppose there is a genetic connection between language users and whatever language they happen to speak.
Another possibility: “ecological or demographic parameters with linguistic parameters.” Here, Nettle cites
the following interesting research:
languages spoken in warm climates tended to use more sonorous combinations of sounds
(essentially, more vowels and fewer consonants) than languages spoken in cold climates.
Languages with more sonorous sounds require lower speech volume at a given distance. The
argument of Fought et al. is that in warm climates, more conversation occurs outdoors where there
is more background noise, more sound dispersion, and greater interpersonal distances. This
creates a context wherein innovations that increase sonority are more likely to be retained than
they would be where conversation mainly occurs indoors (10755).
And then he introduces the third approach, new research by Dan Dediu and D. Robert Ladd. Their work
attempts to show that two genes, apparently still evolving, may play a role in language development: “the
likelihood of a language employing tonal contrasts . . . is strongly influenced by allele frequencies for these
two genes in the population of speakers” (10755-10756).
Dediu and Ladd introduce this research with a summary of language that is not incompatible with
the major points of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell:
Human populations are diverse both genetically and linguistically, through interpopulation
differences in allele frequencies and in the variety of languages and dialects they speak. In
general, any relationship between these two types of diversity merely reflects geography and past
demographic processes, not genetic influence on language behavior. It is indisputable that normal
infants of any genetic makeup can learn the language(s) they are exposed to in the first years of
life, so we can assume with considerable confidence that there are no “genes for Chinese.”
Nevertheless, it is well accepted that there is widespread interindividual variation in
many aspects relevant for language (developmental delays, differences in second-language
learning aptitude, discrimination between foreign speech sounds, recognition of words in noise,
and differences in short-term phonological memory correlated with different syntactic processing
strategies). It is also accepted that this variation can be partially attributed to genetic factors, most
probably through a “many genes with small effects” model including both generalist and specialist
genes. There are also heritable aspects of brain structure in general, and language-related areas in
particular.
It is therefore likely that there are heritable differences of brain structure and function that
affect language acquisition and usage. These differences may have no obvious behavioral
consequences in the nonclinical population; under ordinary circumstances, all normal speakers and
hearers perform “at ceiling” on many language-related tasks. Moreover, no one doubts that all
normal children acquire the language of the community in which they are reared. Nevertheless, if
differences in language and speech-related capacities are variable and heritable and if the genes
involved have interpopulation structure, it is likely that populations may differ subtly in some of
these aspects, and that differences between populations could influence the way languages change
through cultural evolution over time.
It is generally acknowledged that the process of language acquisition plays a major role
in historical language change: language acquirers construct a grammar based on the language they
hear around them, but the constructed grammar is not necessarily identical to that of their models,
and the cumulative effect of such small differences over generations leads to language change. It
follows that cognitive biases in a population of acquirers could influence the direction of language
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change across generations. These biasing effects could result in linguistic differences between
populations, producing nonspurious (causal) correlations between genetic and linguistic
diversities. Computer simulations support the idea that such biases could influence the structure
of languages emerging over many generations of cultural change, and mathematical models
suggest that, under appropriate conditions, extremely small biases at the individual level can be
amplified by this process of cultural transmission and become manifest at the population level.
We propose that the linguistic typology of tone is affected by such a bias. Human
languages differ typologically in the way they use voice fundamental frequency (pitch)
(“Linguistic tone is related to the population frequency of the adaptive haplogroups of two brain
size genes, ASPM and Microcephalin,” 10944).
68

See, for example, “Tone Language Speakers and Musicians Share Enhanced Perceptual and Cognitive
Abilities for Musical Pitch: Evidence for Bidirectionality between the Domains of Language and Music,”
which begins “A rapidly growing body of empirical evidence suggests that brain mechanisms governing
music and language processing interact and might share an important link with respect to their underlying
neurophysiological processing” (1).
69

Warlpiri rampaku (Light Warlpiri) is discussed in “The role of multiple sources in the formation of an
innovative auxiliary category in Light Warlpiri, a new Australian mixed language,” by Carmel
O’Shannessy (Language 89, No. 2 [2013]).
70

Which, Ostler remarks, is interesting as an example of a threat to human understanding, because it
involves Babylon at a time when its citizens actually relied heavily on one language (Akkadian, giving way
at the close of the empire to Aramaic). But if bilingualism and cosmopolitanism are high in a society, is
there any threat? Such a culture may be undaunted by a multitude of languages thrumming within it.
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